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ABSTRACT
THE MONEY-MOVING SYNDROME
AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN AID
BY
NARA FRANÇOISE KAMO MONKAM
May 10, 2008

Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation examines in depth one of the potential causes of the low
performance of foreign aid; in particular, the role incentive structures within international
donor agencies could play in leading to “a push” to disburse money. This pressure to
disburse money is termed as the “Money-Moving Syndrome”. In this dissertation, the
“Money Moving Syndrome” exists when the quantity of foreign aid committed or
disbursed becomes, in itself, an important objective side by side or above the
effectiveness of aid.
The theoretical analysis relies on the principal-agent theory to explore how donor
agencies’ institutional incentive systems may affect the characteristics of an optimal and
efficient incentive contract and thus give rise to the “Money-Moving Syndrome”. We
adapted the basic framework developed in Baker (1992) to fit the organizational settings
of international development agencies. The model concludes that the extent to which a
performance measure based the amount of aid allocated within a specific period of time
would lead to the “Money-Moving Syndrome” and affect aid effectiveness depends on
x

the level of institutional imperatives for survival and growth, the degree of aid agency’s
accountability for effectiveness, the level of corruption in recipient countries and the
degree of difficulty to evaluate development activities.
Due to data unavailability regarding other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies,
the empirical framework tests several predictions of the theoretical model by examining
whether money moving incentives affect World Bank’s decisions regarding project loan
size in developing countries. Overall, the empirical results suggest that there seems to be
some degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” in effect within the World Bank.

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

If you spend your own money on yourself, you are very concerned about how
much is spent and how it is spent. If you spend your own money on someone else,
you are still very much concerned about how much is spent, but somewhat less
concerned about how it is spent. If you spend someone else's money on yourself, you
are not too concerned about how much is spent, but you are very concerned about
how it is spent. However, if you spend someone else's money on someone else, you
are not very concerned about how much is spent or how it is spent.
Friedman, White House ceremony in his honor May 9, 2002

Aid ineffectiveness, defined as the low performance of aid in promoting economic
growth and reducing global poverty, is a problem utterly complex, prevalent and
unfortunately still unresolved. For decades now, it has generated a huge literature
reaching conflicting conclusions as to the justifications of aid, the impact of aid on
growth and institutional reforms, and the role of economic and political institutions in aid
effectiveness. Western countries, international donor agencies, recipient countries, and
other agents in the aid delivery chain have been pondering why, after $2.2 trillion of
official development assistance transferred to developing countries since 1960 and in
spite of countless reform approaches (such as Financial Gap Approach, Sectoral and
Structural Adjustments, Poverty Reduction Strategies, the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative, and so on), many aspects of the performance of international
development assistance yet appear dismal.1
In the discourse of foreign aid, the potential causes of the shortcomings of
development assistance to promote economic growth and self-sustainability in poor

1

See review of literature on aid effectiveness in chapter two of this dissertation.
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countries appear to be manifold, ranging from weak policies and institutions in recipient
countries to problems within the donor agencies themselves.
The goal of this dissertation is to examine in depth one of the potential causes of
the low performance of foreign aid; in particular, the role incentive structures within
international donor agencies could play in leading to “a push” to disburse money. This
pressure to disburse money is termed as the “Money-Moving Syndrome.” In this
dissertation, the “Money-Moving Syndrome” exists when the quantity of foreign aid
committed or disbursed becomes, in itself, an important objective side by side or above
the effectiveness of aid.
A fundamental reason to limit the scope of this dissertation to institutional
framework within donor agencies is that without this transfer of funds to developing
countries, there would be not much “foreign aid.” If the objective is to maximize the
effectiveness of aid, it would appear essential to enhance the design and objectives of aid
resources at the source, i.e., at the stage where the funds originate with donors, before
considering the causes tainting aid in recipient countries.2
The overall motivation for this dissertation is to uncover to what extent the
“Money-Moving Syndrome” (thereafter MMS) may be one major handicap of foreign aid
effectiveness and to what extent this syndrome may shape other incentives at the macro
and micro levels of the aid delivery chain. In short, donors’ incentives to “move the
money” may potentially hinder their genuine intentions to help poor countries, rendering

2

Of course, the misuse of aid funds by recipient countries is an equally deserving aspect of aid
effectiveness. However, this dissertation does not address this aspect. See Boone (1996), Klitgaard (1991),
World Bank (1998), Lancaster (1999), Svensson (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002), and Transparency
International (2007) for a discussion of these issues.
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these efforts ineffective and possibly in some cases, making an already deplorable
situation in developing countries worse.
The theoretical analysis relies on the principal-agent theory to explore how donor
agencies’ institutional incentive systems may affect the characteristics of an optimal
incentive contract and thus give rise to the Money-Moving Syndrome. Additionally, the
model derives conditions required to reach an efficient outcome in terms of the impact of
aid on poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. We adapted the basic
framework developed in Baker (1992) to fit the organizational settings of international
development agencies. In the theoretical model, we assume that, given the difficulty to
quantify the overall impact of aid, an aid agency that values its true mission to alleviate
poverty and is concerned about organizational imperatives may choose to evaluate staff
performance based the amount of aid allocated within a specific period of time. However,
the extent to which this performance measure would lead to the “Money-Moving
Syndrome” and affect aid effectiveness would depend on the level of institutional
imperatives for survival and growth, the degree of aid agency’s accountability for
effectiveness, the level of corruption in recipient countries and the degree of difficulty to
evaluate development activities.
Due to data unavailability regarding other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies,
the empirical framework tests several predictions of the theoretical model by examining
whether money moving incentives affect the World Bank’s decisions regarding project
loan size and how these incentives may directly or indirectly affect the effectiveness of
aid resources. In this dissertation, we posit that evidence in support of the “MoneyMoving Syndrome” can perhaps be used to provide some evidence as to why foreign aid
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has not been more effective at reducing global poverty in developing countries despite
the large amount of resources involved in achieving this mission over the years. Overall,
the empirical results suggest that the quantity of foreign aid committed or disbursed
appears as important a mission as the effectiveness of aid, suggesting that there seems to
be some degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” in effect within the World Bank.
However, since the empirical analysis especially focuses on the World Bank’s
development activities, the scope of the findings and conclusion would be somewhat
limited because although the World Bank is one of the world’s largest sources of funding
to the developing world, there are yet a multitude of other donors in the development
scene.
At this stage, it is important to mention that the intent of this study is not to
identify who to blame for the ineffectiveness of foreign aid; the objective is rather to help
demystify an undermining problem. No doubt, behind the ineffectiveness of international
aid lie the many problems of recipient countries. However, examining the poor
performance of the bureaucracies of developing countries is beyond the scope of this
study. Thus, the contribution of this dissertation will not necessarily solve the problem of
aid ineffectiveness. The scope of this dissertation is also limited to official aid as opposed
to private contributions;3 i.e., we focus on money specifically coming from donor
countries’ governments and channeled through bilateral and multilateral development

3

For instance, according to the USAID (United States Agency for International Development), the U.S.
government provides today only 20 percent of U.S. foreign aid whereas American citizens and corporations
provide 80 percent. In 2003, the official development assistance amounted to $16.3 billion while estimates
of private contributions amounted to 62.1 billion (Kerlin 2006).

4

agencies, as well as money mobilized by multilateral organizations on international
capital market.

Background
There are two types of aid from developed countries to developing countries: the
Official Development Finance (ODF) and the Official Development Assistance (ODA)
also called “foreign aid,” which is a subset of ODF. The ODA, essentially destined to the
poorest countries, is constituted of grants and concessional loans containing at least a 25
percent grant component. The ODF encompasses all the inflows of finance to the
developing world coming from donor countries and multilateral agencies. This financing
is often done at interest rates close to those available on the market (World Bank 1998).
Foreign aid is administered by either bilateral aid agencies, such as the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom’s Department for
International Development (DFID), or multilateral aid agencies, such as the World Bank,
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the Regional Development Banks (the African Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank), the European
Commission (EC), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and so on.
Today, foreign aid appears as necessary as ever, although not a panacea. In a
context of a thriving global economy, over a billion of people around the world are still
afflicted by extreme poverty, living with less than a dollar a day (UNDP 2005). The 2005

5

World Bank annual report recounts that over 115 million children in developing countries
are not educated, maternal mortality amounts to 10,000 women every week, 10.4 million
children die every year before their fifth birthday, and more than 8,000 people die every
day of AIDS. Even today, malaria has still not been brought under control and continues
to kill over 1.1 million people every year. In addition, basic services are lacking; 1.4
billion people in poor countries do not have access to potable water, and 3 billion of them
live without electricity (World Bank 1998, 2006).
In the face of such a gloomy reality, many international development agencies
have made their overall mission to promote economic growth and eradicate global
poverty, generally attempting to do so through the stimulation of democracy, economic
and political independence, environment protection, institutional environments, political
stability, and so on. These goals have been incorporated into the “raison d'être” of many
of these organizations. For instance, the World Bank states that its mission is “to fight
poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results”;4 the first Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) adopted by 189 countries in the United Nations Millennium
Declaration in September 2000 is to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by 2015”;5
the Asian Development Bank’s vision is “a region free of poverty” and is similar to the
African Development Bank’s mission to “combat poverty and improve the lives of people
on the continent”;6 however, eliminating poverty is not the only objective in the agenda

4

The World Bank’s mission statement, available at http://www.worldbank.org/, accessed 10 September
2007.

5

http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/, accessed 10 September 2007.

6

http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968615&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL, accessed 10
September 2007.
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of international development agencies and developing countries. Other aims include
promoting sustained development through the achievement of primary education, the
reduction of infant mortality and the curtailment of endemic diseases such as AIDS,
malaria, and tuberculosis.
In order to achieve these goals, international development institutions have
transferred over the last five decades in excess of $2.3 trillion of foreign aid to
developing countries (World Bank 1998; Easterly 2006b).7 Since the 1960s, the volume
of aid has increased in real terms, at the exception of a period of decline in the 1990s; and
the plans are to double development assistance in the near future (World Bank 1998;
Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006; Gupta et al. 2006).8 In 2006, the World Bank spent
$950 million of its resources to combat poverty in the poorest countries (World Bank,
News and Broadcast). During the 2005 G8 summit,9 world leaders decided to increase
foreign aid by over $50 billion as of 2010 (UN 2005 World Summit, Sept. 2005). In
2002, the White House pledged to increase U.S. foreign aid by $5 billion per year before
2006 through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.10 Jeffrey Sachs, professor at
Columbia University and chief advisor of the United Nations Millennium Development
Project, and others such as the singer Bono and Microsoft’s founder Bill Gates, have
7

See also “Global aid shortfall” in globalissues.org,
(http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Development/aid/shortfall/), accessed 10 September 2007.
8

Three factors explain the decline of aid flows in the 1990s: fiscal problems in donor countries, the end of
the Cold War and the surge in private capital flows to developing countries (World Bank 1998).

9

The G8 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom., and the U.S.

10

President Bush, Press Release, March 14, 2002, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.
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made their mission to lobby for more and more foreign aid to the poorest countries. This
constant demand for further massive disbursements of aid is referred to in the literature as
the “Big Push” (Moss and Subramanian 2006). In his book, The End of Poverty, Sachs
urged the Rich Nations to undertake a Big Push of twice the current amount of aid (i.e.,
$135 billion) by 2006 and a new doubling of aid by 2015 in order to meet the MDGs
(Sachs 2005).11 Overall, international aid is registering an unprecedented expansion; but
what will be the results of this boom in terms of promoting economic growth and
eradicating world poverty?
Evidently, there have been some success stories. In 1980, the WHO announced
the eradication of smallpox around the world.12 From 1974 to 2002 and $556 million later
from donor agencies, the Onchocerciasis Control Program (OCP) launched in West
Africa has reduced the transmission of the parasite and prevented more than 200,000
cases of blindness. Overall, 18 million people were prevented from contracting the
disease.13 Thanks to a child nutrition project financed by the World Bank and the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Tanzania in 1983, severe and moderate
malnutrition were reduced by 70 percent and 32 percent respectively; this program has
been successfully implemented subsequently in other regions. With the Food for
Education program in the early 1990s, the World Bank assisted in doubling female

11

See also Facts on International Aid in http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/endofpoverty/oda.html,
accessed 10 September 2007.

12

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su48a6.htm, accessed 10 September 2007.

13

Onchocerciasis (or river blindness) is a disease mostly encountered in Africa and Yemen. It is
transmitted by a black fly found near rivers. It causes itching, muscle pains and weakness and often leads to
permanent blindness. http://www.ajtmh.org/cgi/content/full/72/1/1, accessed 10 September 2007.

8

enrollment in Bangladesh. In 1991, the World Bank helped finance the DOTS (directly
observed treatment, short course) program for tuberculosis in China. In 10 years, the cure
rate for tuberculosis went from 52 percent to 95 percent. Foreign aid also facilitated the
expansion of high-yield variety seeds in Southeast Asia and India during the 1960s and
1970s, which considerably improved agricultural outputs and reduced extreme poverty
(World Bank 1998; Sachs 2005; Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006; Easterly 2006b).14
Collaboration between aid donors, national governments and NGOs led to the near
eradication of Guinea worm in many countries in Africa.15 In general, development
assistance has likely played a great role over the years in progress made over life
expectancy, child mortality, primary and secondary enrollment; and water and sanitation
in the poorest countries. In addition, some countries have often been cited in the literature
as successful cases of development fostered by substantial aid flows; these countries are
Korea, Taiwan, Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, Mozambique, and Vietnam (World Bank
1998; Devarajan et al. 2001; Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006).16 Finally, in the literature
on the effects of aid on recipient countries, some studies have found evidence that aid
spurs growth, albeit under specific conditions (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen and
Tarp 2000, 2001; Collier and Dollar 2002; Clemens et. al. 2004; Moreira 2005).17

14

http://www.yaleeconomicreview.com/issues/summer2006/sachs.php, accessed 10 September 2007.

15

http://www.cartercenter.org/healthprograms/program1.htm, accessed 10 September 2007.

16

However, controversy remains in the literature over the role played by foreign aid in these success stories
(Easterly 2007).
17

See review of literature on aid effectiveness in chapter two of this dissertation.
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Motivation
In spite of the successes listed above and $2.3 trillion of official development
assistance transferred to developing countries since 1960, millions of people are still
dying of hunger, malaria and tuberculosis; millions of children are still out of school and
made orphans by AIDS; and million of people do not yet have access to clean water and
live in unsanitary slums. Why is it that despite all the successes listed above, still
international assistance could be considered to be a failure or at least a partial failure?18
Africa may be interpreted as a striking manifestation of the failure of overseas
development assistance to rise million of poor people out of poverty and its devastating
consequences. For over five decades, $1 trillion has been spent on Africa alone since
independence, but from many angles, there is too little to show for it (Herbert 2004;
Erixon 2005; Govender et al. 2005). Actually, many African countries are even poorer
today than they were 50 years ago.19 Contrary to other poor regions around the world, the
number of people living with less than a dollar per day has continued to increase in
Africa; so is the number of malnourished children and the number of deaths among
children under five years old (United Nations 2005).
One big part of the problem appears to be that the largest part of aid transferred to
the poor does not actually reach them. For instance, Cudjoe (2006) reported that based on
Jeffrey Sachs’ own calculations, “Out of every dollar of aid given to Africa, an estimated
16% went to consultants from donor countries, 26% went into emergency aid and relief
operations, and 14% went into debt servicing.” By the same token, President Paul
18

See review of literature on aid effectiveness in chapter two of this dissertation for an answer to this
question.

19

See figure 1 in chapter two of this dissertation.
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Kagame of Rwanda declared: “There are projects here worth only $5m and when I
looked at their expenses, I found that $1m was going into buying these cars, each one of
them at $70,000. Another $1m goes to buy office furniture, $1m more for meetings and
entertainment, and yet another $1m as salaries for technical experts, leaving only $1m for
the actual expenditure on a poverty reducing activity. Is this the way to fight poverty?”
(Cudjoe 2006) According to Hancock (1989), the simple fact that aid bureaucracies, after
more than 50 years of existence, are still growing more than ever is irrefutable proof of
the lack of success of earlier efforts.
Some empirical studies have actually shown that there is no evidence that aid has
any positive effect on growth, nor that it affects economic institutions in developing
countries (Boone 1996; Easterly 2003; Easterly et al. 2003; Rajan and Subramanian
2005a; Coviello and Islam 2006; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007).20
In general, it would appear that international aid has failed to eradicate poverty
and, in many cases, to promote sustained development in the main aid recipient countries
around the world. This begs the question of where has all the money gone? Perhaps the
answers to this puzzle of the ineffectiveness of international aid are to be found
simultaneously within both recipient countries and development agencies themselves.
For decades now, a common rationale has been repeatedly used in the literature
and in the international scene to explain the ineffectiveness of foreign aid in developing
countries: poor economic policies, weak institutions, bad governance, chronic corruption,
limited human and physical capital accumulations; lack of democracy and transparency,

20

By “economic institutions” the authors refer to corruption, bureaucracy quality, property rights, and
regulations; rule of law, repudiation, and expatriation risk (Coviello and Islam 2006). For a more
comprehensive and systematic review of the aid effectiveness empirical literature, see chapter 2 of this
dissertation.
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political instability, civil wars, geography, and many more. In order words, poor
countries themselves are obviously one source of the low performance of aid (World
Bank 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000). For example, despite 12 adjustment loans to
Zambia between 1980 and 1994, it had experienced inflation above 40 percent every year
except two from 1985 to 1996;21 Pakistan had a budget deficit of 7 percent of GDP
between 1970 and 1997 in spite of 22 adjustment loans throughout this period. In the
1980s and early 1990s, after 9 adjustment loans to Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko’s loot was
measured in billions of dollars (Easterly 2002). A number of empirical studies have
provided support to the credence that developing countries’ circumstances are the root
cause of aid ineffectiveness. Specifically, the literature on aid and economic growth took
a new turn when Boone (1996) showed that, regardless of political regimes, aid was used
for wasteful public consumption instead of financing investment and growth. However,
his study ran counter to the usual belief that aid promotes growth. Subsequently,
Burnside and Dollar (2000) improved on Boone’s paper and found that aid has a positive
impact on growth in a good policy environment i.e., with good fiscal, monetary and trade
policies; and thus launching the beginning of numerous contradictions in the empirical
literature on aid performance. Collier and Dollar (2002), using a broader measure of
policy environment (World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) and a
larger number of countries, confirmed Burnside and Dollar’s results. Svensson (1999)
showed that foreign aid positively affects long-run growth in democratic countries.
Furthermore, the issue of absorptive capacity has been frequently raised in the aid

21

Adjustment lending carried conditions on economic policies to developing countries in crisis, in an
attempt to induce the recipients to make necessary reforms to promote growth: reduction in inflation,
budget deficits, and black market premium, restructuring of state enterprises in difficulty, and tackle
corruption (Easterly 2002).
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development literature, illustrating that there might be diminishing returns to aid in
developing countries. In order words, because of poor countries’ characteristics
mentioned above, there might be a certain level of aid inflows after which poor countries
would have some difficulty to effectively absorb additional amounts of aid (Burnside and
Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002; Clemens and Radelet 2003). It is an undeniable
truth that over the years, a chunk of official development assistance has been drained
down the pipes of an ill-managed poor world. If not for the above-cited literature, the
daily reality of some African countries and other poor countries around the world clearly
illustrate it. It would be naïve and unrealistic to assert otherwise.
Nonetheless, recipient countries are only one of numerous actors in the vast aid
delivery network with multifaceted interactions and relationships among them; going
from donor countries, donors’ development agencies, multilateral aid agencies, NGOs,
consultants, contractors, to interest groups and civil society organizations.22 Within this
complex network, the contribution of each actor is fundamental to achieve a joint
outcome: poverty alleviation. What is harder is to hold each and every intervenient
responsible and accountable for the results (Ostrom et al. 2001).
For instance, the richest countries of the world (such as the U.S., France,
Germany, United Kingdom and Japan) with the largest decision-making power in
international organizations, and those behind bilateral aid agencies are the ones mostly
formulating aid policies.23 They have a significant influence over the selection of

22

The aid delivery network is a hierarchy of principal-agent interactions.

23

For instance, the five largest shareholders in the World Bank and the countries with the higher number of
votes in the IMF are the ones listed above. Votes in those two institutions are linked to the extent of
financial contributions. Among the 184 member countries of the World Bank, only one selects its president:
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potential aid recipients and over the use of funds within those recipients’ countries
(Clements 2005). They are involved in the design and implementation of development
projects; and sometimes (if not most of the time) in “determining” the needs of the poor
(Tendler 1975; Dichter 2003). For instance, Lancaster (1999) argued that because of the
incapacity of weak institutions in Africa to promote aid, development assistance has
become increasingly “donor-driven.”24 A declaration by the president of Nigeria,
Olusegun Obasanjo well illustrates this “donor-driven” phenomenon: “In education and
in industrialization, we have used borrowed ideas, utilized borrowed experiences and
funds and engaged borrowed hands. In our development programmes and strategies, not
much, if anything, is ours.” (Lancaster 1999, 3) In that context, international aid
institutions might be implicated in the failure to provide quality aid to the developing
world.25 They might therefore be interpreted as being as responsible as developing
countries for the ineffectiveness of foreign aid.

Focus of the Study
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine why foreign aid has been largely
ineffective at eradicating global poverty and promoting sustained economic growth by
focusing in one particular explanation: the extent of the role played by incentive

the United States (Choike.org). See also http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/USAid.asp,
accessed 10 September 2007.
24

This term illustrates the fact that projects are “identified, planned, and implemented with minimal input”
from recipient countries (Lancaster 1999, 224).

25

Quality of foreign aid refers to its output whereas quantity of aid refers to its input. See
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/USAid.asp. A complete definition of aid quality is
provided in appendix A.
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structures, especially incentives to “move the money” (or the “Money-Moving
Syndrome”26) within international donor agencies since the inception of foreign aid. In
this dissertation, the “Money-Moving Syndrome” exists when the quantity of foreign aid
committed or disbursed becomes, in itself, an important objective side by side or above
the effectiveness of aid.
But why is this topic important? Over the years, there have been successive calls
for a “big push” of foreign aid to assist developing countries in their quest for poverty
alleviation and growth. Despite some major achievements, the failures of foreign aid
would seem to have continuously outweighed the successes. And with the amount of
development assistance likely to considerably increase in the upcoming years, the need
for greater caution and awareness, and greater aid effectiveness seem pressing and
imperative. Clearly, reducing poverty and promoting sustainable economic growth in
developing countries entail much more than just giving money. Nevertheless, wealthy
nations continue to provide poor countries with increasing levels of funding and have
even pledged to do more in the upcoming decade. Confronted by the apparent inability of
aid to deliver the expected results, are aid organizations deliberately pushing ahead and
ready to repeat past mistakes? Perhaps it is not feasible to cease aid altogether. But is
really disbursing more and more money the ultimate solution in those circumstances?
Could it be that while being honestly philanthropic, they are simply hampered in their
actions by their institutional framework (Tendler 1975)? This dissertation aims to shed
some light into this debate. In particular, the objective of this study is to investigate the
prevalence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” within donor agencies and deduce its
26

This term had been borrowed from Tendler (1975).
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impact on the performance of aid. Indeed, if a sizable portion of aid resources allocated to
recipient countries is motivated by money moving incentives, there will be a problem in
term of aid effectiveness. In other words, we posit that evidence in support of the
“Money-Moving Syndrome” can perhaps be used to provide some evidence as to why
foreign aid has not been more effective at reducing global poverty in developing
countries.
Furthermore, this dissertation is in an attempt to add one piece to the foreign aid
puzzle in order to better understand why the effectiveness of aid has not been greater
despite all the resources involved in the business of aid over the years.

Overview of the Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: chapter two reviews the
aid effectiveness literature and the groundbreaking studies that attempted to address the
incentive mechanisms within international development agencies as a potential, if not
primary, source of the ineffectiveness of foreign aid. In Chapter three, we identify some
factors that might provide a motive for money moving behaviors within international
development agencies and we develop a principal-agent model to explore how donor
agencies’ institutional incentive systems may affect the characteristics of an optimal
incentive contract and thus give rise to the Money-Moving Syndrome. Chapter four
describes the empirical methodology used as well as the empirical data and their sources.
Chapter five discusses the empirical results obtained and chapter six contains concluding
remarks and potential policy implications of the analysis conducted.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is divided in two sections. The first section examines to what extent
international aid, since the 1950s, has been ineffective in reducing global poverty and
promoting sustained economic development in aid-receiving countries.27 In addition, the
first section attempts to determine whether there have been possible variations in the
level of aid effectiveness across donor organizations and over time. It finally explores
previous efforts to explain aid ineffectiveness and their contributions to help clarify the
foreign aid puzzle. The second section reviews some of the main studies that have
endeavored to shift the focus away from developing country’s shortcomings to
international donor institutions, in analyzing the partial failure of foreign aid.
Specifically, the second section highlights the few studies that attempted to address
institutional incentives and incentives to “move the money” as potential sources of the
low performance of aid in reaching its objectives.

27

Foreign aid, as we know it today (economic aid to poor countries throughout the world) began when
President Truman announced the Point Four Program in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949. The
Point Four Program was later formalized in the 1950 Act for International Development. It was the result of
the Marshall Plan announced by the U.S. government in 1947 and aimed at the reconstruction of Europe
after World War II (Dichter 2003, 55; Roodman 2004, 3). However, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the IMF were initially created in 1945 by the international
community to respond to Europe's calls for help.
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Aid Effectiveness Literature

The Extent of Aid Effectiveness Today
To this day, no consensus exists on the magnitude of the effect of aid on growth.
Besides many success stories evidenced by micro-level studies,28 the overall impact of
aid on macroeconomic variables (such as savings, investment, and growth) evidenced in
the aid effectiveness literature, has been weak and often ambiguous (Gibson et al. 2005;
Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007). This ambiguous or undetectable impact of aid on
macroeconomic outcomes coexisting with successful donor-sponsored aid projects and
programs is called the “micro-macro paradox” (Mosley 1986).
The empirical literature on aid effectiveness encompasses three different
macroeconomic studies:29 first, the accumulation models studying the impact of aid on
savings and investment; these macro-studies were influenced by the Harrod-Domar
growth model which assumes that investment (i.e., the accumulation of physical capital)
is the key determinant of economic growth and, by consequent, the lack of savings
financing investment is the main factor impeding growth in developing countries.30 Based
on these studies, a positive effect of aid on either savings or investment would mean that
28

These studies evaluate the impact of individual aid projects and programs using cost-benefit analyses.
Certainly, there are micro-level cases of failures; however, most micro-level studies reported in the
literature have validated the effectiveness of aid. See Hansen and Tarp (2001), Moreira (2005), and
Bourguignon and Leipziger (2006) for more details.

29

Hansen and Tarp (2000), Moreira (2005), and Doucouliagos and Paldam (2005) surveyed the literature
on aid effectiveness more extensively.

30

The Harrod-Domar growth model was later expanded into the “two-gap model” which assumes that
investment, crucial to economic growth, could be constrained either by a lack of domestic saving (saving
gap) or by a lack of exports revenues (trade gap). The latter gap assumes that developing countries need to
import goods and services necessary for investment and production, but their import costs often exceed
their exports revenues (Hansen and Tarp 2000; Moreira 2005).
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aid stimulates growth. Second, the growth models examining the direct effect of aid on
growth; these studies were influenced by both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth
models. Most of these models, as well as the accumulation models, were cross-countries
regressions studies due to limited aid data availability. Finally, the conditional growth
models which marked a new turn in the aid effectiveness literature in that they are
inspired by the “new growth theory”: economic policy, political and institutional
variables are included in the regressions of growth on aid; and the insertion of quadratic
and interaction terms (e.g., aid square and aid-policy index) captures the possible nonlinearity of the effect of aid on growth. In addition, these macro studies often rely on
panel data econometrics tools to account for country-specific effects and the endogeneity
of aid and other explanatory variables (Hansen and Tarp 2000; Roodman 2004;
Doucouliagos and Paldam 2005; Moreira 2005).
An overall analysis of the three types of macro-studies led to the conclusion that
aid may have a significantly positive, significantly negative, or a non-significant effect on
development outcomes, in statistical terms.31 This lack of robust evidence on the
macroeconomic effects of aid has often been attributed to underlying theories and/or
econometric methodologies applied (Moreira 2005; Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006 ).
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2005) uncovered that until January 1, 2005, the aid
effectiveness literature consisted of 97 studies, each falling in one or more of the three

31

Here is a succinct list of authors who analyzed the impact of aid on selected macroeconomic variables
(savings, investment, and growth) and their estimated results: (a) significant positive impact of aid
(Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2001; Clemens et. al. 2004; Moreira 2005); (b)
significant negative impact of aid (Mosley et al. 1987); and (c) zero impact of aid (Boone 1996; Easterly
2003; Easterly et al. 2003; Roodman 2004; Rajan and Subramanian 2005a). For the most part, studies in (c)
showed that there is no robust evidence of the impact of aid on growth even in the presence of sound policy
environment, contrary to claims by Burnside and Dollar (2000).
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aforementioned approaches. In an attempt to synthesize the conflicting macroeconomic
effects of aid, they analyzed all three categories of models using the meta-analysis
technique and found that despite a great variation in the findings, aggregate results
showed that the average effect of aid is at best positive, but small and non statistically
significant.32
In many instances throughout the years, aid has been negatively associated with
growth in developing countries. This negative association does not prove that aid caused
the decrease in growth, but it does show that aid has not always been able to halt the
deterioration of growth (Easterly 2003) or that success could occur without foreign
assistance in aid-receiving countries (see table 1).

Table 1. Ten Best and Worst per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002
Country Name

South Korea
China
Taiwan
Singapore
Thailand
India
Japan
Hong Kong
Mauritius
Malaysia
Median

Per Capita
Aid/GDP (%)
Percent of time under
Growth,
1980-2002
IMF programs, 19801980-2002 (%)
2002 (%)
Ten Best Per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002
5.9
0.03
36
5.6
0.38
8
4.5
0.00
0
4.5
0.07
0
3.9
0.81
30
3.7
0.66
19
3.6
0.00
0
3.5
0.02
0
3.2
2.17
23
3.1
0.40
0
3.8
0.23
4
Ten Worst Per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002

32

The Meta-Analysis covers the aid effectiveness literature in its totality and examines if this literature has
established that aid has a positive effect on growth or accumulation (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2005).
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Nigeria
Niger
Togo
Zambia
Madagascar
Cote d'Ivoire
Haiti
Liberia
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Sierra Leone
Median
Source: Easterly (2005).

-1.6
-1.7
-1.8
-1.8
-1.9
-1.9
-2.6
-3.9
-5.0
-5.8
-1.9

0.59
13.15
11.18
19.98
10.78
5.60
9.41
11.94
4.69
15.37
10.98

20
63
72
53
71
74
55
22
39
50
54

Figure 1 shows that a steady increase in aid flows in Sub-Saharan Africa since the
1970s has not been successfully in preventing the decline in economic performance in
that region.
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Figure 1. Aid and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1965-2004 (5-year averages)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)

7.00

4.00

6.00

3.00

5.00

2.00

4.00

1.00

3.00

0.00

2.00

-1.00

1.00

-2.00

0.00

-3.00

GDP per capita growth (annual %

Aid (% of GNI)

Aid (% of GNI)

1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
year

Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2006.

Changes in the Level of Aid Effectiveness
Examining the full extent of changes in the level of aid effectiveness across aid
agencies and over time would be a formidable task due to many factors such as the lack
of a consistent measure of the overall impact of aid, the difficulty to disentangle the
marginal effects of a dollar of aid from other factors (attribution problem), and the
fungibility of foreign aid (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007).33

33

Supposed infant mortality is used as a key measure of the impact of aid in developing countries; it is
practically impossible to say whether an additional child being saved is due to an aid-financed program or
many other factors that affect infant mortality such as water quality, mother education, access to clinics,
lack of food, and so on (Clemens and Radelet 2003). Aid is fungible when a recipient country reduces its
own resources in the sector receiving aid and transfers them to non-targeted sectors.
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Despite the absence of a consistent measure required to efficiently assess changes
in the level of aid effectiveness, there are nonetheless a few factors that could cause
variations in the impact of aid in developing countries; variations across donor agencies
and over time:
1. Changes in the development discourse and in donor agencies’ practices
Throughout the history of foreign aid, a multitude of development approaches
have been implemented which may have had the consequence of changing the level of
aid effectiveness. In the 1950s, capital accumulation was thought to be the motor of
economic growth. Development assistance during that period took the form of large aidfinanced projects to build roads, dams, factories, ports, irrigations canals, and so on. In
the 1960s, knowledge transfer and skills began to be recognized for their capacity to
create growth. As such, while the emphasis remained on capital formation, physical
infrastructure, and large projects, development policies and projects started targeting
social infrastructures, such as schools and universities. It was the beginning of technical
assistance. During the 1970s, while the international development assistance experienced
extensive growth, it became evident that the gap between rich and poor was widening.
Development assistance strategies began targeting the poor to alleviate poverty by
attempting to provide for their basic needs (food, water, health). By the mid-1970s,
poverty reduction was as much an important goal as economic growth in the development
arena. Basic human needs and quality of life joined the rank of GDP as yardsticks of
success. In the early 1980s, developing countries, facing severe debt crises, turned to the
World Bank and the IMF for an increase in foreign aid and a debt relief. Inspired by the
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Asian Tigers’ success,34 the World Bank and the IMF instituted the stabilization and
structural adjustment programs to ensure debt repayment and economic restructuring.
These programs aimed at reducing inflation, correcting government deficits, removing
price distortions, and reducing trade barriers. Unfortunately, the stabilization and
structural adjustment programs did not yield the expected results (see table 2). By the end
of the 1980s and early 1990s, the development assistance field had started to recognize
the need for sound institutions like good governance, property rights, and democratic
accountability. This change gradually led to a new aid architecture characterized by: a
greater emphasis on selectivity in allocating aid; a growing recognition of the importance
of governance, institutions, and local ownership of reforms; enhancement of aid
coordination and donor alignment with country strategies; greater considerations for
absorptive capacity constraints; measuring and monitoring of results (Easterly 2007;
Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006; Pitman et al. 2005; Ellerman 2005; Dichter 2003).

34

Between the 1960s and 1990s, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (the four Asian Tigers)
achieved rapid economic growth mainly due to high levels of human and physical capital accumulation, an
export-driven model of economic development, macroeconomic stability (World Bank 1993).
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Table 2. Structural Adjustment Loans, Growth, and Inflation in Poor countries with Most
Structural Adjustment Loans Received
Number of IMF and
World Bank Adjustment
loans 1980- 99

Annual per capita growth
Annual Inflation rate
rate from the date of first
from first adjustment
Structural adjustment loan loan to 1999 (%)
(%)
African countries that were in the world’s top 20 of structural adjustment loans received 1980-99
Niger
14
-2.30
2
Zambia
18
-2.10
58
Madagascar
17
-1.80
17
Togo
15
-1.60
5
Cote d'Ivoire
26
-1.40
6
Malawi
18
-0.20
23
Mali
15
-0.10
4
Mauritania
16
0.10
7
Senegal
21
0.10
5
Kenya
19
0.10
14
Ghana
26
1.20
32
Uganda
20
2.30
50
Top ten recipients of structural adjustment Loans over 1990-1999 among Ex-Communist countries
(growth and inflation measured from first adjustment loan to 1999
Ukraine
10
-8.4
215
Russian Federation
13
-5.7
141
Kyrgyz Republic
10
-4.4
25
Kazakhstan
9
-3.1
117
Bulgaria
13
-2.2
124
Romania
11
-1.2
114
Hungary
14
1.0
16
Poland
9
3.4
52
Albania
8
4.4
40
Georgia
7
6.4
37
Source: Easterly (2006b, 67).

In addition to changes in the development discourse, donor agencies’ institutional
reforms may also affect the level of aid effectiveness. For instance, subsequent to major
environmental disasters in Brazil and Indonesian caused by a series of World Bank
lending blunders in the early 1980s, the Bank adopted dramatic institutional reforms such
as increased reporting requirements and police-patrol oversight. The World Bank also
significantly altered its lending portfolio by increasing environmental lending and
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reducing “traditional” loans in energy and transportation causing environmental damages
(Nielson and Tierney 2003).
2. Changes in recipient countries’ circumstances
The development assistance world is gradually realizing that development is a
very complex phenomenon that occurs as a result of an accumulation of and a
complicated interaction between multitudes of resources: (a) “public capital” such as
political, legal, and economic institutions of society; (b) infrastructure, physical and
human capital; and (c) “cultural and social capital” such as mentalities, beliefs, values,
and social institutions (Dichter 2003). Therefore, different combinations and levels of
these resources within and across aid recipient countries will result in different levels of
aid effectiveness across countries and over time.

Previous Explanations of Aid Ineffectiveness
One explanation of aid ineffectiveness commonly used in the literature focuses on
the shortcomings of aid-receiving countries. On the one hand, problems like corrupt
leadership, misguided government policies, weak policies and institutions, and political
instability have been frequently raised to explain the disappointing performance of aid in
developing countries (World Bank 1998; Lancaster 1999; Easterly 2006b); On the other
hand, some authors like Sachs (2005) argued that bad governments constitute only a
small part of the explanation of the low performance of aid in poor countries and stressed
other problems like diseases, vulnerability to climate shocks, and geographical distress.
Another widespread explanation of the aid ineffectiveness used in the literature
emphasizes that donor country strategic interests have frequently dominated recipient
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countries’ needs and merits as aid allocation criteria within aid agencies.35 Donor
strategic interests generally include diplomatic interests (e.g., establishing military bases,
securing UN votes, supporting a preferred regime); commercial interests (e.g., “tied” aid,
providing exports subsidies to donor countries firms, focusing on projects with high
foreign exchange components; and cultural interests usually provided to promote a
donor’s religion, language, or values (Lancaster 1999).
The preponderance of donor interests over recipients’ needs and merits, as aid
allocation criteria, appears to be present within both bilateral and multilateral aid
agencies, though with less intensity in the latter.
Many empirical studies investigating the determinants of aid, especially which
donor country gives to which recipient country and why, concluded that bilateral aid
most of the time favored former colonies and political allies over recipient countries’
needs or policy and institutional environments. For instance, empirical evidence showed
that the U.S. allocation of aid is mostly influenced by its interests in the Middle East;
France mainly employs foreign aid as a tool to maintain and foster its cultural, economic
and political ties with former colonies; and Japan tends to give more aid to investment
and trade partners. Only smaller donors such as Netherlands and the Scandinavian
countries provide aid to poor countries according to economic necessity and sound
management (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; World Bank 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000;
Fleck and Kilby 2005b; Allen 2006).

35

This is the part of the aid literature that studies the determinants of foreign aid, in particular the reasons
why certain donors give to certain recipient countries..
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If bilateral aid giving appears to be tied to donor interests and less sensitive to
recipients’ need, multilateral development agencies, however, tend to be more needbased oriented in their aid allocations (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Roodman 2006;
Burnside and Dollar 2000; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Milner 2006; Allen 2006).
Unfortunately, multilateral aid agencies, albeit “independent” and “apolitical,”36 have
nonetheless been known to further the interests of their most prominent member
countries. For instance, Frey and Schneider (1986) analyzed the lending behavior of the
World Bank between 1972 and 1981. They found that the “politico-economic model,”
which assumes among other things that the Bank extends more credits to poor countries
to which top member countries export a large share of goods, explains best the World
Bank behavior. In a more recent paper, Fleck and Kilby (2005a) showed that not only
U.S. interests (e.g., recipient countries’ importance to the U.S. as trade partners, U.S.
commercial financial flows into and out of poor countries) influence the World Bank
lending patterns; but that influence varies across presidential administrations. More
recently, Kilby (2006), using a panel data for less developed Asian countries from 1968
to 2002, revealed that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) aid giving is tied to Japan and
the United States’ interests. Consequently, the autonomy of multilateral aid agencies may
be somewhat circumscribed as the autonomy of bilateral aid agencies, but certainly to a
lesser extent.37

36

See Fleck and Kilby (2005a) for more details.

37

The autonomy of the World Bank for instance might be limited through the vehicle of triennial IDA
(International Development Association) replenishment negotiations (Frey and Schneider 1986; Lancaster
1999; Fleck and Kilby 2005a).
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Finally, the third set of explanations of the ineffectiveness of aid encountered in
the literature has been more aid agency-centered. They posit that because international
aid organizations are involved in the identification, design, and implementation of
development assistance activities, they ought to be partially responsible of the low
performance of aid in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty in developing
countries. The next section analyses in depth this third set of explanations.

Donor Agencies’ Incentive Structures and the “Money-Moving Syndrome”
Literature
While there has been a proliferation of studies on the impact of aid based on
recipient countries performance, very few studies have attempted to address the incentive
mechanisms within international development agencies as a potential, if not primary,
source of the low performance of foreign aid.
This restricted but growing literature may possibly be divided in two ways: (a)
studies on how incentives and constraints faced by aid organizations affect the
performance of aid (macro-institutional approach);38 (b) studies on how incentives and
constraints faced by staff in those organizations affect the performance of aid (microinstitutional approach).39
This section highlights the major studies that broached the subject of incentive
structures and, in particular, incentives to “move the money” in analyzing aid agencies’
38

These organizations in the aid business encompass “taxpayers, donor organizations, politicians, lobby
groups, donor agencies and consultants in donor countries and recipient organizations in beneficiary
countries” (Martens et al. 2002, 1).

39

In the macro-institutional approach, a donor institution is considered as a single homogenous agent,
whereas in the in the micro-institutional approach, the donor institution is made of different individuals
with different interests. Those concepts are well developed by Frey et al. (1985).
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shortcomings in delivering aid. Although frequently acknowledged as a problem in donor
agencies, the incentive to “move the money” has nevertheless been very often treated in
an incidental manner in the aid literature.
In this dissertation, incentives are defined as the set of “rewards and punishments
that are perceived by individuals to be related to their actions and those of others”
(Ostrom et al. 2001).

Macro-Institutional Approach and the Incentives to “Move the Money”
Back in the 1970s, Tendler (1975) was already alerting the international scene to
how multilateral agencies and bilateral agencies’ organizational environments, in
particular USAID, could impinge upon foreign aid outcomes. Among USAID
shortcomings hindering the effectiveness of aid, Tendler (1975) mentioned the pressures
to move out the money. Aid agents were considered bright and dynamic based on how
they excelled in moving the money; their accomplishments and career advancements in
the institution were determined by their ability to “move” a certain amount of funds
within a limited time. Tendler also added that the “Money-Moving Syndrome” was not
unique to development agencies funded by annual government appropriations like the
USAID; indeed the pressures to spend were just as great in the World Bank as in the
USAID. In Tendler’s view, the existence of money moving behavior may have the
consequence of switching a donor organization’s sense of mission away from economic
development to the commitment of resources. She argued that a potential explanation of
the “Money-Moving Syndrome” lies on the standards by which development agencies
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judge their performance (i.e., the quantitative estimates of development assistance needs)
and how the agencies are judged by the outside world.
Tendler’s views were corroborated in a more recent book by Lancaster (1999).
Lancaster argued that there are two sides of the aid effectiveness equation: (a) on the one
hand, there are recipient countries with limited natural resources, political instability,
corrupt and incompetent governments; and weak policies and institutions; and (b) on the
other hand, there are donor agencies often constrained in their autonomy and/or
capacity.40 Lancaster identified pressures to spend available funds as one factor limiting
the capacity of both the USAID and the World Bank to “identify and design policies,
projects, and programs and implement them” in such a way as to take into account the
circumstances of recipient countries. For instance, in Lancaster’s view, “the Bank’s
pervasive preoccupation with new lending” had been incorporated in the criteria used to
evaluate the World Bank’s staff. In general, staff’s performance is assessed according to
whether they achieved the targeted number of lending operations agreed in their annual
performance contracts. Furthermore, pressures to spend contributed to an “excessive
optimism” on the part of the staff about conditions in recipient countries and about the
likely impact of the Bank’s development projects and programs.
Three major reports also acknowledged this problem. The World Bank’s
Wapenhans Report, analyzing the factors that affect the development impact of the World
Bank operations, found that a “pervasive culture of approval” for loans and “pressure to
lend” resulted in a decline in project quality (World Bank 1992). Another report, issued

40

Lancaster (1999) defined autonomy as the “ability (or freedom) of an organization to make policy and
allocative decisions to achieve its missions and purposes” and capacity refers to the “the capacity to
identify and design policies, projects, and programs and implement them to achieve overall purposes.”
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by the World Bank in 1998, revealed that aid agencies’ ability to work in distorted
economies has been hampered by their disbursement culture. Indeed, because aid
agencies’ primary objective was to “dish out money,” much went to countries with poor
institutional and policy environments (World Bank 1998). The Meltzer Commission
Report (2000) found that incentives to “move money” are built in the structure of the
Development Banks, and “internal budget resources are awarded where loan volumes are
high, not where the number of worthwhile projects is highest or where technical
assistance and knowledge transfer are favored over funding.”41 This report concludes that
“rewards for lending and no penalties for project failure dilute concern about project
performance.”
In a book recently published, Easterly (2006b) argued that one reason why foreign
aid has continuously failed to reach the poor is the planning approach adopted by aid
bureaucracies throughout the history of development assistance. Planners, with their topdown mind-set, lack two essential elements: feedback and accountability. Easterly
brought up other explanations of the nonperformance of aid such as internal bureaucratic
incentives to serve the “West” rather than serving the “Rest,” and the absence of truly
independent evaluations of aid agencies’ development projects and programs. He also
showed how development agencies apply the volume of foreign aid as a measure of
success, and as such consciously confuse aid disbursements as an output to development
rather than an input. Easterly did not propose a panacea to reform the foreign aid system
41

The Meltzer Report (2000) was commissioned by the U.S. Congress as part of the legislation authorizing
$18 billion of additional U.S. funding for the IMF. Development Banks are the World Bank Group, the
African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.
Note that the World Bank Group includes five institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance
Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). See http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/ifiac.htm.
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but claimed that, would donor agencies acquire a searcher-like mentality, foreign aid will
certainly be successful in finding solutions to piecemeal projects and programs

Micro-Institutional Approach and the Incentives to “Move the Money”
In 2001, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) published a
report examining the link between aid, incentives, and sustainability in an attempt to
improve the performance and sustainability of its development assistance (Ostrom et al.
2001). The report provides an extensive account of the importance of incentives as they
underpin aid performance and recommends strategies to mitigate perverse incentives. The
SIDA study constitutes the first attempt to collect data on the behavior of staff members
and other agents involved in the delivery of aid. The authors interviewed over 175 SIDA
staff and other people involved in the aid process, and found that there is no evidence
supporting the argument that incentives within SIDA are oriented towards individual
learning about sustainability, nor there is evidence of incentives to use evaluations for
organizational learning about sustainability. The interviews also revealed that SIDA is
not immune to the incentives to “move the money”; in fact, SIDA officers feel a strong
pressure to disburse money, especially at the end of the budget year. The report offers
some explanations of the SIDA’s resource-driven environment: the Swedish’s
commitment to increase aid allocations to reach 1 percent of GNP and the fear that
uncommitted resources will be considered unnecessary and not re-budgeted in subsequent
years. Given these results, SIDA reports that the agency is constantly making great
efforts to give a new direction to its development assistance.
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Martens et al. (2002), using the principal-agent model and its variants, explained
that for decades foreign aid failed to achieve its goals because of incentive structures
affecting agents’ behavior in the aid delivery processes.42 They argued that most of the
problems encountered in the aid business stem from two elements: one element is the fact
that the beneficiaries of aid are not the same as the taxpayers in rich countries providing
aid. This “broken feedback loop” deprives aid recipients of the power to reward or punish
public official and/or aid organization. The second element is the multiplicity of
principals and objectives, which restrains the efficiency of aid. In the view of these
authors, a broken information feedback loop combined with difficulties to measure
performance have pushed aid officials towards an excessive focus on “input” activities,
such as budget and personnel, rather than the quality of output. They also noted that
careers within aid agencies are often determined by the staff’s performance in easily
monitorable tasks such as “committing and spending budgets.” In this context, they
argued that straightforward independent evaluations of foreign aid projects and programs
appear crucial to reestablish information feedback between donors and recipients and to
improve aid performance.
In a more recent paper, Wane (2004), an economist at the World Bank, recently
wrote a paper where he argues that donor agencies’ internal incentive system in the
design of aid projects affects the quality of aid and thus its effectiveness. Wane showed
theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid depends on the capacity and
accountability of aid recipients. It also depends on the impact the incentive system has on
the effort the staff put in designing development projects. If the incentive system within

42

Incentives are determined by institutions which are defined as “the formal and informal rules of behavior
that constitute incentives for all agents involved in the aid delivery process” (Martens et al. 2002, 1).
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the aid agency is such that staff promotion depends on project approval rather than
project performance (“spend the budget incentive system”); and if the aid recipient
government has a weak screening capacity (i.e., the ability to screen projects), then the
recipient government will receive poorly designed aid projects. However, if the recipient
government has a high screening capacity, it will only accept bad projects if it has a low
accountability.
The above discussion does not necessarily constitute a complete review of studies
in the aid effectiveness literature that have raised the issue of the “Money-Moving
Syndrome” in development agencies.

Conclusion
The empirical literature mentioned in this chapter has been critical in
assessing the performance of official development assistance in developing countries. In
particular, previous aid effectiveness studies focusing on international development
agencies have corroborated the idea that, not only aid allocations respond to donor
country preferences but also, aid agencies institutional frameworks may hinder their
genuine intentions to help the poor. These studies helped our understanding of the fact
that aid organizations are bureaucracies making their own set of formal and informal
rules. These organizational rules structure incentives for all agents involved in the chain
of aid delivery, may make aid agencies powerful, or lead them to inefficient behaviors
(Barnett and Finnemore 1999). The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to this
literature by analyzing in depth one particular set of incentives common to many
international aid organizations: the incentives to “move the money.” Although frequently
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acknowledged as a problem in donor agencies, these incentives have nevertheless been
very often treated in an incidental manner in the aid literature. To the extent of our
knowledge, this dissertation represents the first attempt to explicitly focus, theoretically
and empirically, on the “Money-Moving Syndrome” in analyzing aid agencies’
shortcomings in delivering aid.
The primary reason to focus on these incentives is that without the “money,” there
would not be “foreign aid”; and if the objective is to maximize the effectiveness of aid, it
would appear essential to enhance the effectiveness of aid resources at the source, for
instance by creating the right incentives in providing development assistance to poor
countries. This research proposes a simple theoretical framework examining some
adjustment mechanisms that could reduce both institutional incentives to “move the
money,” and windows of opportunities for money moving behaviors.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his
not understanding it.
Upton Beall Sinclair I, Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked (1935)

The theoretical analysis in this chapter identifies aid agencies’ institutional
incentives that may lead individuals to engage in money moving behaviors and it
provides examples of such behaviors (section 1). In the theoretical model (section 2), we
develop the hypothesis that the money-moving syndrome may be one major handicap of
foreign aid. The basic rationale for the model is that if the pressures to move out the
money are strong enough, they might lead to an inefficient allocation of aid resources
whether or not international aid agencies and staff are well-intentioned and have the
interest of aid recipients at heart.

Analytical Framework
As mentioned in Chapter two, since its inception in the 1950s, foreign aid has
been used for two not always reconcilable purposes:43 (a) serve the interests of donor
countries and their domestic constituencies;44 and (b) increase the well-being of the poor
in developing countries. This dichotomy in the objectives of aid could be illustrated by
President Ronald Reagan’s words: “Our foreign aid is not only a symbol of America’s
43

This aid can be in the form of tied-aid, grants, loans, and soft loans or concessional loans.

44

Taxpayers, political leaders of the donor countries, donor agencies, commercial businesses (contractors,
consultants, and suppliers), experts, private contributors, lobby groups, and non-governmental
organizations.
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tradition of generosity and good will, but also a servant of our national interest”; or by the
USAID’s declaration: “Foreign aid doesn’t cost Americans, it pays!” (Hancock 1989,
161). According to the empirical literature on the determinants of foreign aid, it would
seem that the former has more than often outweighed the latter (especially in bilateral
aid), thus undermining the ability of aid to successfully promote growth and reduce
poverty.45 Although the main objective of this dissertation is to analyze the extent to
which aid agencies’ self-created incentives to “move the money” may affect foreign aid
performance, and thus focuses on aid once it reaches the “hands” of development
agencies, this research nonetheless indirectly examines options for the elimination of
donor countries’ strategic interests behind aid giving.

Incentives to “Move the Money” in Donor Agencies
Three factors might be identified as providing a motive to money moving
behaviors within international development agencies: (1) the organizational imperatives
to survive and grow and its corollary the remunerative incentive to move the money; (2)
the “warm glow” effect; and (3) the lack of checks and balances and the constraints in the
delivery of aid which potentially allow the money-moving syndrome to set in and thrive.
1. Organizational Imperatives to Survive and Grow
According to Ditcher (2003) and Ellerman (2005), “organizing” international
development assistance, while being necessary and inevitable, appears to be one factor
preventing the achievement of its ultimate goals: poverty alleviation and economic
growth. First, “organizing” development assistance has led to unavoidable organizational
45

See chapter two of this dissertation, section one.
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imperatives, such as employees’ determination to maintain their jobs and succeed within
the organization, and organizational imperatives for “survival,” perpetuation, recognition,
and growth.46 Second, because organizations in the same line of work tend to
conglomerate, development assistance has become an “industry.” As such, it has
furthered its imperatives to protect the interests of its members and ensure its own
survival, sometimes, over its fundamental mission.
Dichter’s characterization of development organizations might provide a strong
motive for “money moving” at the agent and organizational levels, and might plausibly
explain why aid organizations would be as equally concerned with moving the money as
with the effectiveness of the development assistance they provide.47A probable important
corollary of the organizational imperative to survive and grow would be the remunerative
incentive to move the money: as evidenced by the literature review in chapter two, aid
providers are evaluated and rewarded according to the level of aid resources they
disbursed rather than the ability of these resources to promote economic growth and
reduce poverty.48

46

Hancock (1989, 72) called these “bureaucratic survivalism.” These self-perpetuation imperatives run
counter to donor agencies’ objective to bring development to poor countries. In fact, Dichter (2003) argued
that if development were successful in developing countries, donor agencies would no longer have a raison
d'être, and thus questioned the fact that aid agencies will voluntarily go out of business by bringing
development to the Third World.
47

Dichter (2003) acknowledged that survival imperatives can also incite donor agencies to be more
effective and undertake activities such as self-examination retreats, strategic planning workshops, and
internal reviews to help them achieve effectiveness; but according to Dichter more of these internal reviews
are about prospects of survival than they are about concern for effectiveness.

48

See also Transparency International (2007) and OECD/DAC (1999).
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2. The “Warm Glow” Effect
According to Andreoni (1990), pure altruism is not the only factor explaining
observed patterns of giving; when people make donations, they can also be motivated by
“warm glow.” The “warm glow” effect is the utility or psychological benefits (e.g.,
feeling of gratification) people derived from the “act of giving” itself. Considering this
utility essentially arises from the act of giving and not from its impact, Andreoni (1990)
argued that it is “egoistic” or “impurely altruistic.”
Ostrom et al. (2001) and Gibson et al. (2005) applied Andreoni’s theory to
partially explain why foreign aid does not seem to generate the expected results. To the
extent that aid agents get a “warm glow” from giving, all that matters is the amount of aid
spent or “moved.” In this situation, considerable amounts of aid resources may be given
to aid-receiving countries with little concern about the actual impact of aid.
3. Lack of Checks and Balances and Constraints in the Delivery of Aid
They are (a) limited feedback and accountability, and (b) difficulty to evaluate
and quantify the performance of aid. Those elements could possibly allow in aid agents’
perverse behaviors we generally observe in the aid delivery chain.
One essential characteristic of foreign aid appears to be a “broken information feedback
loop” existing between taxpayers in western industrialized nations generating aid
resources and intended beneficiaries in poor countries. Associated with this broken
feedback may be a limited final accountability both at the aid bureaucracy level and at the
staff level (Martens et al. 2002). In this chapter, aid agency accountability or staff
accountability is defined as an aid agency’s or aid agent’s “obligation to demonstrate that
work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules and standards or to report
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fairly and accurately on performance results vis a vis mandated roles and/or plans”
(OECD/DAC 2002).
According to Martens et al. (2002), the geographic and political separation between
taxpayers and beneficiaries result in the fact that aid recipients have no means to
communicate their own needs, or to communicate whether those needs have been met, to
“reward” or “punish” donors’ actions, or to question the adequacy of what donor agencies
provide them. This is seemingly unlike the political process in modern democracies
where the taxpayers (voters) are the same as the beneficiaries and could therefore, to
some extent, exercise political pressure on public bureaucracies to improve performance
and satisfy their needs.
Evidently, feedback without accountability would lead to inefficient outcomes.
And there seems to be limited accountability both at the aid institution level and at the aid
agency’s staff level. An illustration of why there may be a limited final accountability at a
donor institution level is as follows: in a particular country where numerous aid agencies
operate simultaneously and jointly to promote its economic development, the outcomes
of their individual efforts would be difficult to evaluate, and thus no specific agency
could be held accountable. Unfortunately, many developing countries seem to have at one
point or another experienced this situation. For instance, after twenty years and 2 billion
dollars spent in Tanzania to building roads, the road system appears to have been little
improved and none of the numerous aid agencies operating in Tanzania has been held
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accountable; for it is simply difficult to observe or even evaluate the effects of their
individual efforts (Easterly 2006b; Birdsall 2004; Radelet 2003; World Bank 1998).49
If there is staff accountability in a donor agency, a top executive or country manager for
example, is liable to being called to account for: first, the disappointed performance of a
specific aid project or program he/she directs (in case of short time-bound projects); and
second, the deficiencies in a specific project phase involving the said staff (in case of
development projects requiring long periods of time).50 However, for such a system to be
effective, two elements ought to be present. First, the executive or manager should be
held accountable for not only projects at hand, but also for past projects he/she supervised
(retroactive individual accountability with positive or unlimited prescription). Long
project cycles make it difficult to assess the accountability of the staff. Aid agents in
charge of those projects would have moved on before a systematic evaluation is
conducted. In addition, short-term assignments to field positions and high employee
rotation across departments at headquarters are usually frequent in most aid agencies.
While they expose the staff to a variety of experiences, short-term assignments prevent
them to see all phases of a particular project, from design to evaluation stage (Gibson et
al. 2005). Second, if found somewhat responsible for the bad results of a development

49

Aid institutions have financed more than 1,300 projects in Tanzania between 2000 and 2002 alone, with
an estimated 1,000 missions of donor officials per year and over 2,400 reports to donors per quarter
(Easterly 2006b; Birdsall 2004; Radelet 2003).
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The World Bank identifies the following phases in a project cycle: Country Assistance Strategies, the
Identification Phase, the Preparation Phase, the Appraisal Phase, the Negotiation and Approval Phase, the
Implementation and Supervision Phase, the Implementation and Completion Phase, and the Evaluation
Phase (http://go.worldbank.org/GI967K75D0).
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project, the top executive or country manager should liable to be “punished.”51 In this
regard, we might unfortunately observe that if there has often been a system of checks
and balances ex-ante in the aid delivery process, an ex-post mechanism of checks and
balances would not seem to be always in place (Ostrom et al. 2001). A corollary of such
a system would be that once the top executive or country manager is accountable, he/she
would hold accountable all staff members under his/her chain of command and carry out
punishment.
Another characteristic of foreign aid would be the difficulty to evaluate and
quantify the overall impact of aid, but also the costs and time a rigorous evaluation would
entail. Very often, the lack of comparable baseline database and controlled experiments
would make it impossible to tease out the influence of a particular aid project or program
from the influence of environmental factors or random shocks. Furthermore, establishing
such control and treatment groups might not only prove to be costly and time consuming,
but also unfeasible for the project at hand, due to methodological or ethical constraints.
For instance, it would be inappropriate to establish randomization methods with
development projects such as universal primary education and anti-retroviral HIV/AIDS
drugs interventions (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007; Birdsall 2004; Radelet 2003).
Under these murky conditions, it might be very difficult to attribute the failure of
development projects or programs to donor agencies involved in them, thus providing
them with a fair amount of latitude in their design of development policies in the Third
World.

51

Punishment could involve removal from a project or program, elimination of certain perquisites, or even
dismissal.
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In conclusion, organizational imperatives to survive and grow and its corollary the
remunerative incentive to move the money, the “warm glow” effect, and the lack of
checks and balances are incentives at the aid agency level that might allow the “MoneyMoving Syndrome” to set in and thrive. Beyond recipient countries’ shortcomings and
donor countries’ strategic interests plaguing aid, these aid agency incentives, and the act
of “moving the money” itself, may constitute another important factor explaining why aid
does not seem to generate the desired results.

Emergence of the Money-Moving Syndrome
The probable consequences of the above-mentioned factors in terms of pressure to
spend the available funds appear manifold and in themselves would seem to establish a
vicious circle where excessive attention is placed on the quantity of aid rather than the
quality of aid outcomes or its effect in beneficiary countries. Alimented by one or more
of the aforementioned factors, the following money moving behaviors could be
frequently observed in the development field in general and in international donor
agencies in particular.
Taxpayers in developed countries may be truly concerned about the poor in the
Third World, but the broken information feedback loop is such that they could not
directly observe the impacts of aid and would therefore be inclined to rely on aid volumes
disbursed to evaluate the performance of aid agencies (Ostrom et al. 2001, 124). Aid
institutions would also tend to judge their performance on the basis of the volume of aid
disbursed.52 In this context, the case of the World Bank and other multilateral regional

52

This tendency towards processes rather than results seems to manifest itself in the fact that success is
often defined in terms of the volume of aid disbursed on visible short-run inputs such as: conferences,
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banks are often cited; first and foremost, these institutions are banks, and as such, they
are in the business of lending money to developing countries. To continue justifying their
existence and their primordial role in the international scene, they might be under the
pressure to make big loans, and as quickly and frequently as possible (Hancock 1989;
Wane 2004).
In the search of plausible explanations to the ineffectiveness of aid, there would
seem to be a tendency to emphasize the insufficiency of funds rather than questioning the
organizational structures of aid bureaucracies (Tendler 1975); leading rich industrialized
nations to often make pledges of more and more aid resources. Concerns for development
effectiveness have also led some donor countries and donor agencies to demonstrate their
effectiveness through tangible outcomes. For instance, in 2003, the World Bank
developed a conceptual framework and action plan on “managing for development
results” (World Bank 2004, 84). In addition, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness53 stressed the importance of “results” and “mutual accountability” to
reform the ways donors deliver and manage aid. However, this recent shift towards
“management-by-result” may or may not help close the gap between donor agencies and
their clients. For one, it may exacerbate pressures to spend the money on large-scale
development interventions that would guarantee the delivery of “fast, concrete and visible
results” to the detriment of local initiatives requiring little external funding and which

commissions, committees, publications, missions, foreign experts, advisers, consultants, purchase of goods,
issuing of contracts, etc. (Hancock 1989; Birdsall 2004).
53

http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 1
September 2007.
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could bring sustainable development but in a long and less visible manner (Crespin
2006).
The broken feedback loop and the limited accountability would seem to facilitate
the transformation of domestic suppliers of aid into the direct beneficiaries of aid since
they possess both political power over donors’ politicians and information on the needs
of the poor and the outcomes of development assistance in developing countries (Martens
et al. 2002).54 Therefore, they would seem to be free to pursue their self-interest, move
the money or compel governments and aid agencies to appropriate more funds to aid,
thus cultivating a resource-focused rather than a quality-driven international development
assistance.
Seeking possibilities of career advancements and positions of power, aid officials
might also be willing to respond to pressure to spend the monies to the detriment of the
quality of development projects they manage. They may tend to select large and quickdisbursing infrastructure projects, which on the other hand, may in general involve donor
countries’ contractors and may not necessarily reflect the poor’s needs. Perhaps, subject
to the same behaviors are aid officials working in the field.
Other money moving behaviors could be found in the fact that donor agencies
seem to feel the imperative to always “do” something (Dichter 2003).55 This imperative
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Domestic suppliers of aid are consultant firms, experts, lobbyists, contractors, NGOS, private firms, and
academic institutions. They form a vast chain of principal-agent relationships. In general, they make profit
out of providing goods and services used in the delivery of aid, gain access to foreign markets, and are able
to function thanks to official aid funds channeled through them (Martens et al. 2002).
55

Dichter (2003, 7) argued that the key to development lies “in the realm of the policies, laws, and
institutions of a society, and to change these requires indirect kinds of approaches (stimulating, fostering,
convincing) rather than doing things directly.” A similar idea was raised by Jerve (2002).
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to “act” could be explained by the “warm-glow” altruism or by aid agencies’ need for
survival and growth. It can also be explained by the fact that they partially or totally
depend on “other people’s money,” and as such, they are forced to satisfy the constraints
attached to this type of money (Dichter 2003). In addition, the amount of aid resources
spent by the international development industry into producing annual reports,
publications, brochures, reports, and organizing frameworks, conferences, and summits,
has often been considered as wasteful because they appear more to further the selfinterests of development agencies (perpetuation, recognition, and growth) rather than the
interests of the poor (Hancock 1989; Dichter 2003; Easterly 2006b).
Finally, motivated by the above mentioned incentives, aid agencies might also be
willing to respond to recipient country pressures to “move the money.” Aid dependency
and the volatility of aid flows explain why most developing countries would be eager to
do whatever is necessary to receive as much aid as possible (Azam et al. 1999; Jerve
2002).
Certainly, the money moving behaviors cited above do not constitute a
generalization. One might expect the “Money-Moving Syndrome” to vary across
development agencies and over time. Different aid organizations have different incentive
structures, at least on the margin, and they are also likely to differ in terms of their
approach to feedback, accountability, and evaluations problems encountered in the
delivery of aid. By the same token, incentives for money moving behaviors might change
over time within any aid agency as it incorporates lessons learned into future planning or
adopts institutional reforms.
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In conclusion, when the world decided in September 2000 in New York to launch
an attack on global poverty, donors committed to a substantial aid increase, under the UN
Millennium Declaration, with many promising to raise aid to 0.7 percent of their GNI.56
These commitments were later reaffirmed at subsequent UN summits: the UN summits in
Monterrey, Mexico (March 2002) and in Johannesburg (September 2002); the
International Forum on Aid Harmonization in Rome (February 2003); the Marrakech
Round Table on Financing for Development (2004); the High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness in Paris (2005) and the 2005 World Summit. As donor countries begin to
answer those calls for more aid, the need for greater aid effectiveness appears crucial as
ever. The previous section explored one important incentive problem in aid relationships,
namely the pressure to spend the money; and it provided some examples of this
phenomenon. The next section formally examines whether and how this incentive
problem, by sacrificing quality for quantity, might hinder foreign aid’s development
impact in poor countries.

The Theoretical Model
This section proposes a simple theoretical model that explores how incentive
structures within international donor agencies may lead to “a push” to disburse money; it
also examines the extent to which these incentives may inhibit the ability of foreign aid to
promote economic growth and reduce poverty.

56

This promise by donor governments to spend 0.7% of GNI on official development assistance was
initially made at the UN General Assembly in 1970, available from globalissues.org.
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The general approach we use to model the problem at hand is the principal-agent
model (Baker 1992; Gibbons 1998; Prendergast 1999; Courty and Marschke 2003). Other
approaches are possible (such as surveys of development agencies incentive systems, or
case studies), but we believe the principal-agent framework best fits the main dimension
of the problem and can provide a wealth of insights and implications.
Let us assume there is an international aid organization (the principal) whose
mission is to allocate aid so as to maximize poverty reduction and economic growth in
poor countries. To achieve this objective, the aid agency relies on its staff members or the
bureaucrats (the agents) to allocate aid funds to aid-receiving countries. The aid agency
also establishes its internal incentive structure within which its personnel operate.57 This
is a fundamental aspect since the aid institution incentive system determines the
performance evaluation criteria that would be used to design incentive contracts of staff
members.
An ideal performance measure in an incentive contract reflects an employee's
contribution to the organization’s total value.58 However, in many organizations (nonprofit organizations and government agencies), employees’ contribution to the
organization’s total value function is not objectively measurable; it is either too complex
or too subtle to be objectively evaluated and thus cannot be used in an enforceable
contract with employees. In other words, the principal’s value function cannot be
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This is borrowed from Wane (2004) who showed that both the incentive system prevailing within an aid
agency and a recipient country’s characteristics affect the quality of aid. The importance of incentives was
emphasized by the Sida Studies in Evaluation: “A successful approach to the problem of development must
focus on how to generate appropriate incentives so that the time, skill, knowledge, and genuine effort of
multiple individuals are channeled in ways that produce jointly valued outcomes” (Ostrom et al. 2001 p.
xiii).
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The organization’s total value refers to its fundamental objective or mission.
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objectively measured (Baker 1992; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1993; Gibbons 1998;
Prendergast 1999; van Praag and Cools 2001; Courty and Marschke 2003).
The inability to use the organization’s objective (total value) as a basis for
incentive contracts leads to the use of various alternative methods of performance
evaluation which have the ability to be objectively measured.59 The relevant issue when
using (imperfect) performance measurements is whether the measure used in the
incentive scheme may lead to dysfunctional behavioral responses that will deteriorate or
not further the true goal of the organization due to the prospect that agents tend to focus
only on those aspects of the performance measure that are rewarded (Lindsay 1976;
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1993; Prendergast 1999; Courty and Marschke 2003).
As Baker (1992) has argued, in these circumstances, to avoid distorted incentives
and obtain a contract that yields first-best outcomes, the performance measure should
accurately reflect the organization’s objective; in other words, the marginal product of
effort (or agent’s actions) on the performance measure should be perfectly correlated with
the marginal product of effort (or agent’s actions) on the organization’s objective.
Here, we will follow the framework developed in Baker (1992). We first develop
the basic approach and later, we adapt the model to our specific goals. In the Baker’s
model (1992), V (e, ε ) denotes the organization’s objective (or the organization’s total
value or the agent’s total contribution to the organization value) as a function of the
agent’s effort e (unobservable) and a vector of random variables ε . V (e, ε ) is not
contractible, i.e., it cannot be directly implemented in a contract. Let P (e, ε ) denote the
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The principal can also rely on discretionary subjective performance measures, such as worker's
cooperation, innovation, and dependability, which may complement or improve on the available objective
performance measurements (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1993).
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(alternative) contractible performance measure as a function of the same variables.

P (e, ε ) is scaled such that the expected marginal product of effort on performance
measure equals the expected marginal product of effort on value:
E[ Pe (e, ε )] = E[Ve (e, ε )] .60 The principal uses this performance measure to determine a
linear incentive contract as follows:
w = s + bP(e, ε ),
where w is the agent’s compensation, s is a fixed payment or the agent’s base salary,61
and b is the “piece rate” the agent receives for each unit of P . An important assumption
is that the agent is asymmetrically informed about the state of the world (ε ) and his
informational advantage affects the choice of his effort.
Neither the principal nor the agent knows ε before signing the binding contract,
but the realization of ε is known to the agent before he chooses his effort. Furthermore,
it is assumed that at least some components of ε affect the marginal product of the
agent's effort level on both the performance measure ( Pe ) and the value function (Ve ) .
Hence, from the perspective of the principal, these marginal products are random
variables. The degrees to which the two marginal products ( Ve and Pe ) vary with the state
of the world (ε ) are denoted by σ Ve and σ Pe , the standard deviation of Ve and Pe with
respect to ε .
In the Baker’s model, the agent is assumed to be risk neutral, so that his utility
function takes the form:
60

The expectation operator is taken over ε , the vector of random variables.

61

The agent’s salary is chosen to ensure that worker earns his reservation utility; it has no important role
otherwise (Prendergast 1999; Courty and Marschke 2003).
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U = s + bP(e, ε ) − C (e),
where C (e) is the disutility of effort, C’>0, C’’>0.
The model is solved in a standard way, with the principal maximizing his total
value net of compensation payments subject to the participation and the incentive
compatibility constraints given respectively by:
_

E[ s + bP(e, ε ) − C (e)] ≥ U

(3.1)

bPe (e * , ε ) = C ' (e * )

(3.2)

_

In equation (3.1), U is the agent’s utility given by his outside option or his
reservation utility and ε is unknown. In equation (3.2), ε is revealed to the agent and he
chooses e * given b so that his marginal benefit of effort equals his marginal cost of
effort. The principal’s maximization problem is then:
max E[V (e * , ε ) − s − bP(e * , ε )],
b,s

subject to equations (3.1) and (3.2).
The solution to this problem yields the following expression for the optimal piece
rate:62
b* =

E[Ve eb* ]
E[ Pe eb* ]

(3.3)

Equation (3.3) simply states that the optimal piece rate is equal to the ratio of the
expected value of the marginal product ( Ve ) times the responsiveness of the agent’s effort
to incentives ( eb* ), to the expected product ( Pe * eb* ). Baker (1992) points out that if eb* ,
the marginal effect of incentives on the agent’s effort, is not a function of ε , it would
62

Baker (1992) did not show how he derived this solution, but we provide the full development in appendix
C.
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drop out of the formula and b * = E[Ve ] E[ Pe ] = 1 ; which is the standard case in agency
theory with a risk-neutral agent. However, eb* depends on ε in this situation; and
differentiating equation (3.2) with respect to b gives:
eb* =

Pe
.
C − bPee

(3.4)

''

Substituting (3.4) into (3.3) using the second-Taylor approximation for C and P ,63 and
assuming without loss of generality that E[Ve ] = E[ Pe ] = 1 , equation (3.3) can be rewritten
as:
b* =

Cov(Ve , Pe ) + 1 ρσ Ve σ Pe + 1
=
,
var( Pe ) + 1
σ P2e + 1

(3.5)

where ρ is the correlation between Pe and Ve .
An important implication of Baker’s model is that, even under risk-neutrality,
achieving the first-best outcomes (i.e., an optimal incentive intensity or piece rate

b * equals to one) requires that Pe and Ve have the same variance and have perfect
correlation. Otherwise, the performance measure leads to distorted incentives and the
contract does not induce first-best outcomes.
Now taking the 1992 Baker model as a basis, our goal is to extend the analysis to
the case of development assistance by examining how incentive structures within
international donor agencies may lead to “a push” to disburse money and the extent to
which these incentives may inhibit the ability of foreign aid to promote economic growth
and reduce poverty. Specifically, the model explores how donor agencies’ institutional
63

ε

The second-Taylor approximation assumes that the second derivatives of C and P with respect to e and
are constant (Baker 1992).
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incentive systems affect the characteristics of an optimal incentive contract and thus give
rise to the “Money-Moving Syndrome.” Additionally, the model derives conditions
required to reach an efficient outcome in terms of the impact of aid on poverty reduction
and sustainable economic growth.
It follows from Baker (1992) that an aid organization’s mission to maximize
poverty reduction and economic growth is part of its total value function. In effect, aid
agencies are part of a chain of principal-agent relationships which starts with taxpayers
and their legislative representatives as principals who are willing to transfer appropriated
funds to developing countries. They delegate the implementation of development
programmes to an aid agency. The aid agency, in turn, becomes the principal to other
agents in the aid delivery chain (Martens et al. 2001). Hence, the objective or the mission
of an aid organization (i.e., global poverty alleviation and sustainable economic growth)
is mostly defined by those ultimate principals who provide aid resources (e.g., citizens,
taxpayers).64 However, aid agencies, as agents, also have “organizational imperatives”
(survival, growth, achieve and/or maintain higher status or leadership position, have
greater “market share,” promote interests of stakeholders, and so on).65 In the corporate
world, these imperatives are completely integrated into the total value function. In
development assistance, it cannot be the case; being effective for an aid agency, or
accomplish its mission as stated above, would mean to “shorten the organization’s
lifespan, not lengthen it,” which runs counter to its imperative to survive or grow.
64

Note that in some cases, for example, the World Bank, part of its resources comes from loans mobilized
on international capital markets.
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Dichter (2003) argued that these organizational imperatives evolve naturally. See chapter 3 of this
dissertation for more details.

54

Although these organizational imperatives are experienced at different levels across aid
agencies,66 they may be translated into similar actions across organizations. Donors,
whose explicit goal is to alleviate poverty and promote growth, are committed by the
very nature of their mission to deliberately put themselves out of work (Dichter 2003;
Ellerman 2005). Thus, when they are faced with the prospect of survival and/or growth,
aid organizations, though caring about development, may naturally take actions that run
counter or preclude this mission and may institute an incentive system and performance
evaluation criteria somewhat fostering these organizational imperatives. Hence, an aid
organization will value two elements: its true mission (aid effectiveness) and its
organizational imperatives.
We proceed to extend Baker’s model (1992) as follows: let V (e, ε ) denote the aid
agency’s true mission, i.e., to promote aid effectiveness in terms of maximizing poverty
reduction and economic growth. As before, V (e, ε ) is a function of the agent’s effort e
(unobservable) and a vector of random variables ε . Let O(e, ε ) denote the
aforementioned organizational imperatives, as a function of the same variables. Note that
V (e, ε ) is not contractible because the agent’s (staff in the aid agency) contribution to
development is difficult to observe and evaluate. O(e, ε ) is also not contractile for similar
reasons.
The aid agency is thus required to choose an alternative performance measure
easy enough to monitor or evaluate that it can be used in an incentive contract with the
66

It may be argued that some development agencies, such as the World Bank, would not be concerned
about, for example, survival in the short-run given the number of poor in the world. Nonetheless, in the
long-run, as development takes place and is both successful and sustainable, those agencies may become
less necessary.
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staff. Let us assume the aid agency decides on a performance measure P (e, ε ) defined as
the volume of aid allocated within a specific period of time; e then becomes the agent’s
effort exerted for project identification, design, and preparation.67 The rationale for such a
choice of performance measurement is as follows: considering a development institution
is in the business of “transferring” money from taxpayers in the developed world to the
poor in the developing world and in a context where aid workers’ contribution to
development is difficult to observe and evaluate, a tendency will arise to measure
performance according to the size of budgets allocated to implement and finance
development projects and programs for the reason that this performance measure appears
convenient and is easily monitorable. A corollary of this rationale would be to determine
under which conditions the volume of aid allocated would be more likely directed
towards poverty alleviation or/and organization imperatives purposes.
Let us therefore consider the following assumptions:
E[ Pe (e, ε )] = γE[Ve (e, ε )] + (1 − γ ) E[Oe (e, ε )],
where γ =

θ
c+m

(3.6)

and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1

with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, 0 < m ≤ 1.
Equation (3.6) states that the extent to which the expected marginal product of
effort on the performance measure is related to the expected marginal product of effort on
both organizational imperatives and the goal to reduce poverty depends on parameters θ ,
c, and m. The parameter θ is a measure of the degree of accountability in the

development agency, specifically accountability for effectiveness with θ = 1 denoting
67

This is similar to Wane (2004).

56

perfect accountability.68 Parameter c represents the level of corruption in recipient
countries, with c = 1 characterizing highly corrupt countries. The degree of difficulty to
measure or evaluate the performance of development projects or program aid is denoted
by m , where m = 1 embodies development activities whose effectiveness is very difficult
to evaluate.
Accountability is defined as “the means by which individuals and organizations
report to a recognized authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions”;
and accountability for effectiveness is “the extent to which the combined impact of an aid
agency’s portfolio of projects is in fact positively contributing to sustainable
development” (Crawford 2004). The concept of accountability also implies the possibility
of negative evaluation accompanied by sanction, or the possibility of positive evaluation
and reward (Wenar 2006).
Today, there is a general consensus that corruption, defined as the “abuse of
public office for private gain,” deters economic growth and poverty reduction and should
be eradicated (Transparency International 2007).69 In recipient countries, especially those
countries where development resources constitute a large source of finance, corruption
would prevent aid to reach the targeted beneficiaries and would lessen the magnitude of
the impact of aid. Additionally, considering decision-making processes over aid
allocations remain for the most part outside public scrutiny, the level of corruption in
some aid-receiving countries may provide donor agencies with windows of opportunities
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The international aid institutions should be accountable either to taxpayers in rich countries from whom
resources are obtained, or to the intended beneficiaries in developing countries, or to both (Wenar 2006).

69

See Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2004).
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and incentives to yield ground to organizational imperatives and external constraints
when implementing development efforts.
Evaluation of development activities is an important aspect of the accountability
of donor agencies. The evaluation of a particular development effort depends on the
choice of development goals, the choice of indicators used to measure goal achievement,
the choice between absolute goal achievement or the overall “value-added” of the
development effort, the time period over which the evaluation is conducted, and on
decisions about who should do the assessment. Once there is a consensus on the above
evaluation criteria, evaluation becomes more complex the more extensive the
development effort. For instance, the evaluation of a single project would be quite
straightforward while the evaluation of a budget support to a recipient government would
be much more complex (Pitman et al. 2005). We therefore assume that the more
complex it is to evaluate development efforts of a donor agency in a recipient country, the
greater the opportunities and incentives for that agency to emphasize organizational
imperatives over poverty alleviation or economic growth.
Various interactions between accountability, corruption and development
evaluation in equation (3.6) would influence the extent to which the expected marginal
product of effort on the performance measure is related to the expected marginal product
of effort on both poverty reduction and organizational imperatives to survive and grow.
First, if γ → 1 , then the expected marginal product of effort on the performance
measure should be close or equal to the expected marginal product of effort on the
organization’s objective to alleviate poverty or promote economic growth. This criterion
would be met under the following conditions:
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•

If an aid agency with a strong accountability system provides highly corrupt
recipient countries with development assistance strictly in the form of easily
measurable development activities ( θ → 1, c → 1, m → 0 ); such a form of
development assistance would provide the agency accountable with a margin of
maneuver to police and sanction aid recipients. Conversely, such an aid agency
would only implement budget supports, development policy lending, or
comprehensive development frameworks whose economic, political, institutional
and social ramifications render evaluations complex, in highly clean recipient
countries ( θ → 1, c → 0, m → 1 ).70

•

If an aid agency with a strong accountability system chooses to limit aid strictly to
developing countries with good governance and very low levels of corruption and
in the form of development projects and programs whose performance evaluations
are easily carried out ( θ → 1, c → 0, m → 0 ).71

•

Finally, if an aid agency with a limited accountability chooses to restrict its
development aid to the least corrupt countries and focuses on financial and
technical assistance where outputs, outcomes, and impacts are easy to identify
and measure ( θ → 0, c → 0, m → 0 ). In this context, low aid agency

Note that equation (3.6) mathematically imposes that θ ≤ c + m, even though accountability,
corruption, and development evaluation are independent from one another. However, the expected marginal
product of effort on the performance measure remains close or equal to the expected marginal product of
effort on the organization’s objective to alleviate poverty or promote economic growth if
( θ → 1, c → 1, m → 0 ) or ( θ → 1, c → 0, m → 1 ) and θ > c + m.

70

71

The expected marginal product of effort on the performance measure remains close or equal to the
expected marginal product of effort on the organization’s objective to alleviate poverty or promote
economic growth if ( θ → 1, c → 0, m → 0 ) and θ > c + m. Note that when θ = 1 , the aid agency is
totally held accountable for producing positive results in reducing poverty and promoting economic
growth. For efficiency reasons, it is important to increase accountability to the extent that this results in
greater poverty reduction; because a higher degree of accountability also involves costs (Wenar 2006).
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accountability would be counteracted by low levels of corruption in recipient
countries and project performance assessed against easily monitorable targets and
efficiency criteria.
Second, if γ → 0 , then the expected marginal product of effort on the
performance measure should be close or equal to the expected marginal product of effort
on aid agency’s organizational imperatives to survive and grow. This criterion would be
met when the following condition is satisfied:
• If an aid agency with a limited accountability ( θ → 0 ) does not discriminate

against corrupt countries and provides development assistance in the form of
budget supports, development policy lending, or comprehensive development
frameworks whose economic, political, institutional and social ramifications
render evaluations complex ( c → 1, m → 1 ). The same is true when an aid agency
with a limited accountability chooses to implement easily measurable
development activities in highly corrupt countries ( c → 1, m → 0 ) or conversely,
to provide development policy lending in support of policy and institutional
reforms to the least corrupt countries ( c → 0, m → 1 ). In these three cases, aid
officials are given windows of opportunities to satisfy the aid agency’s
organizational imperatives to survive or grow.
Finally, for any other level of accountability and corruption and any other level of
difficulty to evaluate development activities, the expected marginal product of effort on
the performance measure would be equal to a linear combination of the expected
marginal product of effort on poverty reduction and the expected marginal product of
effort on organizational imperatives to survive and grow. In other words, at any other
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level of accountability and corruption and any other level of difficulty to evaluate
development activities, an aid official would work for and allocate his/her effort
simultaneously to both the aid agency’s mission to reduce global poverty and its
imperatives to survive.
A second important set of assumptions relates to the relationship between V (e, ε ) ,
O(e, ε ) and P (e, ε ) . The aid agency’s total value function is defined by:
W (e, ε ) = αO(e, ε ) + (1 − α )V (e, ε )

(3.7)

In other words, the development agency cares about both aid effectiveness and its
organizational imperatives. The parameter α is the preference weight on organizational
imperatives, where 0 < α < 1 . All other assumptions of the Baker’s model remain.
The principal’s maximization problem becomes:
max E[W (e * , ε ) − s − bP (e * , ε )],
b,s

subject to equations (3.1) and (3.2).
The solution to this problem yields the following optimal incentive intensity for a
risk-neutral agent:72
b =
*
1

αE[Oe eb* ] + (1 − α ) E[Ve eb* ]
E[ Pe eb* ]

.

(3.8)

As before, if the marginal effect of incentives on the agent’s effort is not a function of ε ,
i.e., eb* does not depend on ε , eb* would drop out from equation (3.8) and the optimal
piece rate becomes b1* =

72

αE[Oe ] + (1 − α ) E[Ve ]
E[ Pe ]

, where E[ Pe ] = γE[Ve ] + (1 − γ ) E[Oe ]

See appendix C for a complete derivation of the optimal piece rate.
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given the assumption in equation (3.6). In this case, b1* would be equal to one
when α + γ = 1 ; in other words, the closer γ is to one, the smaller the preference weight
attached to organizational imperatives. This result implies the following proposition:
Proposition: In a bilateral or multilateral aid agency, the preference weight attached to

organizational imperatives to survive and grow is small when:
•

The accountability for effectiveness is very high and attached to readily
measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries

•

The accountability for effectiveness is very high and attached to readily
measurable development activities implemented in corrupt countries, and vice
versa (negative relation between c and m ).

•

The accountability for effectiveness is limited but attached to readily measurable
development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries.
Substituting (3.4) into (3.8), using the second-Taylor approximation for C and P ,

the optimal incentive intensity becomes:
b1* =

αE[Oe Pe ] + (1 − α ) E[Ve Pe ]
E[ Pe2 ]

(3.9)

.

Equation (3.9) can easily be rewritten as follows:73
b1* =

α (cov(Oe , Pe ) + E[Oe ].E[ Pe ]) + (1 − α )(cov(Ve , Pe ) + E[Ve ].E[ Pe ])
var( Pe ) + ( E[ Pe ]) 2

,

(3.10)

or
b1* =

α (ρ1 .σ O .σ P + E[Oe ].E[ Pe ]) + (1 − α )(ρ 2 .σ V .σ P + E[Ve ].E[ Pe ])
e

e

e

σ P2 + ( E[ Pe ]) 2
e

73

See appendix C for a complete derivation of the optimal piece rate.
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e

,

(3.11)

where ρ1 is the coefficient of correlation between Oe and Pe , and ρ 2 is the coefficient of
correlation between Pe and Ve , and E[ Pe ] = γE[Ve ] + (1 − γ ) E[Oe ] .
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, an incentive contract is efficient
i.e., induces first-best outcomes, when the optimal incentive intensity or piece rate
b * equals to one. Per this definition, an incentive contract would be efficient whether it

achieves first-best outcomes in terms of aid effectiveness or first-best outcomes in terms
of promoting organizational imperatives to survive and grow. However, we are interested
in an incentive contract where an aid organization’s incentive structure would influence
the chosen performance measure in such a way that would elicit an “effective” effort
from aid officials, i.e., a level of effort that not only would affect their reward but also
contribute as much as possible to the aid agency’s true mission to reduce poverty and
promote economic growth (Praag and Cools 2001). Consequently, “efficiency” hereafter
would refer to efficiency in terms of poverty alleviation and sustainable growth.
Under the assumption that development aid agencies also face organizational
imperatives that may justify the choice of a performance measure based on the amount of
aid allocated within a specific period of time,74 the characteristics of an optimal incentive
contract based on such performance evaluation and the conditions for efficient outcomes
depend on the imperatives of aid organizations and their degree of accountability, the
level of corruption in recipient countries and how difficult it is to assess development
activities.75

74

As aforementioned, other reasons to evaluate performance based on the amount of money spent are
explored in section 1 of chapter 3. However, here we focus on organizational imperatives.

75

The pertinent equations for the discussion are equations (3.6) and (3.11).
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First, if concerns about poverty alleviation and economic growth are predominant
in a development agency and if there is a high level of accountability attached to readily
measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries, such
that α → 0 and γ → 1 , then a first-best linear incentive contract for a risk-neutral agent is
obtained when the marginal product of the agent's effort level on both the performance
measure ( Pe ) and the aid agency’s true mission (Ve ) have the same variance and have
perfect correlation. The first-best linear incentive contract could also be obtained under
the aforementioned conditions in the cases where the accountability for effectiveness is
very high and attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in
corrupt countries, and vice versa, or where the accountability for effectiveness is limited
but attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in the least
corrupt countries. In such an aid agency, the performance measure creates an incentive to
direct each unit of effort/money towards its poverty alleviation mission; the staff is
encouraged to choose projects and adopt policies more likely to promote development.
Furthermore, if the recipient country is highly corrupt, perfect accountability would
require that the agency implement development projects and program aid whose
performance evaluation is easily carried out, and vice versa (negative relation between
c and m ). Lower levels of aid agency accountability would be offset by low levels of

corruption in recipient countries and project performance assessed against easily
monitorable targets. In this case, the quantity of aid disbursed factors in aid “quality.”76
This is the Quality-Aid Incentive Scheme (figure 2).
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According to the Commitment to Development Index 2006 developed by the Centre for Global
Development (CGD), “quality” aid, among other things, excludes tied aid, subtracts debt payments by
developing countries on aid loans, and favors poor and uncorrupt countries.
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Second, it could also happen that concerns about poverty alleviation and
economic growth are predominant within an aid agency with limited accountability
where, on the one hand, development assistance programs do not discriminate against
corrupt countries and are provided in the form of development policy lending inherently
difficult to evaluate. On the other hand, low aid agency accountability could also be
attached to easily measurable development activities in highly corrupt countries or to
development activities difficult to evaluate and implemented in least corrupt countries
such that α → 0 and γ → 0 . In these circumstances, the expected marginal product of
effort on effectiveness should be equal to the expected marginal product of effort on
organizational imperatives in order to maintain the efficiency of the contract. Otherwise
stated, despite strong concerns for development effectiveness, the above combination of
limited accountability and levels of corruption and project performance measurability
would leave room to organizational imperatives however weak they may be, and thus to
the possibility to “move the money.” One solution to dampen this possibility of moneymoving syndrome might be to restrict development assistance to countries with low
levels of corruption and in the form of development projects and programs with higher
levels of performance measurability (Quality-Aid Incentive Scheme with Limited
Accountability).

Third, if the internal imperatives of an aid organization largely outweigh the goal
of effectiveness (α → 1) and the levels of accountability, corruption and project
performance measurability are such that the expected marginal product of effort on the
performance measure equals the expected marginal product of effort level on
organizational imperatives, meaning γ → 0, then the chosen performance measure would
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elicit a level of effort that would contribute as much as possible to the aid agency’s
organizational drive to grow if and only if the marginal product of the agent's effort level
on both the performance measure ( Pe ) and organizational imperatives (Oe ) have the same
variance and have perfect correlation. However, the incentive contract would not be
efficient in terms of poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. Each unit of
effort/money would be directed towards the organization’s imperative to survive, to
grow, or maintain its global status. Therefore, the focus is predominantly on volume of
aid disbursed rather than on the impact of aid disbursement on development. This
situation is encountered when aid agencies with limited accountability and high
preference for survival adopt development assistance programs that do not discriminate
against corrupt countries and are provided in the form of budget support or program aid
more difficult to evaluate; or when these agencies implement easily measurable
development activities in highly corrupt countries and vice versa. This is the MoneyMoving Syndrome Incentive Scheme, a state where the quantity of foreign aid committed

or disbursed becomes, in itself, an important objective side by side or above the
effectiveness of aid (figure 2).
Finally, let us modify the previous case in such a way that the internal imperatives
to survive are still largely predominant in the aid organization (α → 1) , but this time

γ → 1, i.e., the levels of accountability, corruption and project performance measurability
are such that the expected marginal product of effort on the performance measure equals
the expected marginal product of effort level on aid effectiveness. In this case, the
performance measure would still align, as closely as possible, aid officials’ levels of
effort and aid agency’s imperatives to survive and grow if an additional condition is taken
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into account: the expected marginal product of effort on organizational imperatives
equals the expected marginal product of effort on effectiveness. In other words, despite a
high preference for survival, a combination of high level of accountability attached to
readily measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries
would compel aid workers to somewhat choose projects and adopt policies that are more
likely to promote development. Further pressures to emphasize organizational
imperatives over aid effectiveness would be discouraged where the accountability for
effectiveness is very high and attached to readily measurable development activities
implemented in corrupt countries, and vice versa, or to some extent where the
accountability for effectiveness is limited but attached to readily measurable development
activities implemented in the least corrupt countries (Money-Moving Syndrome Incentive
Scheme with High Accountability).
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Figure 2: Analytical Illustration of the Effects of “Money Moving” Incentives on Aid
Effectiveness

[0 < α < 1,0 ≤ γ ≤ 1]
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Conclusion

In general, international development agencies’ principal mission is to reduce
global poverty and promote sustainable economic growth. Concurrent to this mission,
external constraints, institutional structures and the incentives they generate may help or
hinder development efforts. Among these institutional incentives and external constrains,
are organizational imperatives to survive and grow, the “warm glow” effect, the lack of
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e

checks and balances, and the difficulty to evaluate and quantify the overall impact of aid;
factors that have been identified in this study as providing a motive for money moving
behaviors within international development agencies. In the theoretical model, we
assumed that, given the difficulty to quantify the overall impact of aid, an aid agency that
values its mission and is concerned about organizational imperatives (or warm glow) may
choose to evaluate staff performance according to the size of budgets allocated to
implement and finance development projects and programs. The extent to which this
performance measure affects aid effectiveness would depend on the level of institutional
imperatives, the degree of accountability within the aid agency, the level of corruption in
recipient countries and the degree of difficulty to evaluate development activities.
The theoretical model suggests, among other things, that as long as concerns
about poverty alleviation and economic growth are predominant and a high level of
accountability is attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in
the least corrupt countries, the quantity of aid disbursed would factor in aid “quality.”
This is explained by the fact that the staff is given the incentive to direct each unit of
effort and money towards projects and policies more likely to promote development. On
the other hand, where, for example, organizational imperatives outweigh the goal of aid
effectiveness and limited accountability is attached to development assistance programs
that do not discriminate against corrupt countries and are provided in the form of budget
support or program aid more difficult to evaluate, each unit of effort and money would be
mainly directed towards promoting organizational imperatives, because the staff face the
incentive to focus on the amount of money disbursed rather that the impact of that
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amount of aid on development. This occurrence is called the “Money-Moving
Syndrome.”
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The objective of this chapter is to test several predictions of the theoretical model.
We develop an empirical framework to examine the extent to which organizational
imperatives for “survival,” perpetuation, recognition, and growth affect international aid
agencies’ incentive structures and thus their mission to reduce global poverty and
promote sustainable economic growth. In particular, the empirical framework analyzes
the extent to which incentives to move the money stemming from these imperatives are
present within donor agencies and coexist with genuine concerns about aid effectiveness
to shape aid agencies’ decisions regarding project loan size to developing countries.
This chapter is organized in five sections. It begins with an overview of the
empirical approach used to test the existence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome.” In the
second section, we offer a description of variables and data sources used in the empirical
analysis. The empirical methodology is described in the third section. In section four, we
present our main set of hypotheses testing the existence of the “Money-Moving
Syndrome” within the World Bank practices. In the last section, we develop the empirical
model and specify the estimation equations used to test our set of hypotheses.
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Overview

At this stage, it is important to recognize that the nature and the limitation of the
data available do not allow us to derive the testable empirical hypotheses entirely from
the theoretical model presented in the previous chapter; therefore attenuating the
connection between theory and empirics in this dissertation. However, we could draw
from the theoretical model several predictions readily testable empirically and complete
them with testable hypotheses derived from the money moving literature reviewed in the
second chapter.
As discussed in previous chapters, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine
the prevalence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” within international donor agencies
and its role as a potential factor in the low performance of foreign aid in terms of poverty
alleviation and growth enhancement in developing countries.
One approach in attempting to gauge the prevalence of the “Money-Moving
Syndrome” within donor agencies would be to identify the determinants of project size or
net commitment amounts to aid recipient countries.
However, an analysis of the impact of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” on the
effectiveness of foreign aid is less straightforward. An ideal model specification would be
one in which there is a relationship between a measure of aid effectiveness as a
dependent variable and a measure of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” as an explanatory
variable plus a set of other control variables. For example, at the aid institution level, we
would analyze the extent to which the “Money-Moving Syndrome” is present in each
project commitment and disbursement levels and then analyze how it affects the
performance of that project.
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However, while there are many variables readily available that could be used to
measure the overall impact of aid,77 this is not so for the “Money-Moving Syndrome.” To
the extent of our knowledge, variables or proxies explicitly capturing independent
institutional biases toward money moving at the expense of the development impact are
not currently available. This issue was already raised by Fleck and Kilby (2005a).
Moreover, there are not yet any variables specifically capturing money moving incentives
faced by aid officials in aid agencies and other organizations involved in development
assistance.78
Consequently, it appears that estimating a direct relationship between aid
effectiveness and “Money-Moving Syndrome” is not yet feasible. Nevertheless, as
emphasized by the review of literature in chapter two, there is good reason to believe that
a high degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” will somewhat lead or contribute to aid
ineffectiveness for the simple reason that, in this context, what matters the most is the
volume of aid disbursed rather than its actual impact on poverty reduction or economic
growth.
In our context, we posit that evidence in support of the “Money-Moving
Syndrome” can perhaps be used to provide evidence as to why foreign aid has not been
more effective in reducing global poverty and promoting economic growth among
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For instance, variables such as GDP per capita growth, life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate,
primary, secondary or tertiary enrolment ratio, and so on.
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As far as we know, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) is the only aid agency
which attempted to determine if its employees felt pressures to disburse the budget within the appropriation
period. Amongst the 46 randomly selected Sida Desk Officers interviewed, around 31officers indicated that
they had been under the pressure to “move the money,” especially at the end of the end of the budget year
(Ostrom et al. 2001).
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developing countries, despite the large amount of resources involved in achieving this
goal over the years.

Variables Description and Data Sources

Foreign assistance is delivered through a collection of projects and programs
offered by different multilateral aid agencies or bilateral donors to developing countries
(Wane 2004). These development projects and programs are in general “donor-driven.”
This means that international development agencies are highly involved in the
identification, design, implementation, and evaluation of those projects and programs in
poor countries. In this context, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies might be
interpreted as being as responsible as developing countries for the effectiveness of
foreign aid through the quality of aid they provide.79 It is therefore sound to examine
whether the “Money-Moving Syndrome” is present in aid agencies’ decisions over loan
amounts for projects in aid-receiving countries. Of course, our underlying hypothesis is
that whether incentives to move the money are present or not would influence aid quality
and thus aid effectiveness.
However, obtaining comprehensive project databases from International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral organizations is not an easy task and is often impossible.80
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Some authors have shown that donor agencies could improve the quality of the aid they provide. For
example, Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998) showed that the economic and sector work (ESW) provided
by the World Bank improves the quality of World Bank lending portfolio. Kilby (2000) showed that early
supervision and the amount of supervision improve the performance of World Bank-funded projects.
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Regarding some bilateral agencies, the USAID’s “Greenbook” for instance shows a complete record of
the U.S. foreign aid (loans and grants) to the rest of the world for each fiscal year since 1949. However, this
database does not contain any information on the performance of those projects. Also, the Office of
Inspector General in charge of the efficiency and effectiveness in the operations of the USAID does not
release data on the performance of USAID’s projects overseas.
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In 2005, the Bank Information Center (BIC) and freedominfo.org developed the IFI
Transparency Resource, an extensive information tool which compares the transparency
standards of ten IFIs, including the World Bank and the regional development banks.81
The Transparency Resource was developed to encourage greater openness by the IFIs and
promote higher global governance standards within the IFIs. The data in the Resource
examines the ten IFIs’ operations and projects and compare them across around 250
indicators of transparency (IFI Transparency Resource 2005).82
One indicator is the “Final staff assessment of project” which provides critical
information about institution, borrower, and implementing agencies’ performance; and an
evaluation of implementation of various aspects of the project. Another indicator is the
“Evaluation unit assessment or audit of project” conducted by the Operations Evaluation
Department of the institution and which assesses if the original objectives of the project
have been satisfied and determines the project overall performance. The IFI Transparency
Resource comparison of the ten IFIs across these two indicators revealed that, with the
exception of the World Bank, the IFIs in general do not disclose information related to
their evaluations and assessments related to a given project or operation (IFI
Transparency Resource 2005).
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The ten IFIs examined in the Transparency Resource are the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the
African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the
European Investment Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the World Bank (IFI Transparency
Resource 2005).
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The IFI Transparency Resource was launched in 2005 but it has been regularly updated.
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We thus requested the World Bank projects database, and after a careful review of
the request and dissertation outline by the Bank, we were finally able to obtain the data.
However, contrary to the IFI Transparency Resource, some important variables we
specifically requested (such as sub-ratings data, discussed in the section below) were
omitted from the dataset. The reason given was that these data are “not currently
disclosed.”
For all the obvious reasons, the empirical analysis in this chapter focuses
exclusively on the World Bank-funded project database. Due to the unavailability of the
data on projects and programs funded by other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies,
the World Bank will be used as a proxy for the performance of all other donors in the
development field.
The econometric analysis draws on 1,977 World Bank projects approved in 134
developing countries between 1984 and 2006 and completed between 1993 and 2007.
The central variables in this analysis are project loan size or net commitment (dependent
variable), various measures of project success and the World Bank’s and borrower’s
performance in various stages of the project life cycle. We consider a variety of other
project characteristics such as administrative regions, economic sector or network, and
lending instrument types. These project-level variables are reported by the Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank. Additionally, the aid literature has long
emphasized that GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, population size
(indicators of need) and macroeconomic policy indicators such as inflation and trade
openness (indicators of country merit) are important factors influencing aid allocation
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and therefore project size in developing countries.83 It is then important to control for
these variables. All macroeconomic and policies variables included in the empirical
analysis are drawn from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006) and the
Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2006). They cover a period from 1984 to 2004.
Governance indicators such as corruption and bureaucracy quality over the same period
are also retained in our analysis.
From an original population of 7,260 projects transmitted to us, only 2,078 were
found to have complete measures of project success and bank and borrower performance.
Of these, 101 other projects displayed a size of zero and have been excluded. This leaves
us with 1,977 projects in our sample. The resulting dataset is a project-level
independently pooled cross-section dataset. The summary statistics and the definition of
all variables are presented in table D1 through table D3 of appendix D.
The choice of the dependent and explanatory variables presented in detail below
stems from the propositions and implications of theoretical model we developed in
chapter three. In the model, we assumed that because aid officials’ contribution to
development is difficult to observe and evaluate, a tendency will arise to measure
performance according to the size of budgets allocated to implement and finance
development activities for the reason that this particular performance measure appears
convenient and is easily monitorable. However, the extent to which the chosen
performance measure would elicit an “effective” effort from aid officials, i.e., a level of
effort that would contribute as much as possible to an aid agency’s true mission to reduce
poverty and promote economic growth, would depend on factors such as: aid agency’s
83

See Burnside and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Dollar (2000), and Kilby (2000) for more details.
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preferences for organizational imperatives to survive and grow, degree of aid agency’s
accountability for effectiveness, level of corruption in recipient countries and level of
performance measurability. The main propositions of the model are as follows:
(a) As long as concerns about poverty alleviation and economic growth are
predominant, and a high level of accountability is attached to readily measurable
development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries, the staff is given the
incentive to direct each unit of effort and money towards projects and policies more
likely to promote development. Therefore, the quantity of aid disbursed would factor in
aid “quality.”
(b) On the other hand, if organizational imperatives outweigh the goal of aid
effectiveness and limited accountability is attached to development activities that do not
discriminate against corrupt countries and are provided in the form of budget support or
program aid more difficult to evaluate, the staff is given the incentive to direct each unit
of effort and money towards promoting organizational imperatives. Therefore, the focus
would be on the amount of money disbursed (aid “quantity”) rather that the impact of that
amount of aid on development.84
These two propositions and other propositions derived from the model justify the
choice of project loan size as the dependent variable. Indeed, this variable offers the
possibility to separate the component “quality” from the component “quantity” in the
volumes of aid resources allocated to developing countries. From the set of explanatory
variables included in the model that would influence the quantitative and qualitative
aspects of official aid (such as aid agency’s preferences for organizational imperatives to
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Quality of foreign aid refers to its output whereas quantity of aid refers to its input. A complete definition
of aid quality is provided in appendix A.
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survive and grow, degree of aid agency’s accountability for effectiveness, level of
corruption in recipient countries and level of performance measurability), only data on
corruption and performance measurability are readily available and therefore used in the
testable empirical hypotheses. As aforementioned, other explanatory variables that have
been known to significantly influence the quantitative and qualitative aspects of aid (such
as GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, population size, inflation, trade
openness, and bureaucracy quality) have been drawn from the literature (discussion of the
relevance of these variables is in section four).

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is a measure of project’s size and reflects the degree of
World Bank involvement.85 It is called the Net Commitment Amount (in millions of
current dollars) and is calculated as total commitments net of cancellations for all projects
in the Work Bank portfolio (Annual Report on Portfolio Performance 2006).
An important part of a development project is the mode and amount of financing
required for the project. The proposal for financing the project may involve a loan
component from the World Bank. The World Bank may then approve the loan amount
for the project based upon mutually agreed upon terms and conditions.86 The amount of
loan approved is called the committed loan amount. Once the loan is approved, the
borrower should meet certain conditions (in terms of the project), before the loan
becomes effective. Upon the loan becoming effective, the World Bank may disburse the
85

Hereafter, project size, loan amount, and net commitment will be used interchangeably in the chapter.
Loan Approval by the Board of Directors occurs at stage 5 of the World Bank Project Cycle (see
appendix E).
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loan. For closed (completed) projects, net commitments equals to all disbursements
made.87

Independent Variables

Our main independent variables of interest are three project performance rating
criteria developed by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG): (1) overall
project outcome, (2) project’s sustainability, and (3) project’s contribution to institutional
development in the borrowing country. These indicators are available from ex-post
evaluations conducted by the IEG and provide an assessment of the overall performance
of a completed project.
The overall project outcome is the extent to which the project’s major relevant
objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. Project outcome is
rated on a six-point scale: highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory,
moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.
Sustainability reflects the resiliency to risks of a project as measured by the
likelihood that its estimated net benefits will be maintained or exceeded over the project's
intended useful life. Sustainability is rated using the following five-point scale: highly
likely, likely, uncertain, unlikely, and highly unlikely.
Finally, the institutional development impact measure assesses the extent to which
a project improves the ability of a country to use its human, financial, and natural
resources efficiently, equitably, and in a sustainable manner. This last measure is rated
using a four-point scale: high, substantial, modest, and negligible (Independent

87

This information was provided by the Loan Services Group at the World Bank.

80

Evaluation Group 2006). These performance ratings are transformed into dichotomous
variables for the econometric analysis.
Other independent variables of interest include the IEG's evaluations of bank and
borrower performance. The goal of these evaluations is to determine how good a job each
partner has done during the different stages of the project cycle, i.e., project
identification, preparation, appraisal and implementation. However, only the overall bank
and borrower performance are available in our dataset. In the case of the bank, the quality
at entry and quality of supervision ratings are combined into a rating of overall bank
performance. This rating is based on a six-point scale from highly satisfactory to highly

unsatisfactory, where “highly satisfactory” means that the bank performance was rated
highly satisfactory on both dimensions.88 In the case of the borrower, ratings for
government performance and implementing agency (ies)’s performance are combined
into a rating of borrower performance. This rating is also based on a six-point scale,
where “highly satisfactory” means that the borrower performance was rated highly
satisfactory on both dimensions.89
Another potentially useful variable is the Implementation Completion Report or
ICR quality. This is a project performance evaluation conducted by the operational staff
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It should be noted that when the rating for one dimension is in the satisfactory range while the rating for
the other dimension is in the unsatisfactory range, the rating for overall bank performance normally
depends on the outcome rating. Thus, overall bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory if
Outcome is rated in the satisfactory range or Moderately Unsatisfactory if outcome is rated in the
unsatisfactory range, except when Bank performance did not significantly affect the particular outcome
(Independent Evaluation Group 2006).

89

A similar guidance rule as in the previous footnote applies for the borrower performance rating.
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of the Bank itself but not by the IEG; in that regard, it is a self-evaluation.90 ICR quality
is rated as exemplary, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory.
All the above-mentioned performance ratings are also transformed into
dichotomous variables for the econometric analysis.
In the following paragraphs, we discuss other variables of interest that can be
potentially used as control independent variables (discussion of the relevance of these
variables is in section four).
First, other project characteristics that could be used in this study consist of:
i) Administrative regions (Africa; Asia; Europe, Middle East and North Africa; and
Latin America and Caribbean) which correspond to the major operational
divisions of the World Bank
ii) Economic sectors (Agriculture, Health, Education, Transport, and so on), which
reflect the type of project.91
iii) Projects are also categorized by type of lending instruments. There are two types
of lending instruments: investment lending and adjustment lending.92 Investment
lending provides long-term financing for a variety of activities in various sectors
aimed at building the physical and social infrastructure necessary for
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The IEG nevertheless reviews every ICR and validate the self-rating (see
http://www.worldbank.org/oed/oed_tools.html).
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In total, 17 sectors are represented in the IEG dataset.
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In 2004, adjustment lending was replaced by development policy lending (see
http://go.worldbank.org/56JYOB4OV0), accessed 10 February 2008.
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development. Adjustment lending provides quick-disbursing financing to support
policy and institutional reforms in developing countries.93
iv) In the IEG dataset, each project has also an approval fiscal year, an approval date,
an exit fiscal year, a deactivation date (or closing date) and an evaluation date.
We also control for macroeconomic conditions in the borrower country which
may influence Bank managers’ decisions over project size or loan amount. The variables
taken into account are some measures of poverty or need in the recipient country, such as
GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, and some policy indicators such as
inflation and trade openness. These data are compiled from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006) and the Penn World Tables (Heston et al.

2006). Other variables likely to affect decisions over project size or loan amount are
corruption and bureaucracy quality, governance indicators compiled from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
A brief overview of the World Bank’s lending portfolio size, composition, and
performance is presented in Table D4 through Table D7 of appendix D. Table D8 reports
the frequency distribution of projects per aid recipient country.
Tables D4 and Table D5 report the size of the loan by region, sector, and overall
project outcome respectively. Cleary, from 1984 to 2006, East and South Asia received
on average the largest amount of net commitments (around $1.1 billion) for a total of 510
operations. With near 78 percent successful outcomes weighted by number of projects,
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For more information on Investment and Development Policy Lending, refer to
http://go.worldbank.org/Y5DDIIBTY0 and http://go.worldbank.org/NIOSPCWSA0, accessed 10 February
2008.
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this region is well above the Bank’s average of 74 percent. This is the case for most
regions except Sub-Saharan Africa. Over the same period, Sub-Saharan Africa’s total net
commitment averaged $36 million with the largest number of operations (544) financed
by the World Bank during that period. However, the breakdown of successful
development outcomes by region revealed that Sub-Sahara Africa’s low successful
outcomes rating at 61 percent, weighted by number of operations, is well below the
Bank-wide average of 74 percent.
A detailed analysis of development outcomes by Sector Boards (Table D5) shows
that during the same period, the Finance sector outperformed other sectors in successful
development outcomes in terms of number of operations; furthermore the Finance
portfolio was the largest, with an average net commitment of $1.44 billion. Two sectors
(Environment & Social Development and Private Sector Development) had successful
development outcomes below the World Bank’s average of 74 percent; each sector
receiving around $50 million in net commitments.
Table D6 shows development outcomes by loan size and approval month.
Compared to other operations, projects approved at the end of the fiscal year (March,
April and May) had successful outcomes weighted by number of projects below the
Bank’s average; moreover, their average portfolio from 1984 to 2006 is close to the
average portfolio of operations approved during the remainder of the fiscal year.
Operations considered difficult to evaluate are the largest in the Bank’s portfolio,
with an average loan size of about $1.75 billion concentrated on 264 operations and with
development outcomes at 80 percent successful by number of projects. On the other
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hand, operations considered easy to evaluate received on average $80 million with
successful development outcomes slightly above the Bank’s average (Table D7).

Empirical Methodology

To examine the extent to which “Money-Moving Syndrome” and concerns for
poverty alleviation coexist within the World Bank, we use the independently pooled
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. Indeed, projects subject to a Project
Performance Assessment Report (PPAs) conducted by the World Bank’s Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG) are randomly selected each year from a population of completed
projects. One in four completed projects (around 70 projects a year) is subject to a Project
Performance Assessment Report. Unfortunately, data on projects not approved, and
projects approved and completed but not subject to Project Performance Assessment are
not reported.
In addition, we use specific estimation procedures in an attempt to address
potential econometric issues. Due to of the possible nonlinear effects of population and
GDP per capita, these two variables are entered in the regression in logarithm and
quadratic terms respectively. To control for potential heteroskedasticity in the error term,
we use the White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. To account for any historical
factors that could potentially affect the current decisions regarding project loan size, or to
control for unobserved factors (projects and country unobservables) that affect current
project loan size and are likely to be correlated with one or more of the independent
variables (endogeneity bias), we use a lagged dependent variable. Using this technique as
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a way to control for unobservables is not perfect but it allows us to obtain better estimates
of our main variables of interest.

Testable Hypotheses

Our empirical work attempts to explain the “net commitments” dependent
variable as fully as possible by controlling for all independent variables that may
positively affect the size of the net commitments; but at the same time to include other
explanatory variables that may reduce if not eliminate the size of net commitments.
Evidence supporting the existence of a “Money-Moving Syndrome” will be
provided if: a) we find those variables that are expected to take a negative sign to actually
take a positive and significant coefficient (for example, the higher the level of corruption
in the country as measured independently by Transparency International, the higher the
level of net commitments); and b) we find those variables that are expected to have a
positive sign actually being insignificant or taking a negative and significant coefficient.
Specifically, after controlling for country- and project-specific factors, we are
interested in determining the extent to which the World Bank’s managers take into
consideration past project performance, bank and borrower performance when making
decisions regarding the loan amount of a new development project. In effect, we would
expect that, before choosing the loan amount of an additional development assistance
project in a country, a country manager concerned about project performance would take
into account the relevance and efficiency of past projects in the country, their
sustainability, their impact on institutions, and the quality of the work done by both the
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Bank and the borrower in various stages of past projects (hypothesis 1).94 Reckoning with
this information as well as with country specific characteristics may have a positive
impact on the effectiveness of a new development assistance project approved in a
recipient country. In effect, it provides an estimate of the likelihood of success of the
Bank’s future development projects and programs in a country and may reduce the
“excessive optimism” about conditions in recipient countries that often plagues
development organizations preoccupied with volume of lending rather than effectiveness
of loans. Another advantage of such an analysis is that it provides an idea of whether the
World Bank encourages a learning environment, i.e., whether past knowledge affects
future planning within the Bank.
However, a regression of net commitments on past overall project performance
ratings or even past overall Bank and borrower performance may not be a correct
specification because these ratings may not yet be available to the country manager at the
time he/she is making a decision regarding the loan amount of a new project. A solution
to this problem would be to use sub-ratings of past projects performance i.e., performance
ratings at the design, preparation, and implementation stages of past projects.
Unfortunately, the IEG sub-rating data are not disclosed to the public.
To circumvent this problem, we use the performance ratings of past projects
which, at the time of the approval of a new project, are at least halfway to the end or at
least three- quarter to the end (figure 3). The idea is that if past projects are, for instance,
at least halfway to the end at the time of approval of a new project, the country manager
may already possess some relevant information about the overall future performance of
94

We could also argue that, in his/her decision-making process, the country manager should heavily weigh
the performance of the most recently completed projects and the bank and borrower performance for those
projects, rather than the projects that were completed a long time ago.
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these projects. In effect, when a project is halfway completed, performance ratings at
design, preparation, implementation and supervision stages of the project are already
known (see appendix E). Furthermore, previous studies on the World Bank lending
portfolio have shown that a project with a satisfactory quality at entry has a higher
probability of performing well than a project with design problems from the start; the
stock of prior economic and sector work (ESW) improves the quality of World Bank
lending; and the timing and intensity of supervision have a positive impact on a project’s
probability of success (Deininger et al. 1998; Kilby 2000; Wane 2004).
As for past projects which at the time of the approval of a new project are
completed, the country manager would already possess relevant information about the

overall performance of these projects and thus, their performance ratings could easily be
used when making a decision regarding the amount of resources to be allocated to the
new project in the aid-receiving country.
For illustration purposes, let us consider the example in figure 3. In order to
maximize the effectiveness of a new project in China, the China country manager at the
World Bank should consider the following before determining the loan amount of the
new project: (a) country-specific characteristics and (b) the relevance and performance of
past projects P-2, P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-6.
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Figure 3: Project Timeline
Country: China
Approval fiscal year of a new project: FY 199595
90

2000

95

94
P-1 (1/8 in 95)
93

97
P-2 (halfway in 95)

92
96
P-3 (halfway in 94 and 3/4 in 95)
90
97
P-4 (~3/4 in 95)
2000
90
P-5 (halfway in 95)
91

P-6 (completed in 95)

An additional approach to test the existence of an “approval culture” or a
“Money-Moving Syndrome” within an aid agency would be to examine how the promise
of funds or the net commitments to a recipient country respond to macroeconomic
conditions, institutional framework and policy environment in that country. Similar to
the aid allocation literature, we are interested in verifying whether the pattern of lending
is dictated by recipients’ need and merit (factors making aid loans effective in alleviating
poverty) or by aid agencies’ organizational imperatives to survive and grow (hypothesis
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The World Bank’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30. For example, fiscal year 2003 covers the
period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003.
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2). In particular, we would expect that, in an aid agency where poverty reduction

initiatives outweigh money moving incentives, variables such as GDP per capita and its
growth rate (measures of the level of poverty and indicators of need) would have a
negative effect on the size of new projects ceteris paribus; meaning that the promise of
funds of an education or health project would be larger the poorer the country. We would
also expect that aid agencies would reward good economic policies; for instance the
lower the inflation rate and the higher the degree of openness the larger the project loan,
holding everything constant (indicators of merit). The quality of governance measured by
the level of corruption and the bureaucracy quality in recipient countries should also enter
in the decision-making process (other indicators of merit). A proven track record of
lending to corrupt countries or countries with poor bureaucracies would seem to produce
evidence that there is a “Money-Moving Syndrome” at work.
Evidence supporting the existence of a “Money-Moving Syndrome” may also be
provided by the impact of many other variables essential in capturing a donor agency’s
preference for volume of lending over projects’ value or program accomplishments. One
such variable is the total net commitment of past projects in a country at the time of
approval of a new project. This variable would determine whether more budget resources
tend to be allocated in recipient countries where past loan volumes are already substantial
(hypothesis 3). If the emphasis is on the effectiveness of the development assistance
provided rather than on the volume of lending, overall past loans alone should not affect
decisions regarding project loan size; but rather their impact should be weighted in
relation to intermediate or final performance of past projects. More precisely, we would
expect the volume of past loans in a recipient country to have a positive effect on a new
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project loan size if the proportion of successful past projects in that country is quite high
(extension of hypothesis 3).
Another interesting variable would be one that captures the degree of difficulty to
evaluate and quantify project performance. More explicitly, this variable would reveal
whether donor agencies systematically spend more money on large-scale development
interventions which overall impact on poverty would be difficult to evaluate and quantify
(hypothesis 4). As mentioned in chapter three, performance evaluation of development
activities is an important aspect of the accountability of donor agencies. However,
performance evaluation becomes more complex the more extensive the development
effort. Basically, while the performance evaluation of a single project would be quite
straightforward, the implementation of budget supports, development policy lending, or
comprehensive development frameworks with their economic, political, institutional and
social ramifications would render performance evaluations much more complex. We
therefore assume that the more complex it is to evaluate development efforts of a donor
agency in a recipient country, the greater the opportunities for organizational imperatives
for survival, recognition, and growth to enter into play, and the greater the institutional
incentives to “move the money.” We choose to divide economic sectors into three
categories based on the degree of difficulty of project performance evaluation: difficult,
moderately difficult and easy to evaluate.96 A project evaluation dummy is created to
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These three categories are constructed on the basis of the type of project (or sectors), the lending
instruments and the lending instrument types. The first category (“difficult to evaluate”) includes all
projects in economic sectors financed by development policy lending. The second category includes all
projects, except projects in the Infrastructure Network sector, financed by investment loans. The last
category (“easy to evaluate”) includes all projects in the Infrastructure Network sector financed by
investment loans. We assume that it is possible to determine in which category a new development project
will fall even before its design or implementation as long as the type of project, the lending instrument and
the lending instrument type are known.
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capture each category. As aforementioned, this dummy variable also indirectly controls
for the magnitude of projects.
Additionally, we might be interested in testing the existence of end-of-fiscal-year
pressures to spend within the World Bank (hypothesis 5); although it operates mostly on
the basis of loans mobilized on international capital markets (not government
appropriations) and, a priori, should be not subject to this type of pressure. To capture the
end-of-fiscal-year effect, we use project’s approval date to create a dummy variable. The
value of the dummy variable is one if a project’s loan size is approved in April, May, or
June and zero if it is approved in the remainder of the fiscal year (from July to March).97
Finally, we also argue that the quantitative and qualitative aspects of project loan
size do not only depend on the above-mentioned variables but also on the interaction
between these variables:
First, let us consider what we call performance interactions. We have previously
mentioned the interaction term between past project performance and past loans (see
extension of hypothesis 3). In a money moving environment, we also argue that past
project performance would matter less in decisions regarding loan sizes when a new
project to be approved is considered difficult to evaluate than when it is easy to evaluate
(this is an extension of hypothesis 4);98 the rationale being that the wider the economic,
political, institutional and social ramifications of a new development project or program,
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The World Bank’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30. For example, fiscal year 2003 covers the
period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003.
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As aforementioned, we assume that it is possible to determine in which category a new development
project will fall even before its design or implementation as long as the type of project, the lending
instrument and the lending instrument type are known.
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the higher the probability of organizational imperatives and money moving incentives to
enter into play, and thus the lower the chance to take into account the likelihood of
project success in decisions regarding new project loan size. This is the interaction term
between project evaluation dummies and past project performance criteria.
Second, we introduce an interaction term between past project performance
criteria and corruption to examine to what extent the partial effect of past project

performance on net commitments depends on the level of corruption in the recipient
country. Basically, the level of corruption prevailing in a recipient country may also
exacerbate preferences for volume of lending over its effective use by minimizing the
impact of past project performance on decisions regarding new project loan sizes (this is
an extension of hypothesis 2).99
Lastly, we are interested in estimating the effect of time interactions terms
computed as a product of year dummies and past performance criteria on the one hand
and project evaluation dummies on the other hand. Year dummies correspond to four
time periods from 1984 to 2006. First, the 1980s, when development assistance took the
form of structural adjustment programs aimed at reducing inflation, correcting
government deficits, removing price distortions, and reducing trade barriers. Then, the
first and the second half of the 1990s, when development assistance started to recognize
the need for sound institutions like good governance, property rights, and democratic
accountability. We divide the 1990s in two periods to somewhat capture the impact of the
Wapenhans Report released in 1992 and commissioned by Lewis Preston during his
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As a reminder, the corruption index takes on values between zero (most corrupt recipient countries) and
six (least corrupt recipient countries).
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presidency at the World Bank (1991-1995). The Wapenhans Report found that pressure
to lend money surpassed any other considerations and therefore instigated the
implementation of measures destined to shift the focus away from lending volumes
towards effective implementation of lending projects. Finally, the 2000s which saw the
rise of a new aid architecture characterized by a greater emphasis on selectivity in
allocating aid; a growing recognition of the importance of governance, institutions, and
local ownership of reforms; enhancement of aid coordination and donor alignment with
country strategies; greater considerations for absorptive capacity constraints; measuring
and monitoring of results.

In summary, we are interested in empirically testing the following: the extent to
which the “Money-Moving Syndrome” coexists with an aid agency’s true mission to
reduce poverty and promote economic growth; the latter being achieved when aid loans
are allocated on the basis of country need and country performance as measured by good
governance, good policy environment, and good intermediate and final outcome
indicators.
Table 3 below summarizes the main set of testable hypotheses developed to
estimate the level of “Money-Moving Syndrome” within aid agencies and in particular
the World Bank. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, results in the second
column of the table are expected to provide evidence in support of the “Money-Moving
Syndrome.”
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Table 3. Some Testable Hypotheses Assessing the “Money-Moving Syndrome”100

Independent
Variable

Evidence of Quality-Aid if
Expected Impact on Dependent
Variable (a)
Positive

Evidence in Support of “Money-Moving
Syndrome” if
Expected Impact on Dependent Variable (b)
Negative/Insignificant

Overall Project
Outcome
Project
Positive
Sustainability
Project Institutional
Positive
Development Impact
Bank Performance
Positive
Borrower
Positive
Performance
Implementation
Positive
Completion Report
or ICR quality
Total Net
Insignificant
Commitment of Past
Projects
End of Fiscal Year
Insignificant
Dummy
GDP per capita
Negative
GDP per capita
Negative
Growth
Inflation
Negative
Openness
Positive
Corruption101
Positive
Bureaucracy Quality
Positive
Note: (a), (b): statistically significant and holding everything else constant.

100

Negative/Insignificant
Negative/Insignificant
Negative/Insignificant
Negative/Insignificant
Negative/Insignificant

Positive

Positive
Positive/Insignificant
Positive/Insignificant
Positive/Insignificant
Negative/Insignificant
Negative/Insignificant
Negative/Insignificant

The table does not include important interactions terms that may be useful in capturing the “MoneyMoving Syndrome.” See section four for details.
101
The ICRG corruption index takes on values between zero, for the most corrupt countries, and six, for the
least corrupt countries.

95

Model Specifications
To test our set of hypotheses, we estimate variants of the following general baseline
equation:

log(netcommit ) = α + β g g ' + β p p ' + β G G ' + β P P + β b b ' + β D D + β Z Z + ε

(4.1)

where g is a 2x1 vector of governance and institutional variables that affect
project loan size, here corruption and bureaucracy quality; p is a 2x1 vector of
macroeconomic policy variables, i.e., trade openness and inflation rate as a measure of
monetary policy; G is a Gx1 vector of variables reflecting recipient need such as
logarithm of GDP per capita, logarithm of GDP per capita squared, growth rate of GDP
per capita, and logarithm of population. In the aid literature, it has often been found that
small countries usually receive more aid than larger countries.102 In addition, the D vector
reflects region, sector, and year dummies in the regression. The regional and sector
dummy variables capture variations across regions and sectors which may affect project
loan size.
P is a Px1 vector of intermediate and final project performance indicators, notably

overall project outcome, project’s sustainability, project’s contribution to institutional
development in the borrowing country, and implementation completion report quality.
Considering they constitute different measures of project outcome, we estimate variants
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However, there is not a consensus in the aid literature regarding the role of population as an indicator of
recipient need versus its role as an indicator of donor interest. If it is reasonable to assume that, at the same
level of development, larger poor countries would require more aid than smaller ones; it is also the case that
donors would wish to give more aid to larger and potentially powerful poor countries in order to increase
their political influence (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Burnside and Dollar 2000).
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of equation (4.1) with one performance criterion at a time. We also include the vector b,
which is a 2x1 vector of bank and borrower performance.
All these performance ratings are transformed into dichotomous variables for the purpose
of the econometric analysis. For example, the dummy variable “outcome50” is equal to
one if, at the time of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past
projects halfway completed or completed in that country were successful.103 When
making a decision regarding the loan size of a new project, this measure not only gives a
country manager an adequate idea about the success rate of ongoing and completed
projects, but also the likelihood of success of new projects in the country. Hence, with a
proportion of at least 50% of successful past projects in the country, a country manager
might feel confident about allocating more funds to a new project for the reason that
these funds are less likely to be wasted compare to a situation where the success rate of
past projects is very small. The dummies are interpreted similarly for each of the other
project performance rating criteria.104
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The dummy variable “outcome50” is equal to zero if, at the time of approval of a new project in a
recipient country, either there are no halfway completed or completed past projects, or strictly less than
50% of halfway completed or completed past projects were successful.
104

The other dummies reflecting project performance rating criteria are: sustain50, impact50, and icrq50.
Sustain50 equal to one if, at the time of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of
past projects halfway completed or completed were likely sustainable. Impact50 equal to one if, at the time
of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past projects halfway completed or
completed had a substantial or modest institutional development impact. Icrq50 equal to one if, at the time
of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past projects halfway completed or
completed were judged successful by the World Bank’s operational staff. The dummies reflecting Bank
and Borrower performance rating criteria are bankperf50 and borrperf50. Bankperf50 equal to one if, at
the time of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past projects halfway
completed or completed had a successful bank performance. Borrperf50 equal to one if, at the time of
approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past projects halfway completed or
completed had a successful borrower performance.
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Finally, our baseline equation also includes a subset of Zx1 vector of variables Z,
essential in capturing the tradeoff between volume of lending and project's quality within
the World Bank. The vector of variables Z includes the lagged dependent variable,105 the
total net commitments of past projects in a country at the time of approval of a new
project, the end-of-fiscal-year dummy and a project evaluation dummy. The interaction
terms between the above-mentioned variables are also included in this vector.

105

The dependent variable is from period t + 1 and the lagged dependent variable is therefore from period t.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This chapter reports the empirical results derived from our main testable
hypotheses regarding the presence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” using data from
the World Bank. We proceed to estimate the following:
• First, for each of the three project performance rating criteria developed by the
World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), i.e., (a) overall project
outcome, (b) project’s sustainability, and (c) project’s contribution to
institutional development in the borrowing country, we estimate the general
baseline equation capturing our five main testable hypotheses and the corollary
interaction terms;
• Second, we estimate the general baseline equation using the project performance
rating developed by the operational staff of the World Bank itself, i.e., the
Implementation Completion Report or ICR quality.
The rationale for these alternative specifications is simply to evaluate the robustness
of our results to various measures of project performance.
Four tables, Table 4 to Table 7 below, report the estimation results. For each of
the four project performance criteria above-mentioned, we estimate the parameters in the
baseline equation using simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). As for inference, we use
the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for our estimates of the loan allocation
model.
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The first section clarifies some issues regarding the data. The second section
reports the determinants of project loan size using each project performance rating
criterion one at the time in the baseline equation. To that effect, Table 4 presents the
estimation results of our loan allocation model described in equation (4.1) using overall
project outcome as the first project performance rating criterion. Table 7 presents similar
results using the Implementation Completion Report or ICR quality as the fourth and last
project performance rating criterion. The five main hypotheses and the corollary
interactions are discussed in turn. The third section considers the results of the previous
section and discusses the extent to which the “Money-Moving Syndrome” coexists with
the World Bank’s true mission to reduce global poverty and promote economic growth in
the developing world.

Additional Data Issues

Before presenting and interpreting the estimation results of our testable
hypotheses, some clarifications might be useful. The corruption index takes on values
between zero (most corrupt) and six (least corrupt). Therefore, a positive sign in the
estimation results tables indicates that, holding other factors fixed, the least corrupt the
recipient country, the higher the project loan size on average. The same is true for
bureaucratic quality; a positive sign indicates that countries with a high quality
bureaucracy receive on average larger project loan size, holding everything else fixed.
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Determinants of Project Loan Size

In this section, we examine the existence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome”
using the World Bank project database and using alternatively each project performance
rating criterion in the loan allocation model. Table 4 to Table 7 present the empirical
results.

Table 4. Determinants of Project Loan Size (Overall Project Outcome)
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a

Variable
Lnetcommit_1
corrupt
bureau
openk
infl
Lgdp
Lgdp2
ggdp_cap
Lpop
Lcumloan
outcome50
bankperf50
borrperf50
reg2
reg3

(1)
No Interactions
0.059**
(0.030)
0.046
(0.036)
0.010
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.048***
(0.381)
0.083***
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.385***
(0.040)
-0.048
(0.039)
-0.309**
(0.123)
0.363***
(0.127)
0.005
(0.118)
0.102
(0.120)
0.181
(0.122)

Specifications
(2)
Performance Interactions
0.161***
(0.046)
-0.050
(0.050)
0.023
(0.036)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.046***
(0.382)
0.083***
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.382***
(0.040)
-0.048
(0.039)
-0.300
(0.317)
0.342***
(0.126)
0.016
(0.118)
0.092
(0.118)
0.153
(0.123)
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(3)
Year Interactions
0.050*
(0.030)
0.045
(0.036)
0.006
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.985***
(0.373)
0.079***
(0.026)
-0.005
(0.006)
0.379***
(0.040)
-0.042
(0.038)
-0.203
(0.134)
0.319**
(0.125)
0.015
(0.118)
0.096
(0.120)
0.190
(0.123)

reg4
yr80s
yr95_99
yr2000s
proj_eval1
proj_eval2
Apr_June

0.320**
(0.132)
0.004
(0.093)
-0.248***
(0.068)
-0.551***
(0.136)
1.253***
(0.102)
-0.524***
(0.057)
-0.089*
(0.053)

0.279**
(0.132)
-0.055
(0.091)
-0.239***
(0.068)
-0.562***
(0.138)
0.944***
(0.169)
-0.521***
(0.077)
-0.085
(0.053)
-0.145***
(0.051)
0.427**
(0.198)
0.030
(0.111)
0.160**
(0.063)

Lagcom_out50
peval1_out50
peval2_out50
out50_corr
yr80_out50
yr9599_out50
yr2000_out50
yr80_peval1
yr9599_peval1
yr2000_peval1
yr80_peval2
yr9599_peval2
yr2000_peval2
Constant

0.247
(1.372)
Observations
1383
R-squared
0.43
a
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.229
(1.397)
1383
0.44
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0.312**
(0.133)
0.123
(0.132)
-0.100
(0.128)
-0.375
(0.371)
0.815***
(0.170)
-0.455***
(0.081)
-0.083
(0.052)

0.000
(0.000)
-0.131
(0.127)
-0.626**
(0.280)
-0.752***
(0.210)
0.257
(0.210)
1.010***
(0.338)
-0.149
(0.150)
-0.120
(0.122)
0.132
(0.363)
0.078
(1.351)
1383
0.44

Table 5. Determinants of Project Loan Size (Project Sustainability)
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a

Variable
Lnetcommit_1
corrupt
bureau
openk
infl
Lgdp
Lgdp2
ggdp_cap
Lpop
Lcumloan
sustain50
bankperf50
borrperf50
reg2
reg3
reg4
yr80s
yr95_99
yr2000s
proj_eval1
proj_eval2
Apr_June
Lagcom_sust50
peval1_sust50
peval2_sust50

(1)
No Interactions
0.060**
(0.030)
0.052
(0.036)
-0.000
(0.037)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.070***
(0.383)
0.085***
(0.026)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.391***
(0.040)
-0.053
(0.039)
-0.116
(0.078)
0.205*
(0.112)
-0.036
(0.114)
0.064
(0.119)
0.164
(0.122)
0.282**
(0.131)
0.011
(0.093)
-0.258***
(0.068)
-0.552***
(0.136)
1.251***
(0.102)
-0.524***
(0.057)
-0.088*
(0.053)

Specifications
(2)
Performance Interactions
0.097**
(0.038)
0.003
(0.043)
-0.003
(0.037)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.986**
(0.384)
0.080***
(0.026)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.391***
(0.040)
-0.048
(0.038)
-0.370
(0.302)
0.184
(0.112)
-0.034
(0.113)
0.015
(0.118)
0.109
(0.123)
0.216*
(0.131)
-0.015
(0.092)
-0.239***
(0.068)
-0.557***
(0.138)
0.962***
(0.118)
-0.578***
(0.070)
-0.075
(0.053)
-0.073
(0.049)
0.537***
(0.159)
0.173
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(3)
Year Interactions
0.050*
(0.030)
0.057
(0.037)
-0.009
(0.037)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.058***
(0.380)
0.084***
(0.026)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.384***
(0.040)
-0.041
(0.038)
-0.151
(0.111)
0.191*
(0.114)
-0.022
(0.115)
0.072
(0.119)
0.179
(0.123)
0.290**
(0.132)
0.098
(0.131)
-0.228**
(0.114)
-0.792**
(0.364)
0.791***
(0.172)
-0.455***
(0.081)
-0.088*
(0.052)

(0.120)
0.122*
(0.065)

sust50_corr
yr80_sust50
yr9599_sust50
yr2000_sust50
yr80_peval1
yr9599_peval1
yr2000_peval1
yr80_peval2
yr9599_peval2
yr2000_peval2
Constant

0.205
(1.383)
Observations
1383
R-squared
0.43
a
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.044
(1.396)
1383
0.44
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0.000
(0.000)
0.086
(0.126)
-0.131
(0.237)
-0.757***
(0.213)
0.271
(0.212)
1.024***
(0.350)
-0.152
(0.150)
-0.123
(0.122)
0.129
(0.375)
0.240
(1.379)
1383
0.44

Table 6. Determinants of Project Loan Size (Project Institutional Development Impact)
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a

Variable
Lnetcommit_1
corrupt
bureau
openk
infl
Lgdp
Lgdp2
ggdp_cap
Lpop
Lcumloan
impact50
bankperf50
borrperf50
reg2
reg3
reg4
yr80s
yr95_99
yr2000s
proj_eval1
proj_eval2
Apr_June
Lagcom_imp50
peval1_imp50
peval2_imp50

(1)
No Interactions
0.059**
(0.030)
0.050
(0.036)
0.012
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.070***
(0.386)
0.084***
(0.027)
-0.005
(0.006)
0.380***
(0.040)
-0.042
(0.039)
-0.090
(0.115)
0.232*
(0.136)
-0.086
(0.106)
0.079
(0.120)
0.161
(0.123)
0.295**
(0.132)
0.002
(0.094)
-0.247***
(0.069)
-0.555***
(0.138)
1.241***
(0.102)
-0.527***
(0.057)
-0.084
(0.053)

Specifications
(2)
Performance Interactions
0.190***
(0.050)
-0.039
(0.051)
0.018
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.150***
(0.387)
0.090***
(0.027)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.376***
(0.040)
-0.040
(0.039)
0.113
(0.337)
0.250*
(0.137)
-0.101
(0.108)
0.076
(0.118)
0.155
(0.123)
0.275**
(0.131)
-0.064
(0.092)
-0.239***
(0.069)
-0.584***
(0.144)
0.754***
(0.194)
-0.487***
(0.084)
-0.081
(0.053)
-0.172***
(0.053)
0.585***
(0.225)
-0.044
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(3)
Year Interactions
0.049
(0.030)
0.056
(0.036)
0.004
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.994**
(0.385)
0.079***
(0.027)
-0.005
(0.006)
0.366***
(0.040)
-0.025
(0.039)
-0.099
(0.121)
0.218
(0.137)
-0.082
(0.107)
0.077
(0.120)
0.158
(0.125)
0.280**
(0.133)
0.097
(0.133)
-0.233
(0.157)
0.328
(0.363)
0.772***
(0.174)
-0.463***
(0.081)
-0.085
(0.052)

(0.112)
0.136**
(0.064)

imp50_corr
yr80_imp50
yr9599_imp50
yr2000_imp50
yr80_peval1
yr9599_peval1
yr2000_peval1
yr80_peval2
yr9599_peval2
yr2000_peval2
Constant

0.405
(1.390)
Observations
1383
R-squared
0.43
a
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.519
(1.416)
1383
0.44
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0.000
(0.000)
0.056
(0.154)
-1.259***
(0.208)
-0.739***
(0.214)
0.287
(0.213)
1.031***
(0.348)
-0.147
(0.150)
-0.115
(0.122)
0.147
(0.371)
0.297
(1.391)
1383
0.44

Table 7. Determinants of Project Loan Size (Implementation Completion Report
Quality)
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a

Variable
Lnetcommit_1
corrupt
bureau
openk
infl
Lgdp
Lgdp2
ggdp_cap
Lpop
Lcumloan
icrq50
bankperf50
borrperf50
reg2
reg3
reg4
yr80s
yr95_99
yr2000s
proj_eval1
proj_eval2
Apr_June
Lagcom_icrq50
peval1_icrq50

(1)
No Interactions
0.061**
(0.030)
0.049
(0.036)
0.011
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.046***
(0.385)
0.082***
(0.027)
-0.005
(0.006)
0.385***
(0.040)
-0.053
(0.040)
0.093
(0.114)
0.119
(0.131)
-0.096
(0.107)
0.091
(0.119)
0.182
(0.122)
0.301**
(0.132)
0.027
(0.095)
-0.267***
(0.068)
-0.575***
(0.137)
1.248***
(0.102)
-0.525***
(0.057)
-0.087
(0.053)

Specifications
(2)
Performance Interactions
0.180***
(0.052)
-0.047
(0.055)
0.018
(0.036)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.122***
(0.389)
0.088***
(0.027)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.381***
(0.040)
-0.054
(0.040)
0.222
(0.347)
0.149
(0.132)
-0.119
(0.109)
0.093
(0.119)
0.172
(0.123)
0.285**
(0.131)
-0.034
(0.094)
-0.253***
(0.069)
-0.583***
(0.141)
0.789***
(0.235)
-0.478***
(0.088)
-0.082
(0.053)
-0.152***
(0.055)
0.519**
(0.259)
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(3)
Year Interactions
0.051*
(0.030)
0.056
(0.036)
0.002
(0.036)
0.002
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.976**
(0.384)
0.077***
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.371***
(0.040)
-0.036
(0.039)
0.087
(0.117)
0.083
(0.132)
-0.096
(0.108)
0.100
(0.119)
0.193
(0.124)
0.298**
(0.132)
0.111
(0.134)
-0.427**
(0.187)
0.324
(0.363)
0.767***
(0.173)
-0.460***
(0.081)
-0.089*
(0.052)

peval2_icrq50

-0.058
(0.113)
0.139**
(0.067)

icrq50_corr
yr80_icrq50
yr9599_icrq50
yr2000_icrq50
yr80_peval1
yr9599_peval1
yr2000_peval1
yr80_peval2
yr9599_peval2
yr2000_peval2
Constant

0.249
(1.391)
Observations
1383
R-squared
0.43
a
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.421
(1.443)
1383
0.44

0.000
(0.000)
0.252
(0.184)
-1.282***
(0.208)
-0.720***
(0.213)
0.296
(0.213)
1.063***
(0.349)
-0.145
(0.150)
-0.120
(0.122)
0.169
(0.371)
0.180
(1.391)
1383
0.44

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 states that in a money moving environment, the relevance and
efficiency of past projects, their sustainability, and their impact on institutions in a
recipient country would not matter in decisions regarding the net commitments of new
development projects in that country. The results in the first specification (column one)
of Table 4 through F4 finds evidence to support this hypothesis within the World
Bank.106 The dummy variable “outcome50” is negative and statistically significant at the
106

The regression specifications with sector dummies rather than project evaluation dummies yield
approximately the same results, at least when the performance criterion is the overall project outcome (see
Table F1 in appendix F).
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5 percent level, meaning that a country with a proportion of at least 50 percent of
successful past projects receives on average 31 percent less in new project loan (or net
commitments) than when it has a success rate of strictly less than 50 percent, holding
other factors fixed. In other words, more resources are directed to countries where the
success rate of past projects is small and are therefore more likely to be wasted. It would
appear that despite a low performance of foreign aid in some developing countries, the
World Bank continues to provide these countries with increasing levels of funding. This
situation may reflect an “excessive optimism” about conditions in recipient countries that
often plagues development organizations, an “excessive optimism” about the probable
returns of new development assistance projects approved. Another possibility is the fact
that recipient countries with low performance of foreign would attract more attention
from the World Bank.
The additional project performance dummy variables “sustain50,” “impact50,”
and “icrq50” enter insignificantly, suggesting that the proportion of past projects that
were sustainable, or past projects with a substantial institutional development impact, or
even past projects that were judged successful by the Bank’s operational staff does not
affect decisions regarding new project loan sizes.
Related to the first hypothesis is the impact of Borrower and Bank performance
ratings of past projects that are halfway completed or completed at the time of approval
of a new project. The borrower performance rating (“borrperf50”) evaluates the level of
the borrower’s ownership and responsibility necessary to ensure the quality of project’s
preparation and implementation, which are important to achieve both development
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objectives and sustainability. From Table 4 through Table 7 in all three specifications,107
we find that the proportion of past projects for which the borrower performance was
successful does not affect current project loan sizes.
These results may suggest that the World Bank might have not created positive
organizational incentives to learn about factors leading to successful project performance.
Had it been the case, a primary emphasis would have been placed on factors identified as
necessary (if not sufficient) conditions for project effectiveness; factors such as the
success rate of past projects or the level of recipient ownership of a development
assistance project or program.
Strikingly, however, from the dummy variable “bankperf50” in the first column
of Table 4, it seems the World Bank allocates 36 percent more funds to new projects
when at least 50 percent of past projects had a successful bank performance compared to
when strictly less than 50 percent of past projects had a successful bank performance. For
all other project performance criteria, except the Implementation Completion Report
quality, “bankperf50” enters positively and significantly at the 10 percent level.
Therefore, it seems the bank performance during past project identification, preparation,
and implementation outweigh past overall project performance or even borrower
performance in decisions regarding new project loan amounts.
Additionally, when the interaction term between outcome and corruption
(“out50_corr”) is introduced in the regression specification (column 2 of Tables F1 to
F4), the estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, implying
that as the corruption index increases (i.e., for less corrupt countries), new projects will
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Each result table includes three specifications: one specification with no interaction terms, another one
with performance interaction terms and the last specification with year interaction terms.
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receive on average 12 to 16 percent more loan amounts when the proportion of successful
past projects is at least 50% compared to a success rate of strictly less than 50 percent
ceteris paribus. The implication of this result is very important: with less corrupt recipient
countries, the World Bank would be more likely to take into consideration the success
rate of past projects in deciding new project loan sizes, thus suggesting the importance of
good governance as a safeguard or counterbalance against “Money-Moving Syndrome”
within a donor agency.108
Finally, when we introduce the interaction term between past project performance
criteria and time, we found that new projects receive on average 63 percent less when the
proportion of successful past projects is at least 50 percent during the 2000s compared to
the early 1990s (column 3 of Table 4); the average percentage becomes 126 percent and
128 percent for the dummy variables “yr2000_imp50” and “yr2000_icrq50” respectively
(column 3 of Table 6 and Table 7). These results suggest that perhaps many years after
the Wapenhans Report, i.e., during the 2000s, the organizational imperatives to survive
and grow may have once again entered into play within the World Bank’s loan approval
process and driven institutional incentives to pursue “move the money” policies.
Hypothesis 2

Recall that hypothesis 2 states that in a money moving environment, the pattern of
lending would be dictated by the aid agency’s organizational imperatives to survive and
grow rather than by recipients’ need and merit (factors making aid loans effective in
alleviating poverty).
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“Successful projects” here encompass projects with good results in all four project performance rating
criteria.
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Concerning recipient need, the results suggest that the World Bank allocates aid
funds according to recipient’s need only to some extent. Indeed, as evidenced by the
coefficient for “Lgdp” (in all three specifications of Table 4 to Table 7), at low values of
the logarithm of GPD per capita, a 1% increase in GDP per capita reduces loan sizes by
around 1%, holding other factors fixed. But at some point, the elasticity of loan with
respect to GDP per capita increases as the logarithm of GPD per capita increases. The
turning point occurs when the GPD per capita is equal to around $552 (constant 2000
US$).109 It turns out that for 1,162 of the 1,977 projects the GPD per capita averages
more than $552, which represents about 59 percent of the sample. Therefore, the
quadratic to the right of $552 (or 6.31 for “Lgdp”) could not be ignored, meaning that
there is an increasing marginal effect of the logarithm of GPD per capita on the logarithm
of net commitments. In other words, the World Bank would give aid loans to the neediest
countries, but at a certain level of GDP per capita, the Bank would lend more to richer
countries.
Furthermore, as expected, the World Bank allocates more aid to larger countries.
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there is not a consensus in the aid
literature regarding the role of population as an indicator of recipient’s need versus its
role as an indicator of donor interest. If it is indeed reasonable to assume that, at the same
level of development, larger poor countries would require more aid than smaller ones, it
is also the case that donors would wish to give more aid to larger and potentially
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The turnaround value of “Lgdp” is calculated using the following equation: Lgdp*= |coefficient on
“Lgdp” divided by twice the coefficient on “lgdp2”|. Lgdp* is therefore equal to 6.31 (|-1.048/(2*0.083|)
and gdp* is equal to $552.
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powerful poor countries in order to increase their influence (Maizels and Nissanke 1984;
Burnside and Dollar 2000).110
Finally, the growth rate of GDP per capita, which is used in the baseline equation
to determine whether slow-growing countries are more likely, ceteris paribus, to attract
more aid loans per capita than fast-growing ones, is negative but very small and
insignificant. Thus, the growth rate of GDP per capita does not seem to affect project
loan sizes.
In regard to recipient’s merit, the results in column 1 of Table 4 to Table 7 show
that the quality of governance, institutional framework and policy environment necessary
for poverty reduction and sustained economic growth are not the driving force behind
decisions regarding loan sizes of development projects and programs. Specifically, the
level of corruption, the quality of bureaucracy, and the inflation rate in recipient countries
are not statistically significant. However, total trade as a percentage of GDP (“openk”) is
positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that more open
countries receive more net commitments per project. Nevertheless, the estimated
coefficient for “openk” is very small and therefore not economically significant.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 states that in a money moving environment, more budget resources
would tend to be allocated in recipient countries where past loan volumes are already
substantial. The estimated coefficient for “Lcumloan,” i.e., the logarithm of the
110

This result remains even after controlling for agreement type, i.e., the type of financing or credit
according to the financing or credit instrument used: here either the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), or the International Development Association (IDA).
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cumulative loan amount of all past projects in a country at the time of approval of a new
project, enters negatively but it is not significant. However, the loan size of the most
recently approved past project does have a positive and significant effect, ceteris paribus,
on the net commitments of a new development project as evidenced by the estimated
coefficient for “Lnetcommit_1”(column 1 of Table 4 to Table 7).111 This indicates that
only the most recently approved projects in a country influence decisions regarding the
net commitments of new development assistance projects. However, this effect is not
substantial.
When the interaction term between the project performance rating criteria and the
lag of net commitments is introduced in the baseline equation, the effect of the lag of the
dependent variable is reinforced. For instance, the estimated coefficient of the interaction
term “Lagcom_out50” enters negatively but significantly at the 1 percent level, implying
that as the loan size of the most recently approved project increases, new projects will
receive on average 14 percent less net commitments when the proportion of successful
past projects is at least 50% compared to a success rate of strictly less than 50 percent,
ceteris paribus (column 2 of Table 4). The same is true for the estimated coefficients of
“Lagcom_imp50” and “Lagcom_icrq50”; they enter negatively but significantly at the 1
percent level (column 2 of Table 6 and Table 7). In other words, aid loans are allocated
where the most recent loan volumes are substantial and where the achievement rate of
past projects is small i.e., where the likelihood of successful outcomes is lower.
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As aforementioned, the dependent variable is from period t + 1 and the lagged dependent variable,
denoted Lnetcommit_1, is therefore from period t.
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Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 states that in a money moving environment, donor agencies would
tend to spend more money on large-scale development interventions which overall
impact on poverty would be difficult to evaluate and quantify; the rationale being that the
more complex it is to evaluate development efforts of a donor agency in a recipient
country, the greater the opportunities for organizational imperatives for survival and
growth to enter into play, and the greater the institutional incentives to “move the
money.” Here, we assume, for instance, that budget supports, structural reforms, or
comprehensive development frameworks (with their numerous economic, political,
institutional and social ramifications) that are financed by development policy lending
would be more complex to evaluate and quantify than straightforward infrastructure
projects financed by investment lending.112
The results in the four tables (Table 4 to Table 7) confirm this hypothesis. The
dummy variable for projects that are difficult to evaluate (“Proj_eval1”) enters positively
and significantly in all three specifications and its effect is substantial. Holding other
factors constant, development projects which overall impact on poverty is difficult to
evaluate and quantify receive on average around 125 percent more net commitments than
projects considered easy to evaluate. On the other hand, projects categorized as
moderately difficult to evaluate, i.e., all types of projects (except infrastructure projects)
financed by investment loans, receive on average around 52 percent less net
commitments than projects in the infrastructure sector also financed by investment loans.
This result may capture the fact that, confronted to a choice between many investment
112

As mentioned above, we assume that it is possible to determine in which category a new development
project will fall even before its design or implementation as long as the type of project, the lending
instrument and the lending instrument type are known.
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loans, World Bank’s employees would tend to favor large and quick-disbursing
infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, ports, irrigation canals, factories, and so on.
As above mentioned, we argued that for projects with wide economic, political,
institutional and social ramifications, it may be extremely complicated to tease out the
influence of the development project itself from the influence of environmental factors
and shocks. Under these murky conditions, a donor agency is provided with opportunities
and incentives to “move the money.” Consequently, we would expect that with projects
that may be considered difficult to evaluate, the performance of past projects would not
be taken into account in decisions regarding net commitments per new project. The
results in the second column of Table 4 to Table 7 do not corroborate our intuition,
however. The positive and significant coefficient on the interaction terms between project
performance rating criteria and project evaluation dummies, like “peval1_out50,”
suggests that Bank’s employees tend to allocate larger loans to projects that may be
considered difficult to evaluate when the likelihood of success is higher.
Finally, the interaction terms between project evaluation dummies and time
dummies reveal that, ceteris paribus, projects considered difficult to evaluate receive on
average about 72 percent less net commitments during the 1980s than projects considered
easy to evaluate during the early 1990s. The reverse is true for the years 2000s compared
to the early 1990s (column 3 of Table 4 to Table 7). These outcomes potentially reflect
the shift in the development discourse in the 1990s when the development assistance field
began to recognize the need for sound institutional and policy environments as factors
conducive to poverty reduction and sustained and equitable growth.
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Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 states that in a money moving environment, an international donor
agency might be subject to end-of-fiscal-year pressures to spend. The end-of-fiscal-year
effect is captured by “Apr_June,” a dummy variable equal to one if a development
project’s loan size is approved in April, May, or June and zero if it is approved in the
remainder of the fiscal year (from July to March); since the World Bank’s fiscal year runs
from July 1 to June 30. The negative and significant coefficient on “Apr_June” (column
1, Table 4 and Table 5) implies that there is no end-of-fiscal-year pressures to spend
within the World Bank; in fact projects approved in April, May, or June receive on
average 9 percent less net commitments than projects approved throughout the remainder
of the fiscal year, for the same level of other factors. This result seems to indicate that the
World Bank operates mostly on the basis of loans mobilized on international capital
markets (not government appropriations) and, is therefore not pressured to commit
resources at the end of the fiscal year.113

Other Control Variables

Among all the region dummies, only Latin America and the Caribbean region
exhibits a positive and significant coefficient; meaning that Latin America and the
Caribbean receive on average more net commitments per new project than Africa,
holding other factors fixed. This effect is robust to all specifications in Table 4 to Table 7.
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Alternatively, we use the dummy variable “June” to capture the end-of-fiscal-year effect. The dummy
variable equals to one if a development project’s loan size is approved in June and zero if it is approved in
any other month during the fiscal year. Table F2 in appendix F presents the results. The estimated
coefficient of “June” is negative and insignificant in all three specifications, which seems to indicate that,
holding everything constant, there is no difference between a World Bank project approved in June and a
World Bank project approved in the remainder of the fiscal year in terms of loan size. In other words, the
end of the fiscal year has no effect on decisions regarding project loan size.

117

When taking onto account year dummies, we notice that net commitments per
new project during the second half on the 1990s were on average about 25 percent less
than net commitments per new project during the early 1990s. The same is true for net
commitments per new project during the 2000s which were on average about 55 percent
lower than during the early 1990s (column1 in Table 4 to Table 7). These results may
indicate that the Wapenhans Report and the subsequent implementation of measures
destined to shift the focus away from lending volumes towards effective implementation
of lending projects have been somewhat successful in dampening the “approval culture”
for loans and the pressure to lend that had affected the World Bank’s project approval
process prior to the report.
As mentioned in the literature review in chapter two, one widespread explanation
of the aid ineffectiveness emphasizes that donor country strategic interests have
frequently dominated recipient countries’ needs and merits as aid allocation criteria
within aid agencies, both bilateral and multilateral. Donor strategic interests generally
include diplomatic interests (e.g., establishing military bases, securing UN votes,
supporting a preferred regime); commercial interests (e.g., “tied” aid, providing exports
subsidies to donor countries firms, focusing on projects with high foreign exchange
components); and cultural interests usually provided to promote a donor’s religion,
language, or values (Lancaster 1999). Although donor countries’ strategic interests
behind aid giving are beyond the scope of this dissertation, it might nevertheless be
important to control for this factor in the loan allocation regression.
To analyze the role played by the largest shareholders, especially the U.S., in
pressuring the World Bank to deviate from its objectives to eliminate poverty and
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promote sustain development, we use U.S. trade statistics as a measure of U.S.
commercial interests; specifically U.S. exports to a specific country in year t as a share of
U.S. exports, in the same year, to all included countries and U.S. imports from a country
as a share of U.S. imports from all included countries (Fleck and Kilby 2005a).114 In this
framework, an allocation of World Bank funds reflecting U.S. commercial interests
would confirm the emphasis of organizational imperatives to survive and grow over aid
effectiveness, and therefore a focus on the volume of aid disbursements rather than on the
impact of aid on development.
From the results presented in Table F3 in appendix F, the estimated coefficients of
U.S. export share and U.S. import share enter with the right sign (respectively positive
and negative) as suggested by the U.S. trade policy which favors exports over imports
(Fleck and Kilby 2005a), but they are statistically insignificant. These results seem to
indicate that project loan size does not reflect U.S. commercial interests.

Discussion

In general, the empirical results presented in the previous section support the
hypothesis that there is a “Money-Moving Syndrome” at work within the World Bank’s
current loan allocation criteria.
The World Bank’s loan allocation criteria suggest that recipient’s need is a
stronger selection criterion than recipient’s merit as measured by the quality of
governance, institutional framework and policy environment. However, even recipient’
need appears not to be a consistent criterion within the Bank. In particular, Bank’s
114

The U.S. trade statistics data come from the 2008 IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
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employees would give aid loans to the neediest countries, but at a certain level of GDP
per capita, Bank’s employees would lend more to richer countries; thus reducing aid
resources available for the poor in the poorest countries. According to the Meltzer
Commission Report (2000), when development assistance is limited to the poorest
countries, “additionality of resource transfer is enhanced.” The report adds that aid
resources available for the poor would increase drastically if the volume of lending to
middle- or high-income countries was reduced and reallocated to the poorest countries. In
other words, the positive incentives to “move the money” would be reduced and aid
effectively targeted to the poor if aid volumes to richer countries that do not need it are
limited.
Furthermore, despite a new development discourse that emerged in the early
1990s and which recognized the need for sound institutions like good governance,
property rights, and democratic accountability; and despite findings by Burnside and
Dollar (2000) suggesting that aid has been ineffective in promoting growth and
stimulating policy reforms except in good policy and institutional environments, it would
appear that the level of corruption alone, the quality of bureaucracy, and the inflation rate
in recipient countries are not the driving forces behind decisions regarding project loan
sizes within the World Bank; thus creating positive incentives to “move the money.”
However, the evidence shows that with less corrupt recipient countries, World Bank’s aid
officials would be more likely to take into consideration the success rate of past projects
in deciding new project loan sizes. This result suggests the importance of good
governance as a safeguard or counterbalance against the “Money-Moving Syndrome”
within a donor agency.
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Additionally, it appears that despite a low performance of foreign aid in some
developing countries, World Bank’s aid officials would continue to provide these
countries with increasing levels of funding. This situation may reflect an “excessive
optimism” about conditions in recipient countries or about the probable returns of new
development assistance projects approved. This result may also reflect the fact that
recipient countries with low performance of foreign would attract more attention from the
World Bank. In any case, the end results are a reinforcement of positive incentives to
“move the money” and a potential inefficiency of aid caused by a misallocation of scare
resources.
Another important issue is the emphasis on recipient countries’ ownership of
development activities and reforms. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness115
recognized that if development assistance was to be linked to an autonomous design and
implementation of national development strategies, it would promote the reduction of
poverty and inequality, increase growth and accelerate the achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals. However, the evidence shows that World Bank’s
officials do not seem to factor in the level of recipient ownership of national development
strategies in decisions regarding new project loan sizes, which may provide further
opportunities for organizational imperatives to grow and thus drive incentives to pursue
“move the money” strategies.
However, it would appear that World Bank’ officials take into account the bank
performance during past project identification, preparation, and implementation.
Unfortunately, if quality at entry and appropriate supervision provided by a donor agency
115

http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 10
February 2008.
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are necessary for the achievement of development objectives, it is not sufficient;
therefore, it may not be efficient to allocate money among development assistance
projects solely on that basis. On the other hand, a positive and statistically significant
estimated coefficient for the bank performance dummy variable across almost all project
performance criteria would provide evidence that World Bank’s lending practices
encourage an internal learning environment in the sense that past knowledge about the
quality of the work done by Bank’s officials in various stages of past projects affects
current decisions regarding loan sizes.
Furthermore, it seems that loan sizes of new development projects in a recipient
country are higher where loan volumes of the most recently approved development
assistance projects are substantial. Although this result may reflect the fact that a group of
loans may respond to a common policy decision, the effect appears to be reinforced when
the achievement rate of past projects is small i.e., where the likelihood of successful
outcomes is lower. Here again, the evidence of a “Money-Moving Syndrome” at work
within the World Bank’s loan allocation criteria is reinforced.
The World Bank’s aid officials also tend to allocate more aid loans to
development projects which overall impact on poverty may be considered difficult to
evaluate and quantify compared to projects considered easy to evaluate. We argue that
this result may strengthen positive incentives to “move the money” on the basis that the
more complex it is to evaluate development efforts of a donor agency in a recipient
country, the more complicated it is to tease out the influence of the development project
itself from the influence of environmental factors and shocks. Therefore, under these
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murky conditions, a donor agency is provided with opportunities and incentives to pursue
“move the money” strategies.
On the other hand, projects categorized as moderately difficult to evaluate, i.e., all
types of projects (except infrastructure projects) financed by investment loans, receive on
average less net commitments than projects in the infrastructure sector also financed by
investment loans. This result may suggest a preference for large and quick-disbursing
infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, ports, irrigation canals, or factories over any
other development projects financed by investment loans; and therefore, it may indicate a
“lending culture” at work within the World Bank’s development practices.
The regional dummy variables seem to indicate that Latin America and the
Caribbean receive on average more net commitments per new project than Africa. This
result confirms the finding that recipient countries’ needs appear not to be a consistent
allocation criterion within the World Bank. Aid would be “moved” in the sense that it is
not predominantly focused on the poorest of developing countries that actually need it.
Finally, as expected, the World Bank appears not to be subject to end-of-fiscalyear pressures to spend, simply because it operates mostly on the basis of loans mobilized
on international capital markets rather than government appropriations like bilateral aid
agencies.
Overall, the empirical results suggest that, within the World Bank, the
quantity of foreign aid committed or disbursed in itself appears as important a mission as
the effectiveness of aid, suggesting that there seems to be a degree of “Money-Moving
Syndrome” in effect within the World Bank’s development activities. In general, World
Bank’s lending practices do not appear to adequately fit the needs and merit of the
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poorest countries; furthermore, World Bank’s lending resources tend to be directed to
countries where the success rate of past projects is small and are therefore more likely to
be wasted, while the proportion of sustainable past projects in a recipient country, or the
proportion of past projects with a substantial institutional development impact, or even
the proportion of past projects judged successful by the Bank’s operational staff do not
seem to affect decisions regarding new project loan sizes in that country. These factors,
among others discussed above, seem to lead to the conclusion that an “approval culture”
undermines the World Bank’s lending portfolio.
However, there is evidence that World Bank’s lending practices encourage an
internal learning environment in the sense that past knowledge about the quality of the
work done by Bank’s officials in various stages of past projects affects current decisions
regarding loan sizes. Additionally, the World Bank appears not to be subject to end-offiscal-year pressures to spend mainly because it operates mostly on the basis of loans
mobilized on international capital markets. These pressures are in fact more likely to be
present within bilateral aid agencies financed through government appropriations.
As emphasized by the review of literature in chapter two, there is good reason to
believe that a high degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” will somewhat lead or
contribute to aid ineffectiveness for the simple reason that, in this context, what matters
the most is the volume of aid disbursed rather than its actual impact on poverty reduction
or economic growth. In this dissertation, we posited that evidence in support of the
“Money-Moving Syndrome” could perhaps be used to provide some evidence as to why
foreign aid has not been more effective at reducing global poverty in developing
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countries despite the large amount of resources involved in achieving this goal over the
years.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In this dissertation we explored the extent of the role played by international donor

agencies’ incentive structures, especially incentives to “move the money” (or the “Money
Moving Syndrome”), as a potential cause of the low performance of foreign aid in
reducing poverty and promoting sustainable economic growth in developing countries.
Theoretically, we developed a simple principal-agent model which examined how
donor agencies’ institutional incentive systems affect the characteristics of an optimal and
efficient incentive contract and thus give rise to the Money Moving Syndrome. Our
model adapts the basic framework developed in Baker (1992) to fit the organizational
settings of international development agencies by introducing the notion of
“organizational imperatives” (such as survival, growth, achieve and/or maintain higher
status or leadership position, promote interests of stakeholders, and so on) as an
additional factor in an aid agency’s total value function (other than its true mission to
maximize poverty reduction and economic growth).
Our main conclusion from the model indicates that as long as concerns about aid
effectiveness are predominant and a high level of accountability is attached to readily
measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries, the
performance measure would elicit an “effective” effort from aid officials, i.e. a level of
effort that would contribute as much as possible to an aid agency’s true mission to reduce
poverty and promote economic growth. Therefore, the quantity of aid disbursed would
factor in aid “quality” (“Quality-Aid Incentive Scheme”).

126

On the other hand, if organizational imperatives outweigh the goal of aid
effectiveness and limited accountability is attached to development activities that do not
discriminate against corrupt countries and are provided in the form of budget support or
program aid more difficult to evaluate, the staff would be given the incentive to direct
each unit of effort and money towards promoting organizational imperatives. Therefore,
the focus would be on the amount of money disbursed (aid “quantity”) rather that the
impact of that amount of aid on development (“Money-Moving Syndrome Incentive
Scheme”). The empirical chapter and the results partially corroborate the model’s
predictions.
Empirically, we investigated the extent to which incentives to “move the money”,
stemming from organizational imperatives, are present within donor agencies and coexist
with genuine concerns about aid effectiveness to shape aid agencies’ decisions regarding
project loan size to developing countries. In our context, we posited that evidence in
support of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” can perhaps be used to provide evidence as to
why foreign aid has not been more effective in reducing global poverty and promoting
economic growth among developing countries. Due to the unavailability of the data on
projects and programs funded by other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, the
empirical analysis focused exclusively on the World Bank-funded project database. In
this context, the World Bank is therefore used as a proxy for the performance of all other
donors in the development field.
We implemented the empirical estimation using the independently pooled
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology. On the one hand, the empirical results
provide evidence that World Bank’s lending practices encourage an internal learning
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environment in the sense that past knowledge about the quality of the work done by
Bank’s officials in various stages of past projects affects current decisions regarding loan
sizes. In addition, the World Bank appears not to be subject to end-of-fiscal-year
pressures to spend mainly because it operates mostly on the basis of loans mobilized on
international capital markets. These pressures are in fact more likely to be present within
bilateral aid agencies financed through government appropriations.
On the other hand, our empirical results revealed that, in general, World Bank’s
lending practices do not appear to adequately fit the needs and merit of the poorest
countries. More important, World Bank’s lending resources tend to be directed to
countries where the success rate of past projects is small and are therefore more likely to
be wasted; while the proportion of sustainable past projects in a recipient country, or the
proportion of past projects with a substantial institutional development impact, or even
the proportion of past projects judged successful by the Bank’s operational staff do not
seem to affect decisions regarding new project loan sizes in that country. These factors
seem to lead to the conclusion that there is a degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” in
effect within the World Bank’s development activities; in other words, the quantity of
foreign aid committed or disbursed in itself appears as important a mission as the
effectiveness of aid.
These results could be translated into the following policy recommendations for
reducing donor agencies’ institutional incentives to “move the money” and improving the
overall performance of foreign aid.
First, in order to get the institutional incentives right, first at the source i.e. at the

stage where the funds originate with donors organizations, and then at the destination, it
appears imperative to establish within aid organizations a system of checks and balances
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that would allow individuals involved in aid to overcome diversionary incentives
hindering their genuine intentions to help the poor. Instituting accountability for
effectiveness seems to be a step in that direction. Several applications of accountability
for effectiveness within bilateral and multilateral aid agencies exist in spite of the fact
that they may be difficult to implement. In particular, one solution to enforce the
accountability for effectiveness within bilateral and multilateral development agencies
would be to allocate a portion of their budget to the creation of a supreme independent
entity, even though this would mean fewer resources available for development activities
(hierarchical accountability). Aid organizations would be accountable to the entity that
would represent only the interests of taxpayers in rich nations providing aid resources and
intended beneficiaries in aid-receiving countries. The entity would restore the “broken
information feedback loop” that exists between the two parties by providing aid
recipients with means to communicate their own needs, to communicate whether those
needs have been met, to question the adequacy of what donor agencies provide them, or
to have a voice in all decisions that affect development strategies, projects, and policies.
The entity would therefore conduct independent evaluations of donor agencies’
performance or institute standard principles and guidelines that must be abided by in
order to conduct project evaluations; for these independent evaluations constitute an
important criterion by which the success of development activities is judged. Overall, the
existence of a supreme independent organization would recreate a political process in
foreign aid similar to the one in modern democracies where taxpayers (voters) are the
same as beneficiaries and could therefore exercise political pressure on public
bureaucracies to improve performance and satisfy their needs. 116
116

It must be clear that the concept of accountability could only be raised in relation with intermediate aid
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However, such an approach would be probably unfeasible in the current
development paradigm. Another more practical approach to institute accountability for
effectiveness within bilateral and multilateral development agencies would be to allocate
a portion of aid resources directly to recipient countries (civil society or ultimate
beneficiaries of aid) so that they could provide an independent feedback to donor
agencies, thus creating a direct communication channel between recipients and aid
agencies (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2005). Providing recipients with financial means to
easily communicate their own needs and whether those needs have been met, or to
question the adequacy of what donor agencies provide them, appears to be one important
and feasible avenue to reduce money moving incentives within aid agencies.
Second, aid selectivity in donor agencies should be strengthened around criteria
such as high levels of poverty, good governance (such as low levels of corruption,
transparency, ownership, and high bureaucracy quality), and sound policies. Allocating
aid based on such criteria would not only reduce positive incentives to “move the money”
within aid agencies by targeting aid resources where they are needed the most and would
likely be more effective, but also would help improve incentives in recipient countries.
Undeniably, enforcing aid selectivity on such a basis would provide developing countries
concerned about poverty reduction with strong incentives to establish a good governance
environment with sound institutions and policies.

agencies that link the taxpayers in rich countries and the intended beneficiaries in poor countries. The
reason being that aid agencies are expected to use aid resources entrusted to them effectively to promote
economic growth and reduce global poverty. Undeniably, in a relationship solely between these ultimate
protagonists of foreign aid (taxpayers and beneficiaries) there is no place for accountability. Taxpayers in
rich countries willingly transfer part of their income to developing countries to alleviate poverty and simply
cannot be held accountable when aid fails to achieve its purpose. Additionally, we should note that
increasing accountability for effectiveness can increase efficiency but can also impose great costs.
Consequently, accountability should only be increased when its benefits outweigh its costs.
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Finally, providing official development assistance in the form of development
interventions where the overall impact on poverty or economic growth is easy to evaluate
and quantify may be another approach to discourage donor agencies’ institutional
incentives to “move the money”. With such projects, it would be possible to tease out the
influence of development projects from the influence of environmental factors and shocks,
disentangle causes and effects, hold the implementing aid agency accountable, learn from
mistakes, and improve the focus on high “quality” aid. However, considering this approach
may lead to an overflow of “hard” infrastructure projects in developing countries, it would be
more beneficial to invest resources in built-in evaluation systems where an evaluation
procedure (e.g. quantifiable performance measurements and clear evaluation criteria) is built
directly into the implementation of a development project or program rather than being
conducted at the end of the development activity.
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APPENDIX A
BEYOND QUANTITATIVE AID: THE QUALITY OF AID

According to the Commitment to Development Index 2006 developed by the
Centre for Global Development (CGD), “quality” aid, among other things, excludes tied
aid, subtracts debt payments by developing countries on aid loans, penalizes donors for
overburdening poor countries with a large variety of small aid projects, and favors poor
and uncorrupt countries.
Figure A below compares donor countries in terms of the quality of aid they
provide to developing countries. In 2006, while Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden scored highest in terms of the amount of quality aid as a share of GNI provided,
the United States and Japan (the largest donors in absolute terms) ranked at or near the
bottom.
Figure A: Quality Aid in 2006 (% of GNI)

Source: Commitment to Development Index 2006, Center for Global Development.

132

APPENDIX B
LITERATURE REVIEW ON PREVIOUS AID ALLOCATION MODELS

Collier and Dollar (2002) developed a poverty-efficient allocation of aid model
based on some findings from the aid effectiveness literature.117 They deduced the
following from their model: aid allocated to developing countries should be an increasing
function of good policy and poverty level in those countries; and the poverty-efficient
equilibrium is determined where the marginal impact of an additional dollar of aid, in
terms of the number of people lifted out of the poverty line per million dollars, is
equalized across aid-receiving countries.118 Their model depends on the important
assumption that donors have no influence in the distribution of income within countries;
in other words, they can reduce poverty only through an increase in aggregate income.
In the Equal Opportunity Model of aid allocation developed by Cogneau and
Naudet (2004), these authors introduced an effort indicator influenced by structural
disadvantages to growth (such as climate, the health of the population, historical
disruptions…) over which each country has little or no control; in that sense, they tried to
control for aid effectiveness differential across countries; aid effectiveness beyond the
control of aid agencies. Their optimal aid allocation gives more to the poorest countries
by equalizing differences in poverty risk by a specific point in time between countries
facing different disadvantages but making the same degree of effort. Their model
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Some studies on aid effectiveness have shown the following results: 1) the impact of aid on growth
depends on the quality of economic policies and institutional environments in developing countries
(Burnside and Dollar 2000); and 2) aid does not systematically induce political or economic reforms
(Alesina and Dollar 2000); for more studies, see (Collier and Dollar 2002).
118

Collier and Dollar (2002) used the headcount Index as a measure of poverty.
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complements the work done by Collier and Dollar (2002) by introducing a notion of
fairness.
A different aid allocation model is the model implicit in the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) which seeks to allocate aid so as to minimize differences
between actual levels of MDG indicators in each country and their target levels. As such,
the MDGs poverty efficient outcome implicitly assumes that the marginal effectiveness
of aid is equal across all countries (McGillivray 2006).
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APPENDIX C
THEORETICAL MODEL-MAXIMIZATION PROBLEMS

In this appendix, we provide the full development of some equations figuring in
the theoretical model.
•

Equation (3.5) in the theoretical model is derived as follows:

The principal’s objective is to maximize expected profits, i.e. the total value net of
compensation payments:
max E[V (e * , ε ) − s − bP(e * , ε )],
b,s

s.t.
_

E[ s + bP(e, ε ) − C (e)] ≥ U

(C.1)

bPe (e * , ε ) = C ' (e * )

(C.2)

The principal sets the fixed payment, s, to bind the agent’s participation constraint.
Substituting s from the participation constraint and equation (C.2) into the principal’s
expected profit gives:
_

max E[V (e * , ε ) − U + bP(e, ε ) − C (e) − bP(e * , ε )],
b

where e * is function of b and ε .
Deriving this last equation with respect to b yields the following:
∂E[π ]
= E[Ve eb* ] + E[ P(e, ε )] − E[ P(e, ε )] − bE[ Pe eb* ] = 0
∂b
or,

∂E[π ]
= E[Ve eb* ] − bE[ Pe eb* ] = 0
∂b

(C.3)

From equation (C.3),
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E[Ve eb* ]
b =
E[ Pe eb* ]
*

(C.4)

Differentiating equation (C.2) with respect to b gives:
Pe
.
C − bPee

eb* =

(C.5)

''

Replacing equation (C.5) into equation (C.4):
⎡ Ve Pe ⎤
Pe
E
]
⎥
⎢ ''
C − bPee ⎦ E[Ve Pe ]
C '' − bPee
⎣
*
b =
=
=
Pe
E[ Pe2 ]
⎡ Pe2 ⎤
E[ Pe ''
] E⎢
⎥
''
C − bPee
⎣ C − bPee ⎦
E[Ve

(C.6)

According to the definitions of variance, covariance and coefficient of correlation,
Cov(Ve , Pe ) = E[Ve .Pe ] − E[Ve ].E[ Pe ]
Var ( Pe ) = E[ Pe2 ] − ( E[ Pe ]) 2

ρV , P =
e

e

(C.7)

Cov(Ve , Pe )
σ Ve .σ Pe

Assuming without loss of generality that E[Ve ] = E[ Pe ] = 1 , combining equations (C.6)
and (C.7) yields the following optimal piece rate:
b* =

•

Cov (Ve , Pe ) + 1 ρσ Ve σ Pe + 1
=
var( Pe ) + 1
σ P2e + 1

Equation (3.11) in the theoretical model is derived as follows:

The principal’s objective is to maximize expected profits, i.e. the total value net of
compensation payments:
max E[W (e * , ε ) − s − bP (e * , ε )],
b,s

subject to the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints given respectively
by equations (C.1) and (C.2).

136

As above, the principal sets the fixed payment (s) to bind the agent’s participation
constraint. After substituting s from the participation constraint and equation (C.2) into
the principal’s expected profit, it becomes:
_

max E[αO(e * , ε ) + (1 − α )V (e * , ε ) − U + bP(e, ε ) − C (e) − bP(e * , ε )], where e * is
b

function of b and ε .
Deriving this last equation with respect to b yields the following:
∂E[π ]
= αE[Oe eb* ] + (1 − α ) E[Ve eb* ] + E[ P(e, ε )] − E[ P(e, ε )] − bE[ Pe eb* ] = 0
∂b
or,

∂E[π ]
= αE[Oe eb* ] + (1 − α ) E[Ve eb* ] − bE[ Pe eb* ] = 0
∂b

(C.8)

From equation (C.8),
b1* =

αE[Oe eb* ] + (1 − α )[Ve eb* ]

(C.9)

E[ Pe eb* ]

Replacing equation (C.5) into equation (C.9):

αE[Oe
b1* =

Or

b1* =

⎡ VP ⎤
⎡ OP ⎤
Pe
P
] + (1 − α ) E[Ve '' e
] αE ⎢ '' e e ⎥ + (1 − α ) E ⎢ '' e e ⎥
C − bPee
C − bPee
⎣ C − bPee ⎦
⎣ C − bPee ⎦
=
P
⎡ P2 ⎤
E[ Pe '' e
]
E ⎢ '' e
⎥
C − bPee
⎣ C − bPee ⎦
''

αE[Oe Pe ] + (1 − α ) E[Ve Pe ]

(C.10)

E[ Pe2 ]

According to the definitions of variance, covariance and coefficient of correlation
presented in line (C.7), equation (C.10) changes as follows:
b1* =

α (cov(Oe , Pe ) + E[Oe ].E[ Pe ]) + (1 − α )(cov(Ve , Pe ) + E[Ve ].E[ Pe ])
var( Pe ) + ( E[ Pe ]) 2

or
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,

b1* =

α (ρ1 .σ O .σ P + E[Oe ].E[ Pe ]) + (1 − α )(ρ 2 .σ V .σ P + E[Ve ].E[ Pe ])
e

e

e

e

σ P2 + ( E[ Pe ]) 2

,

e

(C.11)
where E[ Pe (e, ε )] = γE[Ve (e, ε )] + (1 − γ ) E[Oe (e, ε )], γ =

θ
c+m

, and ρ1 is the coefficient

of correlation between Oe and Pe , and ρ 2 is the coefficient of correlation between Pe
and Ve .
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APPENDIX D
DATA APPENDIX

Table D1. Variable Names
variable name
country
year
netcommit
Lnetcommit
Lnetcommit_1
approvdate
deactdate
exit_fy
evaldate
p_id
totproj
tproj
region
sector
network
instr
evaltype
instrtype
agreetype
corrupt
bureau
openk
gdp
Lgdp
ggdp_cap
infl
Lpop
count
Lcumloan
outcome50 (b)
sustain50
impact50
bankperf50
borrperf50
icrq50

variable label
Country
Approval Fiscal Year119
Net Commitments (Millions of US Dollars)
Logarithm Net Commitments
Logarithm Net Commitments Lagged
Approval Date
Deactivation Date
Exit Fiscal Year
Evaluation Date
Project ID
Total # of Projects Approved per FY/Country
Total # of Projects Approved in each Country
Region
Sector
Network
Lending Instrument
Evaluation Type
Lending Instrument Type
Agreement Type
Corruption
Bureaucracy Quality
Openness
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
Logarithm GDP per capita
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Total Population (logarithm)
Number of HC (a )
Cumulative Loan Amount of All Past Projects At the Approval Time (log)
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC were successful
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC were likely sustainable
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC had a Substantial or Modest
Impact
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC had a successful Bank
Performance
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC had a successful Borrower
Performance
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC were judged successful by the

119

The World Bank’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30. For example, fiscal year 2003 covers the
period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003.
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BOS(c)
half_date
Time By which Projects are Halfway Completed
Measure Constructed to Reflect Degree of Difficulty to Evaluate Project
projeval
Performance
proj_eval1
Equal to 1 if Sector Projects Difficult to Evaluate
proj_eval2
Equal to 1 if Sector Projects Moderately Difficult to Evaluate
proj_eval3
Equal to 1 if Sector Projects Easy to Evaluate (base)
Apr_June
Equal to 1 if Approval Month is April, May or June
reg1
region==Africa (base)
reg2
region==E&S Asia
reg3
region==Europe, Middle East and North Africa
reg4
region==Latin America and the Caribbean
sect1
sector==Eco. Mngt
sect2
sector==Env&Soc
sect3
sector==Finance
sect4
sector==Human
sect5
sector==Infrastructure (base)
sect6
sector==Private
yr80s
Dummy equal to one if 1980s
yr90_94
Dummy equal to one if 1990 to 1994
yr95_99
Dummy equal to one if 1995 to 1999
yr2000s
Dummy equal to one if 2000s
Note: (a) "HC" means "Past Projects Halfway completed or Completed by the Approval Time of a New
Project". (b) More precisely, outcome50 equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC were successful. Equal to 0
otherwise, meaning that either there are no HC (i.e. count=0) or strictly less than 50% of HC were
successful. (c) BOS = World Bank Operational Staff.
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Table D2. Descriptive Statistics: All Sample
Variable
country
year
netcommit
approvdate
deactdate
exit_fy
evaldate
region
sector
network
instr
instrtype
agreetype
evaltype
outcome50
sustain50
impact50
bankperf50
borrperf50
icrq50
p_id
totproj
count
cum_loan_amt
projeval
Apr_June
corrupt
bureau
openk
gdp_cap
ggdp_cap
infl
pop

Obs
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1581
1581
1906
1941
1934
1818
1951

Mean
63.94588
1994.957
74.02852
12817.04
36980.73
2001.079
37315.47
2.411735
3.514922
3.24785
11.11482
1.866464
1.488113
1.114315
0.5665149
0.4066768
0.6302479
0.5943349
0.5432473
0.6545271
16.19423
3.143652
7.925645
1316.079
2.167931
0.430956
2.909604
1.88707
62.04777
1526.918
2.592812
50.38546
1.42E+08

Std. Dev.
37.54392
4.244748
126.3778
1539.58
1107.845
3.093327
1074.931
1.110506
1.553012
1.467349
2.916425
0.3402388
0.5030125
0.3182735
0.4956814
0.4913379
0.4828596
0.4911445
0.4982522
0.4756425
18.6411
2.662835
12.51287
2590.611
0.6379714
0.4953353
0.9128316
0.8857682
38.35935
1854.101
6.837837
257.8053
3.18E+08
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Min
1
1984
0.1332412
8931
34150
1993
35468
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
7.974345
74.74135
-46.99654
-12.86966
41800

Max
134
2006
2525.25
16692
39156
2007
39262
4
6
6
15
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
109
16
90
16104.58
3
1
5
4
384.6969
15815.79
89.41008
4734.915
1.26E+09

Table D3. Variable Definitions and Data Source
Variable

Definitions and Data Source

Net Commitment
Amount

The Net Commitment Amount is calculated as total commitments net of
cancellations for all projects in the Work Bank portfolio.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
A measure of the extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. Six-point rating scale:
highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately
unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
A measure reflecting the resiliency to risks of a project as measured by the
likelihood that its estimated net benefits will be maintained or exceeded over the
project's intended useful life. Five-point rating scale: highly likely, likely,
uncertain, unlikely, and highly unlikely.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
A measure of the extent to which a project improves the ability of a country to
use its human, financial, and natural resources efficiently, equitably, and in a
sustainable manner. Four-point rating scale: high, substantial, modest, and
negligible.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
A measure of the extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality
at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision. Six-point
rating scale from highly satisfactory to highly unsatisfactory, where “highly
satisfactory” means that the Bank performance was rated highly satisfactory on
both dimensions.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
A measure of the extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and
responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied
with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development
objectives and sustainability. Six-point rating scale from highly satisfactory to
highly unsatisfactory.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
Project performance rating attributed by the operational staff of the Bank itself
but not by the IEG; in that regard, it is a self-evaluation. It assesses (a) the degree
to which the project achieved its development objective and outputs as set out in
the project documents; (b) other significant outcomes and impacts; (c) prospects
for the project’s sustainability; and (d) Bank and borrower performance,
including compliance with relevant Bank safeguard and business policies. Threepoint rating scale: exemplary, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
The administrative regions correspond to the major operational divisions of the
World Bank: Africa; Asia; Europe, Middle East and North Africa; and Latin
America and Caribbean
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
Sectors are economic, political or sociological subdivisions within society. They
reflect the type of project. There are 17 sectors represented in the World Bank
Project Portfolio. E.g. Agriculture, Health, Education, Transport, Water Supply
and Sanitation, and Energy and Mining.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank

Overall Project
Outcome

Project Sustainability

Project Institutional
Development Impact

Bank Performance

Borrower Performance

Implementation
Completion Report or
ICR quality

Region

Sectors
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Variable

Network

Type of Lending
Instruments

Agreement Type

Board Approval Date

Deactivation Date or
Closing Date

GDP per capita

GDP per capita
Growth

Inflation

Openness

Corruption Index

Definitions and Data Source
The World Bank’s portfolio is also distributed by networks. There are six
networks ranging from Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
Network (ESSD) to Private Sector Development Network (PSDN).
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
Investment Lending provides long-term financing for a variety of activities in
various sectors aimed at building the physical and social infrastructure necessary
for development. Adjustment Lending provides quick-disbursing financing to
support policy and institutional reforms in developing countries.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
The type of financing or credit according to the financing or credit instrument
used: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the
International Development Association (IDA), and the Special Fund (SPF).
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
The date that the Board of Directors voted to approve the loan or credit.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank Website: Projects &
Operations, Help/FAQs
The date all financial activities related to the project stopped. In many cases,
financial activities (e.g. closing the books) will continue after actual field
activities have ceased.
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank Website: Projects &
Operations, Help/FAQs
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant U.S.
dollars.
Source: World Development Indicators (2006), World Bank
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local
currency. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear
population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and
degradation of natural resources.
Source: World Development Indicators (2006), World Bank
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods
and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.
The Laspeyres formula is generally used.
Source: World Development Indicators (2006), World Bank
Exports plus Imports divided by the RGDPL or Real GDP per capita (Laspeyres).
It is the total trade as a percentage of GDP. The RGDPL is obtained by adding up
consumption, investment, government and exports, and subtracting imports in
any given year. It is a fixed base index where the reference year is 1996, hence
the designation "L" for Laspeyeres.
Source: Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006)
It captures the likelihood that capture the likelihood that high government
officials will demand special payments and bribes, and the extent to which illegal
payments are expected throughout lower levels of government. The corruption
index takes on values between zero (most corrupt) and six (least corrupt).
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group

143

Bureaucracy Quality

It is a measure of the quality of a country's bureaucracy on a 4 point scale. It is a
shock absorber that tends to minimize policy variations when governments
change. A high quality bureaucracy (high score) has the strength and expertise to
govern without drastic changes in policies or interruptions in government
services. Countries with poor bureaucracies receive low points because a change
in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-today administrative functions.
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group
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Table D4. Loan Size and Performance by Region
IEG Outcome
Region
Africa

E&S Asia

Europe, Middle East
and North Africa

Outcome by
Number (%suc)

successful
40.526971
49.727427
333
116.42653
164.60493
396

unsuccessful
30.142516
36.725063
211
83.088866
78.532262
114

Total
36.499177
45.37823
544
108.97458
150.29587
510

77.65

56.051398
76.049865
391

56.490136
86.279512
97

56.138606
78.096591
488

80.12

61.21

Latin America and
the Caribbean

101.15312
95.559546
100.06012
139.39979
295.78958
180.45831
350
85
435 80.46
Total
79.537467
58.055831
74.028519
122.3375
136.29554
126.37781
1470
507
1977 74.36
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Net Commitments (Millions of Dlrs)

Table D5. Loan Size and Performance by Sector
IEG Outcome
Sector
Eco. Mngt

Env&Soc

Finance

Human

Infrastructure

Private

successful
99.792263
186.08838
203
56.432809
67.280901
299
157.53541
257.70171
83
66.197872
91.262458
365
84.044846
90.201838
459
65.157223
100.26779
61

unsuccessful
98.016032
313.71103
67
41.036762
55.846596
124
96.724817
205.06518
24
40.769037
53.771783
107
70.133236
80.396672
147
20.668555
22.069688
38

Total
99.351494
223.94369
270
51.919547
64.458306
423
143.89565
247.28083
107
60.433284
84.858937
472
80.670248
88.061733
606
48.080765
82.535187
99
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Outcome by Number
(%suc)

75.19

70.69

77.57

77.33

75.74

61.62

Total

79.537467
58.055831 74.028519
122.3375
136.29554 126.37781
1470
507
1977
74.36
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Net Commitments (Millions of Dlrs)

Table D6. Loan Size and Performance by Approval Month
IEG Outcome
Approval
Month
0

Outcome by
successful
unsuccessful
Total
Number (%suc)
79.671605
59.245672 74.769381
134.51098
164.83653 142.56868
855
270
1125
76
1
79.350981
56.700315 73.050268
103.15939
94.102745 101.17831
615
237
852
72.1831
Total
79.537467
58.055831 74.028519
122.3375
136.29554 126.37781
1470
507
1977
74.35508
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Net Commitments (Millions of Dlrs)
Note: Equal to 1 if Approval Month is April, May or June

Table D7. Loan Size and Performance by Evaluation
IEG Outcome
Outcome by
successful
unsuccessful
Total
Number (%suc)
179.82335
154.60088
174.75974
238.66986
367.88969
268.97261
211
53
264
79.92
2
51.576388
35.804017
47.227337
67.77332
49.483375
63.630732
809
308
1117
72.43
3
82.782338
69.950838
79.639051
88.953374
80.642899
87.100141
450
146
596
75.50
Total
79.537467
58.055831
74.028519
122.3375
136.29554
126.37781
1470
507
1977
74.36
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Net Commitments (Millions of Dlrs)
Note: projeval is the Measure constructed to reflect the degree of difficulty to evaluate project performance
1=Sector Projects Difficult to Evaluate; 2= Sector Projects Moderately Difficult to Evaluate; 3= Sector
Projects Easy to Evaluate
projeval
1
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Table D8. Countries Included in the Dataset (by Regions)
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa
Country
Freq.
Percent
Angola
7
1.29
Benin
14
2.57
Botswana
1
0.18
Burkina Faso
19
3.49
Burundi
15
2.76
Cameroon
12
2.21
Cape Verde
9
1.65
Central African Republic
11
2.02
Chad
16
2.94
Comoros
8
1.47
Congo, Democratic Republic of
3
0.55
Cote d'Ivoire
16
2.94
Equatorial Guinea
2
0.37
Eritrea
5
0.92
Ethiopia
18
3.31
Gabon
4
0.74
Gambia, The
9
1.65
Ghana
32
5.88
Guinea
17
3.13
Guinea-Bissau
8
1.47
Kenya
21
3.86
Lesotho
8
1.47
Madagascar
23
4.23
Malawi
17
3.13
Mali
22
4.04
Mauritania
19
3.49
Mauritius
9
1.65
Mozambique
14
2.57
Niger
10
1.84
Nigeria
24
4.41
Rwanda
13
2.39
Sao Tome and Principe
7
1.29
Senegal
24
4.41
Sierra Leone
12
2.21
Sudan
1
0.18
Swaziland
1
0.18
Tanzania
30
5.51
Togo
15
2.76
Uganda
22
4.04
Zambia
19
3.49
Zimbabwe
7
1.29
Total
544
100
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Cum.
1.29
3.86
4.04
7.54
10.29
12.5
14.15
16.18
19.12
20.59
21.14
24.08
24.45
25.37
28.68
29.41
31.07
36.95
40.07
41.54
45.4
46.87
51.1
54.23
58.27
61.76
63.42
65.99
67.83
72.24
74.63
75.92
80.33
82.54
82.72
82.9
88.42
91.18
95.22
98.71
100

Region: East and South Asia
Country
Freq.
Percent
Afghanistan
1
0.2
Bangladesh
24
4.71
Bhutan
2
0.39
Cambodia
6
1.18
China
109
21.37
Fiji
3
0.59
India
91
17.84
Indonesia
64
12.55
Korea, Republic of
18
3.53
Lao People's Democratic Republic
13
2.55
Malaysia
9
1.76
Maldives
1
0.2
Mongolia
5
0.98
Nepal
19
3.73
Pakistan
48
9.41
Papua New Guinea
7
1.37
Philippines
30
5.88
Samoa
3
0.59
Solomon Islands
2
0.39
Sri Lanka
22
4.31
Thailand
19
3.73
Tonga
1
0.2
Vanuatu
2
0.39
Vietnam
11
2.16
Total
510
100

Cum.
0.2
4.9
5.29
6.47
27.84
28.43
46.27
58.82
62.35
64.9
66.67
66.86
67.84
71.57
80.98
82.35
88.24
88.82
89.22
93.53
97.25
97.45
97.84
100

Region: Europe, Middle East and North Africa
Country
Freq. Percent
Albania
31
6.35
Algeria
24
4.92
Armenia
13
2.66
Azerbaijan
7
1.43
Belarus
3
0.61
Bosnia and Herzegovina
24
4.92
Bulgaria
13
2.66
Croatia
8
1.64
Cyprus
5
1.02
Czech Republic
2
0.41
Djibouti
6
1.23
Egypt, Arab Republic of
15
3.07
Estonia
4
0.82
Georgia
11
2.25
Hungary
16
3.28
Iran, Islamic Republic of
3
0.61
Jordan
12
2.46
Kazakhstan
10
2.05
Kyrgyz Republic
15
3.07
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Cum.
6.35
11.27
13.93
15.37
15.98
20.9
23.57
25.2
26.23
26.64
27.87
30.94
31.76
34.02
37.3
37.91
40.37
42.42
45.49

Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of
Moldova
Morocco
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Serbia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Tajikistan
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Yemen, Republic of
Total

11
7
9
15
9
41
27
1
16
19
6
2
4
12
20
24
3
11
6
23
488

2.25
1.43
1.84
3.07
1.84
8.4
5.53
0.2
3.28
3.89
1.23
0.41
0.82
2.46
4.1
4.92
0.61
2.25
1.23
4.71
100

Region: Latin America and the Caribbean
Country
Freq.
Percent
Argentina
41
9.43
Bahamas, The
1
0.23
Barbados
2
0.46
Belize
6
1.38
Bolivia
27
6.21
Brazil
71
16.32
Chile
17
3.91
Colombia
33
7.59
Costa Rica
5
1.15
Dominica
5
1.15
Dominican Republic
11
2.53
Ecuador
22
5.06
El Salvador
9
2.07
Grenada
3
0.69
Guatemala
9
2.07
Guyana
9
2.07
Haiti
10
2.3
Honduras
8
1.84
Jamaica
15
3.45
Mexico
43
9.89
Nicaragua
15
3.45
Panama
7
1.61
Paraguay
8
1.84
Peru
18
4.14
St. Kitts and Nevis
3
0.69
St. Lucia
3
0.69
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47.75
49.18
51.02
54.1
55.94
64.34
69.88
70.08
73.36
77.25
78.48
78.89
79.71
82.17
86.27
91.19
91.8
94.06
95.29
100

Cum.
9.43
9.66
10.11
11.49
17.7
34.02
37.93
45.52
46.67
47.82
50.34
55.4
57.47
58.16
60.23
62.3
64.6
66.44
69.89
79.77
83.22
84.83
86.67
90.8
91.49
92.18

St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de
Total

3
3
12
16
435

0.69
0.69
2.76
3.68
100
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92.87
93.56
96.32
100

APPENDIX E
THE WORLD BANK PROJECT CYCLE

Source: the World Bank (http://go.worldbank.org/GI967K75D0), accessed 10 September 2007.
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APPENDIX F
LOAN ALLOCATION CRITERIA: OTHER EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table F1. Determinants of Project Loan Size with Overall Project Outcome and Sector
Dummy
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a

Variable
Lnetcommit_1
corrupt
bureau
openk
infl
Lgdp
Lgdp2
ggdp_cap
Lpop
Lcumloan
outcome50
bankperf50
borrperf50
reg2
reg3
reg4
yr80s
yr95_99
yr2000s
sect1
sect2

(1)
No Interactions
0.076**
(0.032)
-0.020
(0.039)
0.017
(0.041)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.308***
(0.431)
0.101***
(0.030)
-0.001
(0.007)
0.385***
(0.046)
-0.042
(0.044)
-0.297**
(0.144)
0.314**
(0.141)
0.081
(0.132)
-0.023
(0.132)
0.157
(0.141)
0.306**
(0.150)
0.038
(0.097)
-0.207***
(0.071)
0.083
(0.146)
-0.201
(0.128)
-0.601***

Specifications
(2)
Performance Interactions
0.162***
(0.049)
-0.083
(0.053)
0.028
(0.041)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.309***
(0.433)
0.101***
(0.030)
0.000
(0.007)
0.382***
(0.045)
-0.039
(0.044)
-0.291
(0.349)
0.286**
(0.143)
0.098
(0.132)
-0.030
(0.131)
0.149
(0.142)
0.287*
(0.149)
-0.060
(0.095)
-0.203***
(0.072)
0.050
(0.148)
-0.637***
(0.228)
-0.513***
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(3)
Year Interactions
0.067**
(0.032)
-0.022
(0.038)
0.013
(0.041)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.309***
(0.420)
0.102***
(0.029)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.384***
(0.043)
-0.033
(0.042)
-0.238
(0.154)
0.261*
(0.141)
0.100
(0.130)
-0.024
(0.132)
0.195
(0.143)
0.322**
(0.151)
0.111
(0.132)
-0.187
(0.133)
-0.366
(0.468)
-0.821***
(0.201)
-0.472***

sect3
sect4
sect6
Apr_June

(0.074)
0.184
(0.163)
-0.229***
(0.069)
-0.544***
(0.169)
-0.037
(0.059)

(0.098)
-0.207
(0.241)
-0.318***
(0.087)
-0.548***
(0.191)
-0.031
(0.059)
-0.121**
(0.055)
0.632**
(0.271)
-0.116
(0.142)
0.561*
(0.313)
0.169
(0.130)
0.045
(0.317)
0.111
(0.070)

Lagcom_out50
sect1_out50
sect2_out50
sect3_out50
sect4_out50
sect6_out50
out50_corr
yr80_out50

(0.105)
0.017
(0.241)
-0.259***
(0.088)
-0.506**
(0.219)
-0.031
(0.057)

0.000
(0.000)
-0.028
(0.134)
-0.405
(0.425)
-0.674
(0.715)
0.382
(0.274)
1.886***
(0.366)
-0.060
(0.175)
-0.258
(0.158)
0.071
(0.412)
-0.046
(0.318)
0.022
(0.373)
1.245***
(0.449)
-0.370**
(0.169)
0.042
(0.141)
0.677*
(0.362)
-0.413
(0.509)
0.128

yr9599_out50
yr2000_out50
yr80_sect1
yr9599_sect1
yr2000_sect1
yr80_sect2
yr9599_sect2
yr2000_sect2
yr80_sect3
yr9599_sect3
yr2000_sect3
yr80_sect4
yr9599_sect4
yr2000_sect4
yr80_sect6
yr9599_sect6
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yr2000_sect6
Constant

1.166
(1.555)
Observations
1383
R-squared
0.31
a
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.144
(1.588)
1383
0.32
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(0.292)
-0.466
(1.049)
1.137
(1.545)
1383
0.34

Table F2. Determinants of Project Loan Size with Overall Project Outcome and June
Dummy
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a

Variable
Lnetcommit_1
corrupt
bureau
openk
infl
Lgdp
Lgdp2
ggdp_cap
Lpop
Lcumloan
outcome50
bankperf50
borrperf50
reg2
reg3
reg4
yr80s
yr95_99
yr2000s
proj_eval1

proj_eval2
June

(1)
No Interactions
0.059**
(0.030)
0.046
(0.036)
0.009
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.059***
(0.382)
0.083***
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.388***
(0.040)
-0.051
(0.039)
-0.302**
(0.124)
0.358***
(0.128)
0.001
(0.118)
0.100
(0.120)
0.178
(0.122)
0.330**
(0.132)
-0.012
(0.092)
-0.246***
(0.068)
-0.545***
(0.136)
1.250***
(0.101)

Specifications
(2)
Performance Interactions
0.160***
(0.046)
-0.053
(0.050)
0.023
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.057***
(0.382)
0.084***
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.385***
(0.040)
-0.051
(0.039)
-0.315
(0.318)
0.337***
(0.127)
0.012
(0.119)
0.091
(0.119)
0.150
(0.123)
0.288**
(0.131)
-0.070
(0.090)
-0.236***
(0.068)
-0.555***
(0.138)
0.942***
(0.168)

-0.521***
(0.057)
-0.040
(0.064)

-0.518***
(0.077)
-0.035
(0.064)
-0.144***
(0.052)
0.427**

Lagcom_out50
peval1_out50
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(3)
Year Interactions
0.051*
(0.030)
0.045
(0.036)
0.005
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.995***
(0.374)
0.079***
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.382***
(0.040)
-0.045
(0.038)
-0.193
(0.135)
0.312**
(0.126)
0.012
(0.118)
0.094
(0.120)
0.187
(0.123)
0.322**
(0.133)
0.109
(0.132)
-0.095
(0.128)
-0.370
(0.371)
0.807***
(0.168)
-0.451***
(0.081)
-0.032
(0.063)

(0.197)
0.031
(0.111)
0.165***
(0.063)

peval2_out50
out50_corr
yr80_out50
yr9599_out50
yr2000_out50
yr80_peval1
yr9599_peval1
yr2000_peval1
yr80_peval2
yr9599_peval2
yr2000_peval2
Constant

0.217
(1.375)
Observations
1383
R-squared
0.43
a
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.213
(1.401)
1383
0.44

156

0.000
(0.000)
-0.135
(0.127)
-0.638**
(0.278)
-0.755***
(0.209)
0.265
(0.207)
1.025***
(0.338)
-0.152
(0.150)
-0.122
(0.122)
0.148
(0.364)
0.046
(1.354)
1383
0.44

Table F3. Determinants of Project Loan Size with Overall Project Outcome and Share
of U.S. Trade
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a

Variable
Lnetcommit_1
corrupt
bureau
openk
infl
Lgdp
Lgdp2
ggdp_cap
Lpop
shareexp
shareimp
Lcumloan
outcome50
bankperf50
borrperf50
reg2
reg3
reg4
yr80s
yr95_99
yr2000s
proj_eval1
proj_eval2
Apr_June

(1)
No Interactions
0.055*
(0.029)
0.055
(0.036)
0.004
(0.037)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.066***
(0.392)
0.084***
(0.027)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.393***
(0.044)
2.845
(8.554)
-2.871
(6.795)
-0.051
(0.039)
-0.304**
(0.123)
0.361***
(0.127)
0.010
(0.118)
0.096
(0.120)
0.169
(0.122)
0.299**
(0.132)
0.005
(0.093)
-0.242***
(0.067)
-0.511***
(0.134)
1.232***
(0.101)
-0.520***
(0.058)
-0.095*
(0.053)

Specifications
(2)
Performance Interactions
0.163***
(0.047)
-0.051
(0.050)
0.023
(0.037)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-1.099***
(0.392)
0.087***
(0.027)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.380***
(0.044)
1.221
(8.490)
-0.085
(6.879)
-0.052
(0.038)
-0.300
(0.319)
0.339***
(0.126)
0.017
(0.118)
0.095
(0.118)
0.153
(0.123)
0.262**
(0.131)
-0.053
(0.091)
-0.232***
(0.067)
-0.517***
(0.135)
0.938***
(0.168)
-0.519***
(0.077)
-0.090*
(0.053)
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(3)
Year Interactions
0.047
(0.030)
0.054
(0.036)
0.001
(0.036)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.998***
(0.385)
0.080***
(0.027)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.388***
(0.044)
3.089
(8.414)
-3.246
(6.761)
-0.046
(0.038)
-0.201
(0.135)
0.317**
(0.125)
0.020
(0.118)
0.089
(0.120)
0.177
(0.124)
0.292**
(0.132)
0.122
(0.133)
-0.096
(0.128)
-0.410
(0.370)
0.820***
(0.171)
-0.455***
(0.081)
-0.088*
(0.052)

Lagcom_out50

-0.155***
(0.051)
0.415**
(0.197)
0.039
(0.112)
0.172***
(0.063)

peval1_out50
peval2_out50
out50_corr
yr80_out50
yr9599_out50
yr2000_out50
yr80_peval1
yr9599_peval1
yr2000_peval1
yr80_peval2
yr9599_peval2
yr2000_peval2
Constant

0.193
(1.436)
Observations
1380
R-squared
0.43
a
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.454
(1.453)
1380
0.44
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0.000
(0.000)
-0.128
(0.127)
-0.586**
(0.277)
-0.764***
(0.211)
0.247
(0.211)
1.006***
(0.339)
-0.148
(0.151)
-0.120
(0.122)
0.203
(0.361)
-0.013
(1.417)
1380
0.44
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